Dist. 31, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/31/q/bon-sent-II-d31-a1-q1
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### ARTICLE I.
### *Whether original sin is transmitted by means of the sensible portion.*

### QUESTION I.
### *Whether the sensible soul in humans is from the begetter.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether the sensible soul in humans is from the begetter. And that it is from the begetter, it seems:

1. *First*, by the word of the Philosopher in the second [book] of *On the Soul*, where he says that « the first change of the sensitive [soul] is from the begetter »; but the first change of the sensitive [soul] is that which is toward being: therefore it seems that the sensitive part in us is brought into being by the begetter.

2. Likewise, in the sixteenth [book] of *On Animals*: « The intellect alone enters from without »: therefore the intellect alone enters by creation: therefore it seems that the sensitive soul in us is educed from the principles of matter and by generation.

3. Likewise, just as the operation of the sensitive soul in brutes depends on the body, so also in humans — whence just as a brute is hindered from the operation of seeing when the organ is injured, so also is a human — but what is similarly disposed toward operation, is similarly disposed toward generation: therefore if in brutes the sensible soul is not by creation, but by generation, as is commonly held, and as was shown above in the fifteenth distinction; it seems that in a human it is likewise by generation.

4. Likewise, just as in the generation of brutes « the animal is prior to the horse », so also in the generation of a human « the animal is prior to the human »: therefore it has the operation and perfection of the sensitive part prior to having the perfection of the intellective. And a sign of this is that the embryo is first nourished and senses before it is perfected by the rational soul. Therefore it seems that before the production of the rational [soul] the sensible [soul] is educed in us; but this is not by creation: therefore by generation.

5. Likewise, the sensitive soul is in the potency of matter, otherwise it could never be produced into being by a natural agent in those things which are generated by putrefaction. If therefore the generative power in a human is equally potent or more potent than it is in a brute; and a brute can by its generative power produce a sensitive soul into being: much more, therefore, does this seem [to hold] in a human.

6. Likewise, if in us the sensitive [soul] is by creation, in brutes by generation: therefore it does not seem that it is in us or in them univocally; and if so, "animal" will be said equivocally of an ass and of a human. But if this is unfitting, it remains that, if in brutes it is by generation, it is likewise in a human.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine in the book *On the Spirit and the Soul*: « When the soul departs from the body, it draws with itself sense and imagination and reason and intellect »; but nothing which is separated from the body is by generation; but the sensible [soul] in a human is of this kind: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, in the book *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas*: « The souls of animals are not substances, but are born together with the flesh by the very vivacity of the flesh and are ended with the death of the flesh », « but the human soul does not die with the flesh, because neither is it sown with the flesh ».

3. Likewise, the Philosopher in the second [book] of *On the Soul* says that « the sensitive is in the intellective, as the tetragon in the pentagon; and the vegetative in the sensitive, as the trigon in the tetragon ». If therefore the tetragon is from the same principle from which the pentagon also is; the sensitive and intellective soul will be from the same [principle]; but the intellective is not from the begetter, as was shown above: therefore neither is the sensitive.

4. Likewise, whatever things are the same in substance are educed into being from the same principle; but the sensitive and intellective soul in the same human are the same in substance, because of one perfectible thing there is one perfection: therefore if the rational [soul] is not by generation, it seems that neither is the sensible.

5. Likewise, those things which are corrupted together are also produced together: therefore by parity of reason, those things which are separated together are also infused together. But when the rational soul withdraws, the power of sensing in no way remains in the body: therefore just as the power of sensing is lost at the departure of the soul, so it is infused at its arrival; it is not, therefore, from generation, but from creation.

6. Likewise, when the operation of sense is intensified, the operation of the intellect is diminished, and conversely, as is clear from experience: therefore it is necessary that sense and intellect are either one power, or powers of the same substance. But whichever of these it is, they must be educed into being in the same manner: since therefore the rational [soul] is not from transmission, it seems that neither is the sensible portion in a human. But if you say that one draws back the other on account of the order and union in one perfectible thing, not in one substance of the soul; it is objected against this: that the rational soul either can sense, or cannot. If it cannot: then it seems that it cannot vivify the body. But if it can sense; it remains that these powers are founded in the same substance. If you say to this, that there is a twofold sensitive [soul] in us: one from the begetter, and this is corrupted; another from the Creator, and this is separated together with the soul; it is objected against this: that nature does not do through many what it can do through fewer. If therefore that sensitive [soul] which is from the begetter suffices in brutes for sensing, much more does that which is from the Creator suffice for a human: therefore one must not posit another sensitive [soul] which is from the begetter. But if you say that it is in it not for sensing, but for disposing the body for the reception of the rational [soul]; this does not seem to suffice, because, if such a soul is a substance equally complete in a human as in brutes, and in brutes it does not lack sensitive operation, it seems therefore that neither [does it lack it] in a human. Either, therefore, we must posit in us a twofold act of sensing at one and the same time, or we must posit that the sensitive [soul] is in us from creation. But the first is manifestly false: it remains, therefore, that the latter is true.

### Conclusion.

> The sensitive soul in a human does not have being by generation, but by creation.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this there is a threefold mode of speaking. For certain heretics thought one way here, the philosophers seem to have thought another way, the Catholic doctors think another way.

For certain heretics thought that there are diverse souls in us, such that one is from the good God, and the other from an evil God; and from this, they said, there comes about in us the conflict and rebellion of appetites, such that the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh, because one of those souls, namely that which is from the good God, cannot do evil, but the other, namely that which is from the evil God, cannot do good. — Augustine, in the book *On the Two Souls*, reproves this mode of speaking as heretical, showing that this position implies in itself two contradictories, since it posits that there is such a rebellion in a human, and posits together with this that a human can sin and a human can repent. This position would also be easy to disprove by the way of philosophy: because in one perfectible thing there must be one perfection; and since a human is one something by essence, it is impossible to be produced into being from altogether diverse principles: if therefore the rational soul is from the good God, our sensible [soul] cannot be from the evil God.

But certain ones said that the rational and the sensible are in us two substances; yet they are not two souls, for the reason that "soul" is a name of office, and those two substances are ordered to the perfection of one body, such that one disposes toward the other. Yet one of them is by generation, namely the sensible; and a sign of this is that it depends on the body and is the perfection of some part of the body: but the rational, which is the act of no part of the body, is by creation. — But Augustine rejects this mode of speaking in the book *On Ecclesiastical Dogmas*, saying: « We do not say that there are two souls in one human — as James and others of the Syrians write — one animal [soul], by which the body is animated and which is mixed with the blood, and another spiritual [soul], which administers reason ». And if you say that he denies there to be two souls, [but] does not deny there to be two substances; by the following text it appears that he denies two substances to be. For he says thus: « But we say that there is one and the same soul in a human, which vivifies the body by its association and disposes itself by its reason ». And more expressly in the book *On the Spirit and the Soul* he says that one and the same soul is called sense, while it senses, and reason, while it discerns. And again he says that the soul, when it withdraws, draws the sensitive powers with itself.

But the theological doctors say that the sensible and the rational in a human are of the same substance and are to be educed into being from the same principle, namely from the Creator, for the reason that in us they do not name diverse substances, but diverse powers of the same substance, as Augustine, where he speaks about this matter, expressly intimates. And this same [view] is very reasonable, to posit in a human one perfecting substance, which gives it life and sense and intellect. Nor does that conflict with the words of the Philosopher, if they are rightly understood.

On account of which it is to be noted that "sensuality" is taken in three modes. In one mode sensuality names the disposition on the part of the flesh toward the act of the sensitive power; and in this mode it is taken in the book *On the Spirit and the Soul*, in the fourteenth chapter, where it is said: « The soul, which is truly spirit, and the flesh, which is truly body, are easily joined at their extremities », that is in the phantastic [faculty] of the soul, which is not body, but like body, and by the sensuality of the flesh, which is almost spirit ». — In another mode sensuality names the disposition on the part of the flesh toward sensing with a moving spiritual power, the soul not yet perfecting the flesh; and such sensuality is in the embryo before its complete animation. For there the perfecting substance of the soul cannot be present, since it is « the perfection of a physical, organic body »; nor could it actually exist, except with the body existing in due complexion and organization. Yet there can be present the power of the father's soul, which indeed is in the seed, as in a subject conveying [it], just as the power of a mover is conveyed together with a thrown stone; and therefore this ceases when its operation is consummated; which happens when the perfecting sensitive soul is introduced into the organized body, whether it is educed from the potency of matter suddenly, or is infused from without together with the rational [soul]. — But the third sensuality is that which names not only the disposition with the moving power, but also the aptitude which is present from the perfecting soul. — Taking sensuality in the first and second mode, thus it is in us from the begetter, because together with the seed there fall down heats and spirits, by which the flesh is disposed for sensing. There is also transfused together with this a certain power of the soul, which moves and rules and operates until the introduction of the form. In the third mode sensuality is in a human from the perfecting soul, which indeed does not have being by generation, but by creation. — These things having been seen, the response to the question is clear.

For it must be granted that the sensible soul is not in us from transmission, as the reasons objected to the second part show. But to the reasons which are adduced to the opposite, it is easy to respond.

1. For to that which is objected, that the first change of the sensitive [soul] is from the begetter; it must be said that he speaks of the sensitive insofar as it names a substance, not insofar as it names a power of an incorruptible substance. — Or also he says this by reason of that sensuality said in the second mode, which indeed has being from the begetter.

2. To that which is objected, that the intellect alone enters from without; it must be said that there the intellect is called the intellective substance; and because the intellective and sensitive substance of a human is the same, therefore by this the sensitive [substance] of a human is not excluded, but the brute sensitive [substance].

3. To that which is objected, that the operation of the sensitive [soul] depends on the body; it must be said that from this it does not follow that the substance depends [on it], since in the same substance there is found an operation which can belong to it apart from the body. This, however, does not belong to the soul itself, except insofar as it animates, and thus insofar as it is joined to the body, and therefore it depends on the body, nor does the soul use that power after it is separated from the body; nor does it follow that it is idle, because that substance has another operation. But this will be found more plainly determined in the fourth [book], in the question on the cognition of the separated soul.

4. To that which is objected, that the animal is prior to the human; it must be said that this is said because in the embryo the animal operation is found prior to the operation of the human; for it is first moved and senses before it reasons. But this is from the sensuality said in the second mode, insofar as it is from the moving power, not insofar as it is from the perfecting power.

5. To that which is objected, that the sensible soul is in the potency of matter; it must be said that it is true insofar as the sensible soul names a generable and corruptible substance, but not insofar as it names a power of an incorruptible substance. And because the sensitive soul in brutes names a substance of this kind; hence it is that brutes educe their sensitive soul from matter, as also in those things especially which are generated by putrefaction.

But the sensible [soul] in a human names a power of the rational substance; and therefore it is produced by that alone by which the rational substance [is produced]. And therefore, that the sensible [soul] cannot be propagated in a human as in brutes, this is not from imperfection on the part of the generating power, but by reason of the perfection which consists in the sensitive [soul] of a human.

6. To that which is objected, that it is not univocal in a human and in an ass: it must be said that for something to be produced by generation, and something to be produced by creation, does not take away univocation; just as if God were now to create one human, it would be of the same species as other humans. If therefore a greater univocation is required in species than in genus, it is plain from this that the diverse mode of producing the sensible soul in a human and an ass does not cause "human" and "ass" to be said equivocally. And if you object that the sensible [soul] in a human names a power, and in an ass names a substance, therefore it is said equivocally; it must be said that in an ass it can both name a substance and can name a power, yet it principally names a power, because its name is taken from the act of sensing. In a human likewise it can name both a substance and a power; but insofar as it names a substance, it is not said to be something diverse from the rational; for it is the same substance which makes the human both sense and reason, although the power is one and another. And thus it is clear that from this the univocation in the genus of animal with respect to the rational and the irrational is not taken away.