Dist. 32, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/32/q/bon-sent-II-d32-dubia
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### Doubts concerning the text of the Master.

**Doubt I.** In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about that which he says: *There remains therefore, as Augustine says, in the body of this death the carnal concupiscence.* For since after baptism nothing ought to remain in us except a *promoting punishment*, and concupiscence is rather a *suffocating punishment* than a promoting one; it ought not to remain in the *body of this death*. But that it is a *suffocating* punishment is plain from the following text, in which it is said: *We are bidden not to obey its noxious desires.* If therefore the desires of concupiscence are noxious, and we are forbidden to obey concupiscence: then it seems to be a *suffocating* punishment. — Likewise, the act of concupiscence binds the reason, especially in the work of the generative power; but such is a suffocating punishment: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that the concupiscence which remains after baptism is not a *suffocating punishment*, because it does not bar the entrance to the spiritual life; for it stands together with grace. *Moreover*, although it incites to the unlawful, yet it does not prevail, because our appetite is beneath us, and we can have dominion over it. But this concupiscence remains in our members as a *promoting punishment*, especially with regard to the exercise of the fight, which conduces to the increase of merit and of the crown. This was well signified in the entrance of the children of Israel into the land of promise, in which the Lord left them adversaries, with whom they might fight, and through whom God might test them, whether they loved God or not, as is plain in the book of Judges. And there are also several other utilities, to which a man is moved on the occasion of the concupiscence left in him; but these can be found in the fourth book, distinction four.

By this the answer to the two objections becomes plain. For concupiscence does not *suffocate*, unless we are willing to obey it; and although in the act of generating the use of reason is *impeded*, yet there is not there a *suffocation*, because such an act can be meritorious.

**Doubt II.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *Through the grace of baptism concupiscence is mitigated and diminished.* Against this it stands: for either the grace of baptism *has an opposition* [to concupiscence], or *not.* If *yes*: then the one cannot stand with the other: therefore, when grace comes, concupiscence withdraws, it is not diminished. If it is *not opposed* to it: then it seems that it does not diminish it. — Likewise, if concupiscence is diminished through grace: then since it is finite, it seems that at some time it would be totally taken away; which is against Augustine in the text, who says that «this is not granted except by an ineffable miracle, that the law of sin be utterly extinguished».

Therefore there is here a question, whether the tinder [of sin] has in anyone been totally extinguished.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as was said above, concupiscence says two things — for it says an immoderate appetite for the changeable good — I say therefore that this immoderateness about the appetite can be in two ways: either so that the reason is *taken captive*, and the soul is perverted, so that it has a necessity of preferring the changeable good to the unchangeable good; and thus it is called *intense* concupiscence, and in this manner it holds the formal character of *fault*, namely by reason of that immoderateness. In another way concupiscence says an immoderateness, not because the reason succumbs to the sensuality, but because the sensuality *does not perfectly comply* with the reason; and in this manner it holds the formal character of *punishment.* In the first manner, since it holds the formal character of *fault*, it is directly opposed to grace itself; and therefore supervening grace takes away that immoderateness, on account of the fact that such immoderateness posited a lack of due justice. But the other immoderateness, which, as was said, says the formal character of *punishment*, grace does not take away at its coming, on account of the fact that it is not formally opposed to it. But since grace and the concupiscence left [in us], with respect to that to which they incline, have a certain opposition; hence it is, that according as a man is more exercised in grace, concupiscence is said to be more and more remitted. — Yet concupiscence is never altogether taken away, because the root of it always remains in man, unless it be taken away by a special gift of grace, as is believed to have been the case in the Virgin after the conception of the Son of God. But this has its place rather in the third book, when it is asked about the sanctification of the Virgin.

But by these things which have been said, the objections become plain. For grace and concupiscence are in a certain manner opposed, and in a certain manner not, as has been shown. — To that which is objected in the second place, that concupiscence is finite, therefore at some time it is totally taken away; it must be said that this would be true, if concupiscence were diminished with regard to its *cause*; but it is only diminished with regard to its *exercise* or by comparison to that *to which it is [directed]*; and therefore it is never totally taken away, just as the aptitude of the soul is never totally removed by sin; and this will be seen better below.

**Doubt III.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that *the vice of concupiscence remains in the oldness of the flesh as something overcome and slain, unless by an unlawful consent it revive and be recalled into its own kingdom.* For this seems to be false, because, if concupiscence, insofar as it reigned, was called original sin by Augustine; it seems that if it is recalled into its own kingdom after baptism, original sin would return. But if this is false, it remains etc. — Likewise, things which are of diverse genera, the one does not increase the other; but the unlawful consent is a *fault*, the concupiscence left [in us] is a *punishment*: therefore it is not increased by an unlawful consent.

**I respond:** It must be said that concupiscence is increased by an unlawful consent, as Augustine says, and this for a twofold cause. First, because grace is expelled, by whose presence the reason was set over the sensuality, and consequently concupiscence was remitted. The other reason is, that a power by the frequency of acts becomes more prompt to go out into a like act; and because the unlawful act says an act of desiring: hence it is, that concupiscence is increased by the unlawful act as by something like it.

To that therefore which is objected, that then original sin returns; it must be said that this does not follow, for a twofold cause. First indeed, because reigning concupiscence is not called original sin, except insofar as it has both kingdom and dominion from the very origin of man. But when it has this through an unlawful act, it does not have the character of *original* sin, but rather of *actual.* — There is also another reason, that concupiscence is diminished by baptism in one way, and increased by unlawful consent in another. For by baptism it is so diminished, that there is taken away that which *formally* was original sin, namely the lack of due justice. For there one is absolved from the *debt* of original justice, to which all were bound by the very obligation of Adam; but by unlawful consent it is said to be *increased*, on account of the fact that, while a man sins, he becomes more prone to evil, at least *intensively* and with regard to some determinate genus of sin.

To that which is objected, that concupiscence, insofar as it is a *fault* and insofar as it is a *punishment*, is of diverse genera; it must be said that although they are of diverse genera in the genus of *morals*, yet not in the genus of *nature*; for the act of each is to desire. *Moreover*, although concupiscence, insofar as it is a *punishment*, is not of the same genus with concupiscence, insofar as it is a *fault*, formally speaking, yet since it is a *vicious punishment*, it of itself orders to that [fault], and on account of this the one is increased by the other, as experience itself teaches.

**Doubt IV.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *As other sins pass away in act and remain in guilt, so conversely it can come about that concupiscence pass away in guilt and remain in act.* But on the *contrary*: if concupiscence remains in act, then in original [sin] not only is *guilt* considered, but also *act*: therefore it ought to be called *actual sin.* — Likewise, he seems to say what is false, when he says that other sins pass away in *act* and remain in *guilt.* For when actual sins are forgiven in baptism, they pass away both with regard to *punishment* and with regard to *fault.* In penance also they pass away with regard to the *guilt* of eternal punishment. And *if you say* that there remains a guilt unto satisfactory and temporal punishment; it is *objected* likewise concerning original [sin], after whose deletion in baptism there remains an obligation unto death and unto other temporal punishments.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master here broadly calls *act* not only the *actual motion* itself, but also that *proneness* according to which a man is ordered to act. And therefore he says that original sin remains in act, because, since there is there a *privation* of original justice, by which a man is guilty of the lack of the vision of God, there is also a *proneness*, by which a man is ordered to the act of desiring; that privation of original justice is taken away, and that habitual inclination is left.

But to that which is objected concerning the actual passing-away, it must be said that the Master does not speak of a passing-away which is by the *deletion* of sin, but by the *consummation* of sin, by which manner the present is said to pass into the past. Therefore he says that it passes away with regard to *act* and remains with regard to *guilt*, because the act is in *becoming*, but the guilt is in *rest*.

**Doubt V.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *The soul is not such as God made it.* On the *contrary*: in a sudden operation the *becoming* and the *having-become* are simultaneous; but this argument is necessary: God makes the soul, therefore it is; therefore also this: God makes such a soul, therefore it is such: therefore the Master implies two opposites in the text. — Likewise, I ask: either God made the soul *just*, or *unjust.* If *just*: then God gave it justice, and this is false; for justice was never created together with this soul. If *unjust*, and it is such: then the soul is such as God made it.

On account of this there is a question, of what sort God made the soul; and it does not seem that it can be granted that he made it *unjust*, since the highest justice cannot make anything unjust. Likewise it does not seem that he made it *just*, because, since in the first instant it was unjust, it would have been at once just and unjust, and these are incompossible. For it does not seem that a middle can be granted concerning these, because these two are immediately opposed concerning the soul.

**I respond:** It must be said that when it is asked of what sort God made the soul with regard to goodness and malice, this can be understood in two ways: either with regard to the goodness of *nature*, or with regard to the goodness of *morals.* If with regard to the goodness of *nature*, thus it must be conceded that he made the soul *good*, and it is still good. If with regard to the goodness of *morals*, thus it must be said that he neither made it *good* nor *evil.* He did not make it good, because he did not give that goodness to the soul, the infection from the side of the body resisting, to which the soul was united in the same instant in which it was created. He did not make it evil, because, although the soul from the instant of its creation is evil, yet this is not from *God creating*, but from the *flesh infecting.* And therefore the Master says that this is not to be conceded: the soul is such as God made it, but rather *the converse*; not because God gave it *actual justice*, but because he gave it the goodness of nature for having ordered justice, of which justice it is deprived through the infected flesh.

And thus the objections become plain. By this manner also it would have to be answered, if it were asked concerning an evil *action*, which is posited to be from God, insofar as it is action. For it is not from God insofar as it is *just*, because it is not just; nor insofar as it is *unjust*, because injustice is not from God; but it is from God with regard to the goodness of nature, by which it is indifferent to either. In a like manner it is to be understood in the creation of the soul.

**Doubt VI.** Likewise it is asked about that which is said in the last chapter, that *from the very creation one soul is subtler than another in essence and more apt for understanding and remembering.* For this seems to be false, because, as Gregory says, «he begat all men equal by nature»: therefore likewise also from the very creation the souls are equal.

Likewise it is asked, whether subtlety of intellect and aptitude for remembering come from the side of the *body*, or from the side of the *soul.* And that they come from the side of the *soul*, the Master seems to say in the text. But the contrary of this seems [true], because we see that the soul itself, which is not varied through times, is now more dull, now keener for understanding. But this cannot be except from the side of the *body.* — Likewise, we see that the choleric are naturally of better intellect than the phlegmatic: therefore if this bespeaks complexion from the side of the body, it seems etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as the Master says in the text, it is sufficiently probable that in the very creation there is a pre-eminence in souls. And that they are said to be *equal*, this is not understood with regard to the privation of the order of natural things in *pre-eminence*, but with regard to the privation of the order in *dominion* and *servitude.*

But if it be asked whence comes this pre-eminence of natural things, whether from the side of the *soul*, or from the side of the *body*; it must be said that, since the soul is not for the sake of the body, but *the body for the sake of the soul*, this pre-eminence comes from the side of the *soul*. But in this one soul excels another, not by reason of the principle *from which* [it is], since it is from nothing, but by reason of the wisdom of the Creator, who produces all things according to due order. — Yet it is not to be denied that the body does much toward the exercise of those aptitudes which are in the soul from its creation. Hence a good disposition of the body much avails, just as on the contrary a bad one much hinders; and on account of this the choleric are judged to be of good intellect, because the soul, with regard to the use of that aptitude, is aided by the suitable disposition from the side of the body. Nevertheless that is not the principal reason of good intellect, because we see that sometimes men of contrary complexion are ingenious. Hence since we see men apt for diverse exercises, some for the mechanical arts, some for the liberal [arts], and again some for mathematics, some for metaphysics, some for natural [sciences], some for rational [sciences]: if the reason of this be asked, the *theologian* will answer that this is from the distribution of the gifts of God, from whom proceed not only gratuitous gifts, but indeed also natural gifts; and all such things are called *graces* by the Saints; and of these is understood that which is said in the fourth chapter of First Peter: *Each one, as he has received grace, administering it to one another* etc. But the *natural philosopher* will answer that this comes from the diverse disposition from the side of the body, whether with regard to complexion, or with regard to organization. Yet both answer well, but the *theologian* better, because he assigns the more principal cause; whence also the *Philosopher* in the book *On Animals*, when he assigns the causes of the disposition of the members, where he does not find the principal cause from the side of nature, has recourse to the disposition of the Wisdom that fashions [them].

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