Dist. 34, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/34/q/bon-sent-II-d34-a1-q2
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### QUESTION II.
### *Whether sin is from the will, as from an efficient or a deficient [cause].*

Secondly it is asked, whether evil is from a good cause, namely from the will, as from an efficient or a deficient [cause]. And that it is, it seems:

*Fundamenta.*

1. First, by Augustine in the *Enchiridion*, where he says thus: « Let no one seek the cause of an evil will; for it has not an efficient cause, but a deficient one ».

2. Likewise, this seems [to follow] by what is said by Dionysius *On the Divine Names*: « Evil is beside nature and beside cause »: but it is agreed that he does not mean that evil is not from anything, he means therefore that it is not from another as from a truly causing and efficient [cause]: therefore if it is in any way [at all], it remains that it is as from a deficient [cause].

3. Likewise, it seems [to follow] by *reason*. As the effect stands to the efficient act, so the defect [stands] to the deficient itself; but a true effect cannot be drawn into being except by a cause as *efficient*: therefore neither a defect except by a *deficient* [cause]. But « evil is a defect about nature », as Augustine says: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, everything perfect is from a perfect cause, therefore everything deficient from a deficient cause; but an evil work is called evil on account of the defect of some due circumstance: therefore evil is from a deficient cause.

5. Likewise, *to do* and *to fail* are opposed, likewise *to construct* and *to destroy* are opposed: therefore just as *to construct* is to do, so *to destroy* is to fail. But to go forth into evil is to corrupt some good, since nothing is called evil except what harms or takes away something of good: therefore to go forth into evil is to fail.

6. Likewise, all efficiency is from the first and highest efficient [cause]; but evil is in no way from God: therefore it in no way proceeds from anything as from an effective principle.

**On the contrary:** 1. Dionysius *On the Divine Names*: *To the opposite.* « The soul is the cause of evil, as fire of [the becoming] hot »; but fire is the cause of [the becoming] hot by the mode of an efficient [cause]: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, everything that can be before it is has an efficient cause; but evil can be before it is: therefore etc. The major and minor are manifest.

3. Likewise, that thing is the more judged the efficient cause with respect to which it is the more sufficient; but our will is the more sufficient for evil than for good: therefore it ought the more to be called the efficient cause of evil than of good: if therefore the good is from the will as efficient, evil will likewise be [so].

4. Likewise, if the will is the cause of evil, insofar as it is deficient, either that defect is *punishment*, or *guilt*. If *punishment*: therefore punishment before guilt. If *guilt* — let us then speak of the first guilt — either then it is from the will, insofar as it is deficient, or not. If so: therefore before the first guilt there is guilt. If not: therefore if the first evil is not from the will as deficient, it seems that there is no evil [at all].

5. Likewise, if the first evil is from the will as deficient, then either by a natural defect, or by a praeternatural [one]. If by a natural defect: therefore it is naturally and always a principle of evil, since it always has this defect in itself. If by a praeternatural defect: either it is *contracted*, or *inflicted*, or *voluntarily acquired*. In none of these ways can it be posited in the will of Lucifer and of the first human: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, if evil is from a deficient will, either insofar as it fails from the *highest good*, or insofar as it fails from the good which it *ought to have*. If insofar as it fails from the *highest* good: therefore, since such a defect is in every creature, in every [creature] sin will be found. If insofar as it fails from the good which it *ought to have*; but no one fails from such a good unless he be deprived [of it] by the merit of some guilt: therefore in no way can the first guilt be from a deficient will.

*(An incidental question.)* There is therefore a question: what is the ground or disposition about the will, by reason of which it is the proximate and immediate cause of evil itself? For it does not seem to be the cause because it is a *being*, for this belongs to every being; nor because [it is] *from nothing*, since this belongs to a good will as much as to an evil one; nor again because [it is] *willing*, by the same account; nor because [it is] *willing evil*, since *to will evil* is the first sin, and *to will evil* is the first evil: if therefore the same is not the ground or cause of itself, the will will not be called the cause of evil because it is *willing evil*.

### Conclusion.

> That evil is from the will as deficient can rightly be understood in three ways.

**I respond:** *(A general conclusion.)* It must be said that without doubt evil or sin is from the will as deficient, as Augustine expressly says, and Dionysius agrees. *(It is explained.)* For the understanding of which it is to be noted that, when some effect is said to be from some cause under a disposition or condition superadded, this can

be understood in three ways: either so that that disposition states something *praeambulary* to that effect, or because it states something *annexed*, or because it states that same effect as *informing and denominating* its effective principle. In the first way light is said to be from the *shining* sun; for *to shine* is an act praeambulary to *to illuminate*. In the second way light is said to be from the *warming* sun; for heat accompanies light. In the third way light is said to be from the *illuminating* sun; for when I say *the sun illuminates*, and *light is from the sun*, the same influx is meant, yet [it is] imported in one way and in another according to the diverse comparison. — In this manner it is to be understood in the matter proposed, that, when it is said that evil is from a deficient will, this can be understood in three ways.

*(A threefold defect in the will.)* On account of which it is to be noted that a threefold defect is found about the will; one indeed *natural*, another *culpable*, and a third *penal*. The *natural* defect I call defectibility itself, which is in the will by this very fact, that it is from nothing; the *culpable* defect I call sin itself; the *penal* defect, that loss or harm or injury which follows upon it.

*(Concluding from these the special [conclusions].)* Of each of these defects the aforesaid discourse holds truth. For the evil of guilt is from the will deficient by a *natural* defect, in such a way that that defect is praeambulary to guilt; for the will could never fail in willing the good, unless it had vanity and defectibility in itself. Likewise evil is from the will deficient by a *penal* defect, in such a way that that defect is annexed to guilt; for never is there the disgrace of sin without the beauty of justice. It is true also that the evil of guilt is from the will deficient by a *culpable* defect, yet not by another guilt, but by the same, compared in diverse ways; for it is the same guilt by which the will and its interior action are deformed. Whence it is thus conceded that evil is from the will deficient, just as the act [is] from the acting substance.

*(Corollaries.)* Since therefore there is a threefold defect about the will, by reason of which evil can be called [as] from a deficient will, of which one, namely the *natural*, is praeambulary to the defect of *guilt*, but the other, that is the *penal*, is consequent and annexed; the *penal* defect inseparably follows the *culpable* defect; for it is impossible that there be « the disgrace of sin, as Augustine says, without the beauty of vindication ». But the *culpable* defect does not follow necessarily nor inseparably upon the *natural* defect. Whence it does not necessarily follow, if anywhere there is a natural defect, that there be *guilt*; for the will sins not by this very fact, that it is from nothing, but by this very fact, that, being from nothing, it is able to fail; by this very fact, that it is a will, it is able to keep the rectitude of justice; but by this very fact, that the will is from nothing, it is able, so far as is in itself, to desert it; and so that defect about the will renders it capable of sinning.

*(To the incidental question.)* But if you ask what makes the will go forth into sin, and what is its immediate disposition with respect to guilt; it must be said that no disposition is superadded; but the will itself, which is mistress of its own act and free, can convert itself toward that to which it wills and as it wills; and if it convert itself unduly, then it sins, with no new disposition superinduced on the part of the will which is praeambulary to guilt itself. Whence just as he who stands upright could at once, if he willed, without a new disposition supervening, let himself fall; so the will, standing upright and in order toward the ultimate end, is able to go forth from it; and that going-forth is sin. — From what has been said, therefore, it is plain in what manner evil is from a deficient will; and from these things is manifest the response to all the things which have been objected to the contrary.

*Solution of the opposing [arguments].*

1. To that which is first objected, that the soul is the cause of evil, as fire of [the becoming] hot; it must be said that there is no likeness as to the *special* mode of causing, but [only] the *general*. In the *general* mode of causing there is agreement, since each stands in the account of an *efficient cause*; but in the *special* there is difference, because fire is a cause by the mode of nature and necessity, but the soul by the mode of liberty; the former by the mode of *position* and of a *truly efficient* [cause], the latter by the mode of *privation* and of a *deficient* [cause].

2. To that which is objected, that evil can be before it is etc.; it must be said that evil, in the manner in which it has *being*, in that manner has also its *coming-to-be*; and since evil is a privation and a defect, as will appear below; hence it is that, just as *to be evil* is not *truly to be* something, so neither is *to be made evil* truly *to be made* by anything as efficient, but [only] as deficient.

3. To that which is objected, that the soul is the more able [to incline] toward evil; it must be said that sufficiency in failing is not sufficiency *simply*, but sufficiency *in a certain respect* and *simply* insufficiency; and therefore to infer true efficiency from such sufficiency is a paralogism *from a certain respect to the simple*.

For the first proposition is understood of sufficiency *simply*, as is plain to one who inspects [it].

4. 5. 6. To that which is asked, whether that defect be *guilt*, or *punishment*; and whether it be *natural*, or *praeternatural*; and again *with respect to what*; the response is now plain. For in all these ways, as has been said, it can be taken. But insofar as it is taken for the *natural* defect, which is in the creature from this, that it is from nothing, there is not noted there the condition of the defect as the proximate and immediate cause of sin itself, as was said before. But insofar as it is taken for *guilt*, it is not noted that it precedes, but that it denominates the will. For never is the *act* deformed by the will, but that the *will* be deformed. Insofar as it is taken for *punishment*, it is not noted to precede, but to accompany. — And by this those three things are plain, and the others which are asked consequently.