Dist. 32, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/32/q/bon-sent-II-d32-a2-q2
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### Question II.
### *Whether concupiscence is from God.*

Secondly it is asked concerning this, from what concupiscence itself is as from a principle. And the question is, whether it is from God. And that it is not, it seems:

1. To the Romans, sixth [chapter]: *Our old man is crucified;* the Gloss: « The old man is the tinder, which is from us, not from God ».

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book *Of Five Responses*: « Believe that lust is an evil from the devil, not a good from God »; but lust and concupiscence are the same: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, « The Son of God assumed everything that He planted in our nature »; but He did not assume concupiscence: therefore concupiscence is not in us from God.

4. Likewise, everything that is from God is good and of itself ordained to the good; but concupiscence is an evil and ordained to evil, since its use, namely the act of concupiscing, is evil: therefore it seems that concupiscence is not from God.

5. Likewise, the tinder, insofar as [it is] of this kind, is an original cause in the offspring, and so it is an original cause [so] necessary and determinate that there is no consideration there of freedom of the will; but that which is the cause of some thing necessarily and determinately ordained to evil, is the cause of evil. If therefore the tinder were from God, then it would follow that original sin were from God. But if this is false, it remains that the first [is false] also.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine, *On Free Choice*: « Every punishment of sin is just and is named a chastisement »; but concupiscence, which remains after baptism, is a punishment: therefore it is just. But everything that is just is from God: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, every punishment is either *acted*, or *inflicted*, or *contracted*; but the tinder is not an *acted* punishment, because it is in little children, who have done nothing of good or evil. It is not a *contracted* punishment, because it was in Adam, who did not proceed from another parent. It remains therefore that it is an *inflicted* punishment. But every such punishment is from divine justice: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, concupiscence states an intensification of love, but the intensification of love states a position; but everything that states some position is from Him from whom proceeds every being: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, to take away dominion belongs to him whose it is also to give: if therefore God gave dominion to the human or to the rational spirit over the lower powers; it seems that it was His alone to take it away. But to take away dominion is nothing other than to inflict the disorder of concupiscence in the sensuality, on account of which *the flesh concupisces against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh*.

If therefore that dominion is taken away by God, it seems that the vice of concupiscence is inflicted by Him.

5. Likewise, that the beasts do not obey the human, this is from the divine disposition, according to which all things are wisely governed: therefore by parity of reasoning, that the lower powers do not obey the higher, this is from divine vengeance. And that this is true, many authorities of the Saints seem to say, who intimate that rebellion is therefore inflicted on the human, because the human was rebellious to God; but this rebellion is nothing other than the vice of concupiscence.

### Conclusion.

> Concupiscence, insofar as it states a punishment ordained to guilt and an underlying appetite, is from God; but not insofar as it is properly concupiscence, or insofar as it states the excess of appetite.

**I respond:** It must be said that there are two ways of speaking of concupiscence itself: either according as it is a punishment, or according to that which concupiscence is. If we speak of it according as it is a punishment, thus it states an order to guilt; and in this way it has a meriting cause and an ordaining cause. For the human merits to have such a rebellion from his own guilt and disobedience; but God ordains this evil from His justice to another, pre-existing [end]. — In another way one speaks of concupiscence according to that which it is; and thus concupiscence states two things. For it states an appetite, it states nonetheless an excess in the act of appetite. The appetite, I say, that underlying one, is good and is from God. But that excess in appetition, even though it may seem to be a position, is nevertheless more a *privation*, and has no *efficient* cause, but a *deficient* one. And therefore, because God is the *deficient* cause of nothing, in this way it is not held to be from God, but rather from free choice deficient through guilt, and from the instigating devil.

But that concupiscence by reason of excess states a *privation*, although it may seem to state a *position*, this is plain. For concupiscence is, with respect to the appetitive power, what paralysis is with respect to the motive [power]. And just as a paralyzed member trembles and moves very swiftly; and this comes not from an increase of strength, but rather from a decrease of strength, nor from a strengthening of strength, but rather from its dissolution: so also in concupiscence it must be understood that the appetite blazes up in the love of a temporal thing, nor can it contain itself, but rather consists in continual motion and in the repetition of concupiscence: this, I say, must be understood to come about from a defect of the *restraint*, just as wild beasts are moved when their chains are broken, and ships when their rudders are destroyed. — Therefore the reasons showing that concupiscence is not from God are to be granted, insofar as they conclude concerning concupiscence according to that which it is.

1. But to that [argument] of Augustine, who says that every punishment is just; it must be said that he understands it of punishment under the character of punishment; for thus it is just by reason of the just ordination to the preceding guilt. — It could nevertheless be said that he understands it of a punishment which is *purely* a punishment, that is, which is so a punishment that it is neither guilt, nor of itself ordained to guilt. But concupiscence is either guilt, or ordained to guilt; and therefore that authority has no place here.

2. To that which is objected, that every punishment is either acted, or inflicted, or contracted; it must be said that concupiscence in Adam was *acted*, for the reason that by sinning he deprived himself of original justice and induced concupiscence into himself. But in us it is a *contracted* punishment, for the reason that from our parents we contract infected flesh, which makes concupiscence to be in the soul united to it.

3. To that which is objected, that every position is from God, and concupiscence states a position etc.; it must be said that just as limping and trembling state a certain position, because they posit an act and a progressive power; they also state nonetheless a defect and a privation — for limping posits a defect in the leg, but trembling a defect in the moving power or an ineptitude regarding the movable — so also in the case at hand it must be understood to be, as was explained before. And by reason of that which is there of position, without doubt it is from God; but by reason of that which is there of defect and privation, no *efficient* cause is to be sought, but a *deficient* one.

4. To that which is objected, that to take away dominion belongs to *God*, whose it is to give; it must be said that he to whom dominion is given can lose it through bad custody. And thus it must be understood that the human lost that dominion which his reason had over the lower powers; and this, not because it was taken away from him violently, but because, although it was in his power to conserve such dominion in himself, by his own carelessness and negligence he *was unwilling* [to do so] and lost it; just as a human, while he sins, drives away the divine grace from himself, and God is said to take it away, because by His just judgment He no longer applies [it], while the human renders himself unworthy to receive the gift of God.

5. And by this also one could respond to the following objection concerning the loss of dominion over the beasts. — It can nevertheless be said also otherwise, that it is not similar, because that a beast does not obey the human, this posits no guilt, neither in the beast, which is not subject, nor in the human, who does not preside; nevertheless it is otherwise in the sensuality and the reason. For since the sensuality fights against the reason by moving and inclining to the illicit, this very fighting is a guilt for it; and therefore such a rebellion ought not properly to be said to be from God, nor [that] God inflicted concupiscence. And if any such authorities are found, they are to be understood and expounded so that they speak of concupiscence according as it is a *punishment*. And thus the objections are clear.

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