Dist. 32, Art. 3, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/32/q/bon-sent-II-d32-a3-q1
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### Article III.
### *On the equity of the divine judgment in the infusion and the punishment of the soul.*

There is asked, consequently, concerning the third [point], namely concerning the equity of divine justice, according to which it infuses the soul into such flesh, from which it contracts the liability of eternal damnation. And concerning this two [questions] are asked.

First it is asked, whether God ought, out of justice, to impute to it that stain which the soul contracts.

Second it is asked, whether it befits divine justice to associate the soul with such flesh.

### Question I.
### *Whether God ought to impute to the soul that stain which it contracts from the flesh.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether God ought to impute to it that stain which the soul contracts from the flesh. And that [He ought] not, it seems.

1. Augustine, in the book *On the Two Souls against the Manichees*: « That anyone be held guilty because he does not do what he cannot do, is [a mark] of the highest iniquity and insanity ». If therefore the soul of a little child cannot at its origin have justice, it seems that the original stain ought in no way to be imputed to it.

2. Likewise, just as glory regards merit, so also punishment regards demerit; but merit properly consists in respect of an act, therefore also demerit: therefore nothing is to be imputed to anyone for a demerit which is not from his own act.

3. Likewise, in that which is in someone naturally, one is neither to be praised nor blamed; but such a guilt is in the little child from the natural conjunction of soul and flesh: therefore for it the little child is neither to be praised nor blamed: therefore that stain which it contracts ought not to be imputed to it unto punishment.

4. Likewise, God is more inclined to mercy than is the human; but a human holds another excused on account of impossibility, nor does he punish him who is not capable of reason: if therefore such a condition is found in a little child, it seems that nothing which is in it ought to be imputed to it by the Lord.

**On the contrary:**

1. Actual sin renders a human unworthy, because there is therein a privation of some good which ought to be present; but original sin shares in this with actual [sin], because in it there is a privation of some good which ought to be present, namely of original justice: therefore original sin makes him in whom it is worthy of punishment. But everything such is to be imputed by a just judge: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the original [sin], as was proven before, is an evil of guilt; but guilt disorders the universe, unless punishment follows, in which it may be ordered, according to what Augustine holds: therefore if divine justice ought not to leave anything disordered in the universe, it ought therefore to punish original sin in whomever it is found, whether in a little child or in an adult.

3. Likewise, it is just that God should exact from every soul the honor owed to Him: since therefore the beauty of the image in a rational creature pertains to the honor of God, God exacts that beauty from every rational creature. But he who justly exacts something from someone, if he lacks it, rightly imputes it to him unto punishment: if therefore whoever has original sin lacks that beauty which the soul ought to have; therefore to everyone such it ought to be imputed unto punishment by the highest justice.

4. Likewise, just as the second Adam was an example of obeying, so the first Adam was an example of transgressing, as the Apostle intimates: therefore just as one having the image of the second Adam is worthy of glory, so one having the image of the first is worthy of punishment. But everyone who is regenerated in the baptism of Christ, by this very fact that he has the image of Christ, namely baptismal grace, is reputed by God worthy of eternal glory, although he has done nothing

of good or evil: therefore by the opposite, everyone who is generated from Adam, since by this very fact he bears his image, ought to be reputed by divine justice unworthy of glory and liable to punishment.

### Conclusion

> **Conclusion.** It befits the divine wisdom, power, and justice to impute to the soul the guilt which it has contracted from the flesh.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt God imputes original sin to the little children themselves unto demerit, because unto the liability of punishment, at least the punishment of loss. And this the *loftiness of the divine power* and the *beauty of the wisdom* and the *rectitude of the justice* demand.

The *loftiness of the divine power* demands this, on account of which God ought always to seek His own glory and honor; and therefore, if the rational soul does not render honor to God, since it does not have in itself the comeliness of the divine image, through which God is to be honored; it is necessary that God recompense the disgrace of guilt in the comeliness of justice. — The *beauty* also *of the wisdom* requires this, because it does not suffer anything base or disordered to be found within the universe. And since every sin, whether it be actual or contracted, is « a privation of mode, species, and order »; it is necessary that God recompense the disorder of nature through the order of punishment, so that thus the beauty of the universe may remain disfigured in no part. — The *rectitude* also *of the divine justice* requires this, because God exacts from the creature that which He gave it. Since therefore God had made human nature upright in the first human, He ought to exact the justice of the will not only from the first parent, but also from all the posterity in whom that nature is found. In whomever therefore there is a lack of that justice, it is deservedly imputed to him by divine justice. And this is what Anselm says in the book *On the Virginal Conception*, chapter twenty-eight: « It must be said that God ought to act otherwise toward infants, and the human otherwise. For the human ought not to exact from nature what he did not give it and what is not owed to it; nor does a human justly reproach a human for being born with a guilt, without which he himself did not exist, and from which he is healed only through another. But God rightly exacts from nature what He Himself gave, and what is justly owed to Him ». Thus therefore it is plain that it befits God to impute to the soul the guilt which it contracted from the flesh. For this both power, and wisdom, and also justice demand. Therefore the reasons which show this are to be granted.

1. To that, then, which is objected first to the contrary concerning the words of Augustine in the book *On the Two Souls*, it must be said that that reasoning is deficient in two ways. First indeed, because it proceeds from a bad understanding of the authority. For Augustine speaks of an impossibility which is in the human simply from nature, not of that into which the human has been thrust through will and guilt, as above, in the twenty-eighth distinction, the example was set forth of the servant going to the market. But this impossibility of preserving the rectitude of justice was not implanted in the human from the condition of nature, but rather was thrust in from the voluntary transgression of Adam. — Second, it is also deficient in the assumption [of the minor premise], inasmuch as God does not impute to the little child original sin from this, that it does not *do* what it cannot do, but from this, that it does not *have* what it ought to have. And this is well imputed to the human, according to that [text] of Luke: *To everyone who has it shall be given, and he shall abound; but from him who has not* etc. And the Apostle says that *he who is ignorant shall be ignored*. And the human was cast out from the wedding not only on account of the enormity of the actual transgression, but also on account of the lack of the wedding garment, which because the human lacks in the original conception, unless he be clothed in baptism, he is not permitted to enter the hall of the heavenly king, the dignity of that heavenly hall demanding this.

2. But to that which is objected, that demerit regards an act; it must be said that, just as little children having grace are worthy of eternal life, because they have that grace through the Sacraments of Christ, who merited eternal life for them by His grace and passion, so that the grace in the little children is other than [that] in Christ: so also in the [present] matter it must be understood that the soul contracts the stain of sin from its generation in the very propagation, and this from Adam himself, who by his own act befouled human nature. And therefore *in Adam himself* we are said to have sinned and demerited, and *through his disobedience to have been constituted sinners*. Yet the guilt in us is other than it was in him; nevertheless this has the *character of demerit* from that [guilt] from which it proceeded. And this is what Anselm says *On the Virginal*

*Conception*, chapter twenty-seven: « Original sin I can understand to be nothing else in little children except that *nakedness of the owed justice* made through the disobedience of Adam, through which all are *children of wrath*, since the spontaneous desertion of justice which it made accuses also nature; nor does the impotence of recovering excuse persons, which the nakedness of beatitude accompanies, so that, just as they are without all rectitude of justice, so they are without all beatitude ».

3. But to that which is objected, that no one is to be praised or blamed for that which is in him naturally; it must be said that if it be understood of *instituted nature*, one is neither to be praised nor blamed, neither before God nor before humans, because God Himself instituted nature and ought not to blame what He made. But if it be understood of that which is in him naturally according to the *state of fallen nature*; thus I say that the human is not to be blamed before *humans*, as Anselm says, and as was held in the [above] response, because humans as regards such things are equal; nor ought a human to exact from a human what he did not give. But before *God*, who instituted nature otherwise, he is to be blamed, because he does not have in himself what God justly exacts from him. Therefore that word of the Philosopher, who says that for natural things we are neither praised nor blamed, is either to be understood of natural things as regards the institution of nature, or, if it be understood of other [things], this is understood as regards human judgment, not as regards divine judgment.

4. To that which is objected last, that God is more inclined to mercy than the human; it must be said that it is true, inasmuch as He bestows full mercy on him whom it shall please Him to pity; nevertheless He judges most strictly, as is gathered from that word in the twelfth [chapter] of Matthew: *Of every idle word humans shall render an account in the day of judgment.* Hence there are many sins which among humans are tolerated and not punished, such as are spiritual and interior, of which it will behoove us to render an account in the day of judgment. For mercy does not preclude the way of justice.