Dist. 34, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/34/q/bon-sent-II-d34-a2-q1
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### ARTICLE II.
### *On evil in comparison to the subject in which it is.*

Consequently it is asked about the second principal point, namely about evil in comparison to that in which it is. And concerning this three things are asked.

The first is, whether it happens that there is found an evil sequestered from every good.

The second is, whether evil has being in the good opposed to it.

Thirdly it is asked, whether evil is in that in which it is, as a certain habit, or [as] pure privation.

### QUESTION I.
### *Whether anything is so evil that it has nothing of good.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether some evil is sequestered from every good, and this is to ask, whether anything is so evil that it has nothing of good, but is evil in the highest degree. And that it is so, it seems:

1. « In things which are said per se, if simply [is referred] to simply, and more to more, and most to most », by the consideration of the Philosopher; but this is true per se: to good evil is opposed: therefore to a greater good a greater evil, and to the greatest good the greatest

evil: if therefore it happens that there is found a highest good, therefore also a highest evil. For « if one of opposites is posited in nature, consequently the other also is posited ».

2. Likewise, more and less is said by approach to a terminus: therefore where there is found *more* and *less*, it happens that there is found a *highest*; but in evil there is found *more* and *less*: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, either there is a stopping-point among evils, or not — it is agreed that it is necessary to posit a stopping-point; for it is posited in everything that is in act — but the stopping-point is not short of the highest: therefore it is necessary to posit a highest evil. But this is what has nothing of good: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, « everything *per accidens* is reduced to *per se* »: therefore if there is to be posited an evil *per accidens*, there is to be posited an evil *per se*; but that *per se* is present in something which has its origin from the proper principles of it: if therefore something is evil *per se*, it seems that its principles are evil; and if its principles are evil, the whole is evil; and if the whole is evil, there is nothing there of good: therefore from the first, if there is to be posited an evil *per accidens*, there is to be posited something which is *simply* and *totally* evil. But it is agreed that the first is to be posited: therefore also the other.

5. Likewise, everything said *by participation* is reducible to what is said *by essence*: when therefore something is said to be evil, either it is said *by participation*, or *by essence*. If *by essence*; but the good *by essence* is the highest good, which has nothing of evil: therefore likewise there will be something so evil that it will have nothing of good. If it is said *by participation*; and every such thing is reduced to what is said *by essence*: therefore it returns necessarily that something is evil essentially: and so the same as before.

6. Likewise, « in any genus there is found one first thing, by which are measured all the things which are of that genus ». This is plain and is manifest through the Philosopher, who proposes this in the tenth [book] of First Philosophy; this also is manifest *by induction*. Therefore in the genus of evils there is found some one thing which is the measure of all evils; but that can be nothing except the highest among all evils: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. If there is to be posited a highest evil, which has nothing of good; and to be some good is [good]: then there is to be posited, that the highest evil is, and yet has not being. But these are two incompossibles: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, « every power, as the Philosopher says, is of the genus of goods », therefore if something is the highest evil, it can do nothing at all; but the highest in every genus can do more than that which is short of the highest: if therefore that which is not the highest evil can do something, that which is the highest evil can do many things: therefore by the very fact that it is the highest, it can do *many* things and can do *nothing*. But these two are incompossibles: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, « every science is of the genus of goods », not only the science of good, but also the science of evil; for to know evil is good. If therefore something is the highest evil, it lacks the knowledge of good and evil: therefore it neither knows how to do evil nor to harm; but by the very fact that it is evil, it knows how to harm good: therefore by the very fact that it is the highest evil, it knows and does not know good and evil things. But these are incompossibles: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if something is the highest evil, it is evil *by essence* and necessarily; but if it is evil *by essence* and nature, it is natural to it to do evil. But everything, while it does what is natural to it, *does well*; and what does well is good: therefore if something is the highest evil, it itself is good, and while it does evil, it does well. But this is impossible: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, if something is the highest evil, it is the vilest; for the more evil something is, the viler it is; and if it is the vilest among evils, therefore among them it is the lowest. But what is the lowest among evils is not the highest head of evils: therefore what is the highest evil is not the highest evil. If you say that it does not follow: it is the vilest, therefore it is not the highest evil, because this is to be the highest evil, which is the lowest in respect of goods; it is objected, because if something is posited as the highest evil, it ought not to be posited *above* others, but *below*, according to the right order: therefore it is not the *god* of darkness, but the *servant*; which is against that error.

6. Likewise, if there is a highest evil, then it will be as omnipotent in evil as the highest good is in good: therefore every evil is subject to its power; but the corruption of any good whatever is evil: therefore the corruption of any good whatever is subject to the power of the highest evil: therefore if there is a highest evil, it can corrupt every

good. But a good which can be corrupted is not the highest: therefore if there is to be posited a highest evil, there is no highest good; and if there is no highest good, there is no good: therefore from the first, if there is to be posited a highest evil, there is no good. But if this is altogether false and impious, it is manifest etc.

### Conclusion.

> Both faith and reason dictate that nothing is so evil that it does not have something of good.

**I respond:** It must be said that to posit that there is some evil which has nothing of good is not only [a mark] of heretical perversity, but also of manifest blindness and stupidity. For as was shown in objecting, the very position implies opposites within itself. For it implies that that thing, namely the highest evil, *is* and *is not*; that the same thing *can* and *cannot*; and that the same thing *knows* and *does not know*. And while it implies opposites within itself, it destroys itself. For in positing that the highest evil is, which has nothing of good, it posits that that thing is not the highest; it posits that it is not evil; it posits also that it has no good opposed [to it]. And all these things were shown in objecting, which manifestly convince that this error is foolish and blind; and they show its author or inventor to have been blinded and impious. For never would the impious Manichee have been thrust into such great darkness, had he not long before been a servant of the god of darkness, who blinded his mind, so that the *illumination of truth* which irradiates over every intellect did not shine in him. And to this day this worst error flourishes, although it is most irrational. And the chief cause of this is *pride* itself, the mother of blindness, which reigns in certain laymen as to the things which are of faith and morals. For since they are uneducated, they presume to expound sacred Scripture, which is the most profound of all writings; since again they have a certain exterior respectability, they despise the life of all others; and by the merit of this twofold pride they are blinded, so as to fall into that worst error, by which they are so blinded that they do not know how to discern what is good and what is evil, while they posit that many kinds of goods are from an evil god. These Isaiah foreshows in the fifth chapter: *Woe! you who call evil good, and good evil, putting light [for] darkness and darkness [for] light.* And on account of the excessive blindness in which they are, having as it were lost the use of reason, arguments have no efficacy in them for persuading, nor torments for drawing them back, nor the suffrages of prayers for relieving them, unless this be done by a most special grace. — Repudiating this heretical, nay most foolish and blasphemous position, let us say, as the catholic faith and right reason say, that nothing is so evil that it does not have something of good.

But for the understanding of the objections it is to be noted that *highest* in some genus can be said in two ways. In one way is said *highest*, than which nothing can be *greater*; and in this way it does not happen that there is found nor posited a highest evil; for nothing is so evil that it could not be worse, for the reason that it has something of good, of which it could be more deprived, and so it would be still worse. And for this reason Dionysius says that « evil is infinite ». In another way is said *highest*, than which nothing is *greater according to act*, but it itself exceeds among all others; and in this way it happens that there is found a highest among evils. For Lucifer, who is *king over all the sons of pride*, is the worst over all. — These things having been seen, it is easy to respond to the objections.

1. To that therefore which is first objected concerning the opposition of evil, it must be said that the consideration is understood thus, that the term be taken in the same way, when it is said *simply*, and when it is said *with excess*; but it is not so in the matter at hand. For when it is said that good is opposed to evil, here good is taken *by participation*; but when it is inferred concerning the highest good, there good is taken for the good *by essence*, which alone is the highest good, and to it nothing is opposed.

2. To that which is objected, that more and less is taken according to the greater and lesser approach to a terminus; it must be said that it is true in those things which state a *position*; but it is not true in those things which state a *privation*, rather they are taken *by recession*. Whence a greater evil is said [to be] that which recedes more from good; and because it never recedes so much that it cannot still [recede] more; hence it is that there is never a highest to be posited there.

3. To that which is objected concerning the stopping-point, it must be said that the stopping-point is according to *act*; but it is not necessary that there be a stopping-point according to *potency*, so that there could not be progress further. For although in created things it does not happen that one finds an *actual infinite*, it does happen that one finds an *infinite in potency*, as is plain in number by addition and in the continuum by division. So also it is to be understood in the matter at hand; and this will be manifested below, when corruption of evil is treated.

4. 5. 6. To that which is objected, that *per accidens* is reduced to *per se*, and likewise what is said *by participation* to what is said *by essence*, and likewise that in any genus there is found one first thing etc.; it must be said that these have a place in those things which state a position and a nature, which can be caused from the principles of the subject, and which can be said essentially, and according to which other things can be measured according to their greater and lesser participation of it. But evil states a privation, insofar as it is evil; and therefore those three reasons have no place here. — And this is what deceived the Manichee, as Augustine says, because he did not know what evil was. And because he wished to dispute about evil, not knowing what this was, therefore he cast himself and many into error. For his pride made him ignorant of the manner of learning. For in every inquiry it is necessary first to understand « what it is that is said by the name », and to bring this as it were as a foreknowledge with oneself to the properties of the thing to be known afterward.