Dist. 33, Art. 3, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/33/q/bon-sent-II-d33-a3-q1
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### ARTICLE III.
### *On the punishment of original sin.*

Consequently it is asked, as to the third article, concerning the punishment of original [sin]. And concerning this two [questions] are asked. First it is asked, whether those dying in original [sin] alone are punished with the punishment of material fire. Second it is asked, whether they are punished with the punishment of interior sorrow, or only [with] the lack of the vision.

### QUESTION I.
### *Whether little children dying in original [sin] alone are punished with the punishment of material fire.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether little children dying in original [sin] alone are punished with the punishment of material fire. And that they are, it seems.

1. Augustine, *On Faith, to Peter*: « Hold most firmly that little children who pass from this world without the Sacrament of baptism are to be punished with the everlasting torment of eternal fire ».

2. Likewise, Augustine: « Whoever begins to live in such a way that he ends life before he is loosed from the obligation of it, namely of original [sin], if for the space of one day or one hour the soul has lived in the body, it is necessary that he, together with the same body, sustain the interminable torments of Gehenna ». From this it is expressly gathered that to original [sin] is due not only the lack of the vision of God, but also the punishment of fire.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by *reason*. Little children in this life sustain many afflictions and penalties; either therefore *justly*, or *unjustly*. Not *unjustly*; this is established, because every punishment is just. If *justly*; therefore original guilt merits this. If therefore guilt ought not to remain unpunished, and original [sin] merits the punishment of sense; it seems that little children are tormented with sensible punishment.

4. Likewise, that is more worthy to be punished in which the cause of sin more resides; *for through the things by which someone sins, through those he ought to be tormented*; but the transmission and cause of original sin most resides in the flesh: therefore it seems that it especially ought to be punished. If therefore the soul by the merit of that guilt is worthy to be deprived of the vision of God, much more strongly is the flesh worthy to be tormented with eternal torments.

5. Likewise, to little children bodies endowed [with gifts] will not be restored, they will therefore have passible bodies; but everything passible must at some time suffer either from without, or from within, especially when it is brought near to an active agent: therefore it seems that the bodies of little children will at some time suffer and be afflicted.

**On the contrary:**
1. Augustine in the *Enchiridion*: « Their punishment indeed will be the mildest, who, besides the sin which they drew originally, added nothing further »; but if little children were to lack the vision of God and be punished with material fire, they would not have the mildest punishment. If therefore no one doubts that they are to be deprived of the vision of God, it seems in no way to be held that they are to be punished with bodily torment.

2. Likewise, the Master in the text, in the chapter *Alioquin*: « For the original sin which little children drew from their parents, they will feel no other punishment of material fire, or of the worm of conscience, except that they will lack the vision of God forever ».

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [to follow] by reason. It is unjust to exact more in punishment than was committed in guilt: if therefore the little child by no act of his own contemned the divine command, it seems that no eternal torment is due to him.

4. Likewise, the bitterness of the punishment corresponds to the quantity of the delight, according to that [passage] of the Apocalypse: *As much as he glorified himself and was in delights* etc.; but the soul which was joined to the body of an infirm and weak little child sensed no inordinate delight in the body: therefore it does not seem that the bitterness of sensible punishment is due to it.

5. Likewise, it is more horrible to be continually and eternally in torments than not to be at all: if therefore God were to assign to eternal torments a soul which he created without the perpetration of any sin; he would seem to bestow no benefit on it, nor would mercy run together with justice. But if it is unfitting to say this of the Father of mercies, it seems etc.

### Conclusion.

> Little children dying in original sin do not feel the bitterness of the punishment of fire, yet they are deprived of the vision of God and placed in a base place.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that here there is a twofold opinion.

For some, attending to the rigor of divine justice and of the sentence by which God torments eternally a human for one slight mortal [sin], in which there was a momentary and as it were nothing of delight; say that little children will be burned with material fire, yet far less than those who sinned by actual sin. And they say that Augustine held this, when he said in the *Enchiridion* that « the punishment of little children is the mildest », and in the book *On Faith, to Peter*: « Little children will be tormented with eternal torment ». For he calls that punishment *the mildest* not absolutely, but in respect of others. Nor in

this, as they say, is anything derogated from divine mercy, although *more* is manifested of justice than of mercy, for the reason that it is a lesser evil to be in such a punishment than not to be at all, since there is not there so great a privation of good, as Augustine manifests in the book *On Free Choice*. And they say this to be fitting, that, just as in original sin there was the lack of due justice and concupiscence, so also in the punishment there should be the lack of the vision of God and the affliction of eternal fire.

But since it seems very hard to say that God acts so harshly and so severely with little children dying thus, who altogether could not avoid either the death of guilt or the death of nature, especially since we see that God acts mercifully in many things with the most impious and most wicked sinners: therefore there is another, milder position, which more agrees with the piety of faith and the judgment of reason, [namely] that, because little children dying with original [sin] lack justice and the grace of the Holy Spirit, which is the *pledge of the eternal inheritance*, they are deprived forever of the vision of God; but because in the flesh there was foulness, therefore they are placed in a base place, namely an infernal one; but because they did not have in themselves actual delight of sin, neither in spirit nor in flesh, therefore they do not feel the bitterness of the punishment of fire. — This way of speaking the masters more commonly approve; and therefore, sustaining it according to the opinion of the Master, as appears in the text, I grant the reasons which are adduced toward this part.

1. 2. To that therefore which is first objected to the contrary concerning the words of Augustine, it must be said that Augustine in those words does not intend to say that little children are tormented sensibly; but he intends to manifest their punishment as to the lack of the vision of God and also as to the baseness of the place. And this he expresses very abundantly, saying more and wishing less to be understood. Nor without cause does he speak thus. For he does this in order to root out that heresy which said that little children are punished with no punishment. Whence just as in moral matters it is a teaching that he who wishes to arrive at the mean from one of the extremes must as it were incline toward the other extreme, as the Philosopher teaches; so also blessed Augustine, in order to root out that heresy which said that little children are immune from all punishment, and to lead [them] back to the mean, namely to the punishment of the lack of the vision of God, simply asserted that they are eternally damned together with other sinners. But this his meaning he explained in the *Enchiridion*, where he said that their punishment is the mildest, as the Master says in the text.

3. To that which is objected, that little children sustain many penalties in this life; it must be said that although to be punished *temporally* for original sin is just, yet it does not follow that [they are punished] *eternally*. And the reason for this is that temporal punishments are not only punitive, but also promotive; whence God afflicts not only his enemies, but also his friends, as appears in Tobias and Job; and therefore in temporal affliction the benignity of mercy is joined to the severity of justice; which two ought elegantly to be found in every punishment and reward of God. But thus it would not happen to be found in eternal punishment; for this would be purely of the rigor of justice, if it tormented the souls of little children with the torment of the fire of Gehenna.

4. To that which is objected, that in the flesh the cause of sin most resides; it must be said that although the *cause* of sin in some manner resides in the flesh, this is by way of a certain *habit*, not by way of an *act*. Whence the flesh does not make the soul of the little child *concupiscing*, but *concupiscible*; and on account of this neither it nor the soul in it ought to be tormented by the actual burning of fire; but just as the *soul* is deprived of the vision of God, so also the *flesh* is deprived of its robe and is placed in a base and dark place, when it ought to be placed in the empyrean heaven, if it had been healed from the corruption of such foulness by the efficacy of baptism.

5. To that which is objected, that little children do not have endowed bodies, but rather passible ones; it must be said that for something not to suffer from something happens in two ways: either from the *power* which it has in itself, or from the *order of divine justice*. I say therefore that, that the bodies of little children are lacking passion, this is not on account of the *power* which they have of resisting in themselves, but rather on account of the *order of divine justice*, according to whose rule the infernal fire has to act, since it is the instrument of divine justice. Whence just as the same fire torments the greater sinner more than the lesser, so in the same fire the bodies of those who sinned by actual sin suffer. But the bodies of little children,

even if they are rolled about in the very infernal fires, do not feel passion, and yet they do not have the gift of impassibility, because they do not overcome the force of the fire by that which they have from their own power. And *if you object* to me that they ought to suffer, by a passion coming from within, such as hunger and thirst, since they do not have impassible and immortal bodies; it must be said that, just as the bodies of the damned, since they are passible and defectible, yet by the sustaining divine power are perpetuated in life, so that they are not consumed by the fires; so also the bodies of little children are continued in life by the same divine power, so that they need neither food nor drink; nor yet do they have that firmness and solidity which the glorious bodies will have.