Dist. 31, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/31/q/bon-sent-II-d31-a1-q2
----------------------------------------
### Question II. *By reason of which part original sin first inheres in the soul.*

Secondly it is asked, by reason of which part original sin first inheres in the soul. And that it first inheres by reason of the vegetative power seems so:

1. Because original sin is in the soul from its conjunction to the corrupt flesh; but the soul is most of all united to the flesh according to the vegetative power, which is the first power in it: therefore it seems that it first inheres in it by reason of the vegetable power.

2. Likewise, this seems so by another argument. The generative power belongs to the vegetable soul itself; but that is the power by means of which original sin is transmitted, and which is most of all infected by original sin, as will be made clear below: therefore it seems that by reason of the vegetable power the original fault first and principally inheres in the soul.

But that it inheres by reason of the sensible part seems so.

3. For original sin, as Augustine says, is concupiscence; but concupiscence is rooted first and principally in the sensible part, since concupiscence denotes an appetite for a good *as here-and-now*, with cognition going before, and this belongs to the sensitive part: therefore it seems that original sin must first come to be in the soul according to that part.

4. Likewise, in the actual perpetration of sin we see that sin reaches reason by means of sensuality, for the reason that the perversion of man begins from the lower and from a turning to a changeable good: therefore if original sin begins from the lower, namely from the infection of the flesh, and has to infect the soul from the lower; it seems that it must first inhere in the soul by reason of the sensitive power.

But that it first inheres by reason of the rational part seems so.

5. «For original sin is the lack of due justice»; but «justice has its being first and principally in the rational will alone», as Anselm says in the book *On the Virginal Conception*: therefore original sin must inhere in the soul first and principally by reason of the rational part.

6. Likewise, original sin is a mortal sin, therefore through it the soul is turned away from God; but to be turned away belongs to the rational portion first and principally: therefore it seems that original sin must first inhere in the soul by reason of the rational power.

But that it first inheres in the soul itself by reason of its substance or essence seems so:

7. Because original sin is contracted in the soul from its union to the flesh; but by priority of nature the substance of the soul is united to the body itself rather than the powers to the bodily organs; for to *live* is prior to to *be moved*: therefore by priority of nature the substance of the soul is infected, rather than that the powers are infected. And if this is true, original sin is first in the soul on the part of its substance.

8. Likewise, original sin, since it is one, infects all the powers of the soul; but nothing one is common to all the powers of the soul except its substance: therefore original sin is first in the soul by reason of its substance.

The question therefore is, by reason of what original sin first inheres in the soul: namely whether by reason of *substance*, or of *power*; and if of power: whether of the *vegetative*, or of the *sensitive*, or of the *intellective*.

### Conclusion.

> *Original sin, insofar as it is a vice, inheres in the soul first by reason of the sensitive part, but insofar as it is fault, it is in the rational part alone.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that some have wished to say that original sin is so transmitted and contracted by the soul that it first inheres in the soul by reason of its substance, which is first conjoined to the flesh; and consequently the powers are infected by it by means of the substance, for the reason that the powers are not united to the infected flesh except through the union of the substance. And just as grace is one, which reforms the soul and its powers — which grace, I say, is called one because it first regards the substance of the soul, as they say — so original sin is one, which infects and disorders all the powers of the soul. — But if anyone were to understand this in such a way that through original sin the substance would be infected before the powers, so that original sin inheres in the soul not by reason of power, but by reason of the substance itself as united; this does not seem intelligible: both because original sin is the lack of due justice, while justice, since it is the rectitude of the will, is first in the will; and also because original sin is concupiscence, but to be concupiscent is not an act of the substance except by reason of power; and also because in original sin there is a disordering of the soul itself, but disordering is not in the soul except by reason of power, since through it the soul can be ordered and disordered.

Hence, just as it was said above concerning *grace*, that it regards the *substance* — not because it could be in the substance of the soul with power set aside, but because it is in the powers of the soul, insofar as they are continued into one substance — so too in the matter at hand it must be understood that original sin is said to *regard the substance of the soul*, because it is in the powers of the soul, not from their proper acts, but insofar as they are to be continued into one substance of the soul, insofar as it is united to the infected flesh; yet in such a way that the disordering itself inheres first in the *power* than in the *substance*. For the substance is not said to be ordered or disordered except by reason of power.

This therefore being supposed, that original sin inheres in the soul first by reason of *power*, it must be understood that there are two ways of speaking of original sin: either insofar as it is *fault* rendering the soul hateful to God; or insofar as it is a *vice* disordering the power itself. Taking it the first way, it properly inheres in the soul according to *free choice*, and most of all according to the will. For it is this alone according to which the soul is blamed or praised when it is *in act*, and according to which it is blameworthy or praiseworthy *from its origin*. Taking it the second way, namely insofar as it denotes a vice disordering the power, thus, because the kindling of this disordering has its rise from the flesh, and the rational movers have to be bent by the appetite or concupiscence of the sensitive part, which impels and moves to the illicit; thus it must be said that the original sin or vice which we contract in being born inheres in the soul first by reason of the sensitive part. — And thus the answer to the question proposed is clear; the answer to the objections is also in part clear. For I concede that original sin, insofar as it is a vice in us, first begins from the sensitive part, because the manner of corrupting is the reverse in us from what it was in Adam. For there the *person* corrupted the nature, and reason the sensible part, and the will the flesh; and so, since it is the reverse in us, the original corruption ascends to the rational part by means of the sensible portion, insofar as it is viciousness; although, insofar as it is fault, it has its being in the rational part alone, in which there is freedom of choice. Hence the four middle arguments conclude truly and are to be conceded.

1. To that which is first objected concerning the vegetative part of the soul, it must be said that the union to the body is not the whole cause of contracting original sin, but the *union* together with a *possibility for disordering*. For nothing is corrupted by original sin, insofar as it is a vice, except what is in some way orderable to justice. And since the vegetative power holds more to the natural manner of acting than to the voluntary; hence it is that original sin does not regard the vegetative as it regards the sensitive, in which there can be conjoined appetite and delight.

2. To that which is objected concerning the generative power, the answer is now clear, because in it corruption flourishes, not only because it is a power of the vegetable soul, but also because by reason of the adjoined sense it can be disordered by delight and concupiscence.

7. To that which is objected last, that original sin is first in the substance of the soul, and through the union; it must be said that, as has been touched on, the union is not the whole cause, but there is required together with this a possibility for disordering by sin; but such a possibility is not in the substance, but in the power, as was said above.

8. To that which is objected concerning the unity of original sin, it must be said that this does not conclude that original sin is first in the substance, but that it is in the powers, insofar as they are continued into one substance, as was previously explained concerning grace. But this will be better explained below, when the unity of original sin is treated.