Dist. 34, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/34/q/bon-sent-II-d34-dubia
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### Doubts concerning the text of the Master.

**Doubt I.** In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked about that which he says, that *the evil will of an angel or of a man is the cause of the evils that follow.* But on the *contrary*: Augustine in the book *Eighty-three Questions* says that « by no other author can a man be made worse »: therefore the evil will of an angel or of a man cannot cause evil wills in others. — *Likewise*, if every evil ought to be imputed to him who is the first cause, and the evil will of an angel or of a man is the cause of all evils: therefore all evils are to be imputed to them.

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a cause *truly efficient* and producing, and there is a cause that is in a certain manner *disposing* and *inducing.* When therefore it is said that *the evil will of an angel or of a man is the cause of the evil wills that follow*, this is said by way of a certain *disposition* and *inducement.* For the devil induces and disposes by suggesting; but man [does so] by corrupting nature and by furnishing a bad example. But when Augustine says that «by no author is a man made worse», this is understood as [no] *principal* author. — *Otherwise.* Yet it could be said that this text is understood of the evils following the first evil will of man and of the angel, not with respect to diverse persons, but with respect to the *same* [person], so that his first evil will is the cause of all the evils which he himself does.

**Doubt II.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says in the same chapter: *The will of man is the cause both of sins and of punishments;* because punishment is an involuntary passion; but what is caused by the will is voluntary: therefore punishment is not caused by the will. — *Likewise*, if it is caused by the will, [it is caused] either by a *good* one, or by an *evil* one. Not by a *good* one; this is clear, because no one is punished for a good will. Not by an *evil* one; because an evil will is not the cause of what is just, insofar as it is such; but every punishment is just: therefore no punishment is caused by the will.

**I respond:** It must be said that the will is said to be the cause of something in two ways; either by way of *meriting*, or by way of *efficiency.* When therefore it is said that the will is the cause of punishment, this is not said by way of *efficiency*, but rather it is said by way of *meriting.* For the will, by causing fault either by acting or by failing, merits punishment, and so it is said to be the cause of punishments and of sins, although in one way and in another. And by this the solution of the objections is plain.

**Doubt III.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *The good, entirely lacking evil, is an integral good.* For this seems to be false, because an integral good is that to which nothing of good is lacking; and this is the good in which is every good: therefore that alone is an integral good which is the highest good. But many created things are lacking all evil, as the blessed Angels and the blessed souls: therefore if what he says were true, many things would be supremely good. — On account of this there is a question, whether anything created merits to be called an integral good.

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as *perfect* is said in many ways: both with regard to the perfection of *sufficiency*, and with regard to the perfection of *superabundance*; so also integral good can be said in many ways: both with regard to the integrity of *sufficiency*, and thus that is called integral good which lacks all evil of fault and of punishment; and with regard to the integrity of *superabundance*, and thus that is called integral good in which is every good. And in the first manner integral good is not said to be the highest good, but a *pure* good, because it has nothing of evil admixed. But in the second manner it is said to be the highest good, and it is in God alone by *essence*, but in a creature by *participation*, which is called good in this, that it participates in the highest good, from whose participation it is said to have every good. And *if you object* that *highest* is said by the unmixedness with the contrary, and thus the good which is entirely unmixed with evil is the highest good; it must be said that this is true in those contraries, of which each is some nature; but in those of which one is a nature, and the other a privation, as is the case with good and evil, light and darkness, it does not hold true. Hence just as a thing is not said to be more luminous because it has less of darkness, so a thing is not said to be more good because it has less of evil; but just as one star is said to be greater than another because it approaches more to the perfection of light; so that is said to be more good which approaches more to the perfection of goodness. Nevertheless, entirely lacking evil cannot be said [of any] except God alone, so that emphasis be placed on this, that I say *entirely*, so that it lack all evil according to *act* and according to *potency* and according to *aptitude*, or according to the first possibility of nature.

**Doubt IV.** Likewise it is asked about that word of Augustine, which he says in the exposition of that saying: *Woe to those who call evil good* etc.; *that which was said in the prophecy is to be understood of the things themselves, by which men are evil, not of the men.* For this seems to be false, because, just as he sins who says that adultery or homicide is good, so he sins who says that the impious man is just. Hence also he is cursed who justifies the impious for bribes: therefore it has to be understood not only of things, but also of men.

**I respond:** It must be said that when I say *an evil man*, I also say *man*, and I say *malice.* Goodness therefore can be attributed to him, either the goodness of nature according as he is *man*, or the goodness of morals by reason of *malice.* And in the *first* manner indeed, to attribute goodness to him is [an act] of truth, not of the prophetic detestation. In the *second* manner, he merits a curse; but this is so, not because he praises the man, according as he is *man*, but because he praises him, according as he is *evil.* And this is nothing else than to praise malice. For when Augustine says that this is not understood of *men*, but of *things*; he does not deny that there is sin in commending an evil man; but he wishes to say this, that there is no sin if *nature* be commended, but there is sin if *malice* be commended.

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