Dist. 32, Art. 3, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/32/q/bon-sent-II-d32-a3-q2
----------------------------------------
### Question II.
### *Whether it befits divine justice to infuse the soul into such flesh.*

Second it is asked, whether it befits divine justice to infuse the soul into such flesh. And that [it does] not, it seems.

1. He is not truly innocent who can relieve another from guilt, and does not relieve him: therefore much more is he not truly innocent who can preserve another from guilt, and does not preserve him. But the Creator could preserve from guilt the soul which He creates, if He did not infuse it into such a body: therefore it seems that, by infusing it into such a body, He acts less justly.

2. Likewise, it is the same thing to make something in itself, and to make something which being done it is necessary that the other come about. Hence it is the same thing to kill a human, and to do that which being done the human necessarily dies; and he who opens a window is said to illuminate the house, because he does something which being done the house is illuminated. But the soul infused into infected flesh, it is necessary that it be made a sinner: therefore it is the same thing to make the soul a sinner, and to infuse the soul into such flesh; but in no way does it befit divine justice to make the soul a sinner: therefore in no way does it befit it to infuse it.

3. Likewise, it is a lesser evil to be afflicted with any temporal punishment whatever, than to be stained with mortal guilt: but in no way would it befit divine justice to plunge the soul, in the first beginning of its creation, before it were united to the body, into infernal punishment; nay, it would be said to do an injury to the soul itself, which it would humble innocent in punishment: therefore much more is it unbecoming to divine justice, and an injury seems to be done to the soul itself, if it is joined to infected flesh, from which it contracts the stain of the original [sin].

4. Likewise, although the flesh of the posterity was in some way in Adam, yet the souls are never propagated from the soul of Adam, but are produced immediately by God: therefore it seems that Adam neither merited nor demerited anything for them: therefore just as it would not have befitted divine justice to infuse the soul of Adam into an infected body in the first condition of things, so neither now does it seem that it ought to associate it with such flesh.

5. Likewise, there is no true justice except where mercy is joined to it — for *all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth* — but when God infuses the soul into infected flesh, which He knows will go forth from the body before it is baptized or can be converted to God, then He does no mercy: therefore it seems that in such an operation divine justice, which abandons mercy, is not commended.

6. Likewise, if some soul had the use of will and refused to be united to such a body, it would not be just that God should imprison it, against its refusal, in that body: therefore if the condition of the soul ought not to be worsened, because, when it is created, it lacks the use of freedom of choice; it seems that in no way, with the rectitude of justice preserved, ought it to be associated with infected flesh.

**On the contrary:**

1. It is just that the *Author* of nature should satisfy the natural appetite which He implanted in nature; but a body propagated from Adam, organized by a perfect organization, desires to be united to a rational soul: therefore if nothing can satisfy that appetite except God alone, it seems that it pertains to divine justice to infuse a soul into that body.

2. Likewise, it is just that a *governor* should conserve things in the mode in which they are born to be conserved; but the human species is born to be conserved, like the species also of other animals, through the propagation of human from human: therefore according as bodies are procreated, it is just that God infuse souls into them: therefore whatever the bodies propagated from Adam may be, the souls ought to be associated with those bodies.

3. Likewise, it is just that a *helper* of all should expend his aid in that which he commands to another; but God commanded the human to procreate children, and the human cannot, without divine assistance perfecting and completing what the human begins, by giving the completive form: therefore as often and in whatever manner the human generates, if there is no defect on the part of the human preparing the bodies, it seems that it is just and equitable that God should assist by infusing souls.

4. Likewise, it is just that an equitable *requiter* should reduce a whole posterity into servitude for an enormous crime, just as by human laws we see a whole posterity disinherited for the crime of treason. If therefore Adam, the father of all humans, sinned inexcusably and against a most excellent Lord; it seems that it is just that all his posterity be reduced into misery and servitude; and if this, it is just that their souls be coupled with infected and penal bodies.

### Conclusion

> **Conclusion.** It befits divine justice, insofar as it bespeaks the becomingness of the divine goodness, to infuse souls into bodies propagated from Adam.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that *justice* is wont to be taken in two ways. In one way it is called the justice [which is] the *becomingness of the divine goodness* itself. In another way it is called justice, insofar as it considers the *exigency of merits*. — If justice be called the becomingness of the divine goodness, in this way it befits divine justice to infuse a rational soul into flesh propagated from Adam: both from this, that it is the *Author* of things; both from this, that it is the *Conservator*; both from this, that it is the *Provider* or administrator. — It befits the *Author* to satisfy the appetite of nature; and therefore, since nature, vitiated in Adam, forms a body having an appetite for a rational soul, it pertains to the becomingness of the divine goodness to supply and perfect that appetite. — It befits the *Conservator* also so to conserve a thing, according as it is born to be conserved. If therefore the human species, which was begun in Adam, is born to be conserved through the propagation of human from human; since the human has an animate body, nor can be conserved in bodies alone without souls; it pertains to the becomingness of the divine goodness, inasmuch as God is the conservator of nature, to infuse souls into bodies propagated by the law of nature. — It befits the *Governor* also so to administer a thing, according as He instituted and bestowed on its nature the power and potency for moving and operating. On account of which Augustine says in the seventh [book] of the City of God: « He so administers the things which He founded, that He lets them carry out their own motions ». Since therefore God so instituted human nature, that Adam should prepare the bodies, and He Himself should infuse souls into those bodies; and

again, He instituted Adam himself in a state of mutability, in which namely he could be made mortal and immortal: from these two it is necessarily gathered that it pertains to the becomingness of the divine goodness, inasmuch as it is the administrator of things, that He should infuse souls into such bodies. For if in the first condition He so *instituted* and so decreed, that He would infuse rational souls into bodies propagated from Adam; and again, He so *ought to administer* things, « that He lets them carry out their own motions »: so that the law of *institution* and the law of *administration* be preserved, whatever bodies Adam may propagate for himself, provided that they be disposed for a rational soul, it befits God to infuse souls into them. — Nor by this is God blamed in anything. And there is a sufficiently manifest example. If I had promised someone, that however many casks he should make from a certain tree, I would fill them with wine; and the root of that tree were so infected that all the casks, made from that tree, would infect the wine which was poured into them: it would not be the fault of me who pour the wine into such casks, because I do what I owe and promised, but it is the fault of him who infected the root of the tree and prepared unfit casks. — And thus it is plain that, according as justice is called the becomingness of the divine goodness, it demands this, namely, that souls be infused into such bodies.

But if justice be called *properly* according as it regards the *exigency of merits*, thus there is no question whether God infuses the soul into such a body justly or unjustly. For this justice does not regard the condition of things, but regards the distribution of retributions. But it is one thing to create and infuse the soul, another to requite it according to its merits. For when He creates it, He does not consider what the soul has merited, but that the soul by natural appetite desires to be united. — Yet it could be said that, although justice be not assigned in this way, according as a respect is had to the soul *in itself*, nevertheless it happens to be found *in comparison to the demerit of Adam.* And this is what Anselm says in the book On the Virginal Conception, chapter twenty-eight: « If a man and wife have been advanced to a certain great dignity and possession by no merit of their own, but by grace alone, [and] if they inexcusably commit a grave crime and for it are justly cast down and reduced into servitude; who will say that the sons whom they begot after the condemnation are not subject to the same servitude, but rather ought freely to be restored to the goods which the parents justly lost? Such are the first parents and their sons, who, justly cast down for their guilt from beatitude into misery, generate in the same exile, concerning whom the judgment ought to be so much the stricter, the more inexcusably their offense can be proven ». — Thus therefore it is plain how it befits divine justice to infuse souls into bodies propagated from Adam. And the reasons which show this are to be granted.

1. To that, then, which is objected first to the contrary, that he is not truly innocent who can relieve another from guilt, etc.; it must be said that that is true of the innocent one who does not know or cannot elicit goods from evils, or whose office it is also not universally to govern nature; and therefore it has no place in the [present] matter. For God permits evils not only original, but also actual: both because « He so administers the things which He founded, that He lets them carry out their own motions »; both also because He knows how to elicit goods from evils.

2. To that which is objected, that he who makes [something] by which being done it is necessary that the other come about, is said to make it; it must be said that this holds true, when the consequent effect follows directly upon that intermediate thing done, and according to the ordination of the work and according to the intention of the agent, as it is in him who opens a window, that the house may be illuminated. But it is not so in the [present] matter: both because God does not intend to infuse the soul into the flesh for this, that it may contract guilt; both also because the infusion of the soul into the flesh is not *directly* ordered to the staining of the soul except only *per accidens*, namely by reason of the foulness introduced into the flesh from the guilt of Adam; and therefore such an effect is extraneous to the divine operation. And therefore that reasoning errs *per accidens*.

3. To that which is objected, that if God were to place the soul in hell, He would not act justly; it must be said that it is not similar, because, when I say *the soul is placed in hell*, this is not regarded according to the order of nature, since such a place is not owed to the soul by nature. If therefore it is placed there in an ordered way, it is necessary that it be placed according to justice, which regards the exigency of merits. But the soul, before it is infused into the body, has no merits; and therefore, if it were placed in hell, there would be no justice there. But it is not so on this side, because the soul has a natural appetite for the flesh, and the flesh for the spirit; and therefore according to the order of nature the soul is placed

in such a body, nor ought the natural appetite to be infringed on account of some preternatural accident, such as of foulness or penality.

4. To that which is objected, that the soul is not propagated from a soul, therefore one merits nothing for another; it must be said that although the *power of the generative virtue* does not extend further than to the propagation of the flesh by way of an efficient [cause], yet the *intention of nature* extends to the whole composite. For the human does not intend to generate flesh, but intends to generate a human like himself in species; and therefore all are called sons of Adam. And on that account, although Adam could not demerit for the soul as *separated*, he could nevertheless demerit for it as *united to the flesh*; and therefore that reasoning is not valid.

— Yet it could also be said otherwise, as has been touched on, that that infusion of the soul does not regard preceding merits.

6. To that which is objected concerning a separated soul, which would have the use of free will; it must be said that it is not similar, because, if such a soul had the use of free will and rejected such a body, that infusion could not be without punishment; and thus guilt would precede its infusion, or an injustice would be done to it. But it is not so in the [present] matter, because since the soul desires to be united to the body, that union is natural, although accidentally from this it contracts guilt and punishment.

5. To that which is objected, that justice ought always to be joined to mercy; it must be said that it is true; for justice, according as it is called the *becomingness of the divine goodness*, is joined to mercy, which indeed is called the *affluence of the divine goodness*, and both are to be found in the [present] matter. For in this very [fact], that God infuses souls into such bodies, is manifested the affluence of the divine goodness, by which *He makes His sun to rise over the good and the evil*; nor on account of the transgression of Adam did He withdraw His hand from the conservation of human nature. But according as justice regards the *exigency of merits*, thus also it has mercy conjoined; but in neither mode, properly speaking, does it have place in the [present] matter, unless we compare to the sin of Adam. For by comparison to the sin of Adam there is justice there, because God punished the whole posterity of Adam for his transgression; there is also mercy, because He did not utterly destroy it, although Adam merited this by his transgression; nay, to many of those same posterity He restored grace. But to others, who die before baptism, although He does not bestow the benefit of grace, He nevertheless expends some benefit of mercy in this, that He conserves for them the being of nature. For it is better so to be than not to be at all. He would even be ready to bestow on them the benefit of grace, if they were brought to the Sacrament of baptism. But that they are not brought, this comes from a defect of nature.

And *if you ask*, since God foreknew this, why He would infuse the soul into that body; or since He also foreknew that Adam would fall and would corrupt human bodies, why He instituted the propagation of the human thus and not otherwise, since He could institute [it] in such a way that in no way would prejudice be done to the offspring by the parent; it must be said that in the condition of things the order of the divine *wisdom* is weighed more than the order of *justice* or of *mercy* is weighed. But the order of the divine wisdom demanded this, that rational spirits should go forth immediately from God, to whose image they are; and that all humans should be propagated from one human, for many causes, as was assigned above in the eighteenth distinction; and although God saw that some evil would come thence, He nevertheless ought not to alter the order which the divine wisdom required. For by eliciting goods from the evils that follow, He reduces the whole to the order befitting wisdom; and while He elicits greater goods from great evils, both power and wisdom and goodness are rendered more commendable. On account of which Gregory exclaims and says: « O happy fault, which merited to have such a Redeemer ». And therefore if anyone wishes to attend to how commendable God is in His works, he ought not to look only to that which he sees in the present, but also to the antecedents and the things to come; because, just as the beauty of a verse is not perceived in one syllable, but in the integrity of the verse, so he cannot regard the beauty and praiseworthiness of the divine works who regards them in part.

---