Dist. 34
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/34/q/bon-sent-II-d34-littera
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### DISTINCTION XXXIV.

#### Chapter I.

#### *On actual sin.*

After the foregoing concerning actual sin, certain things must be considered with diligent inquiry, namely what was the origin and cause of the first sin, whether a good thing or an evil thing; afterward, in what thing sin is; then, what sin is, and in how many modes it comes about, and concerning the difference of these sins.

#### Chapter II.

#### *What was the first origin and cause of sin.*

The first cause and origin of sin was a good thing, because before the first sin there was not anything of evil from which it could arise. For since it had an origin and cause, it had it either from good or from evil. But evil did not exist before; therefore it arose from good. For sin first arose in the angel, and afterward in man. And what was the angel but a good nature of God? The evil which was in the angel did not arise from God, nor from any other than from the angel; therefore it arose from good. Whence Augustine, in his responses against the heretic Julian, who had said: "If sin is from nature, then nature is evil"; he says: I ask that, if he can, he answer. It is manifest that from an evil will, as from an evil tree, all evil works are made, as evil fruits; but whence does he say that the evil will itself arose, except from good? For if from the angel — what is the angel but a good work of God? If from man — what was man himself but a good work of God? Nay, what were these two, before the evil will arose in them, but a good work of God and a good and praiseworthy nature? Therefore evil arises from good, nor was there anything from which it could arise except from good. I say, therefore, that no evil preceded the evil will, but it took its origin from good." — Here it is plainly said that the first cause and origin of evil was a good nature. And nonetheless it is shown of what sin it was the cause, namely of the evil will.

#### Chapter III.

#### *What was the secondary cause of evils.*

But that evil will of the angel and of man is also the cause of the subsequent evils, namely of evil

works and of evil wills. Whence Augustine in the Enchiridion: "We ought by no means to doubt that the cause of the good things which pertain to us is nothing but the goodness of God; but of evil things, the cause is the will of changeable good, falling away from the immutable good — first that of the angel, afterward that of man": "this is the first evil of the rational creature, that is, the first privation of good." — Behold, you have it that the first will of changeable good, that is, of the angel or of man, falling away from the immutable good, that is, from God, is the cause of the evil things that pertain to us, since it is the cause both of the sins and of the penalties by which human nature is oppressed. The first origin and cause of sin, therefore, was a good, and the second an evil, which arose from the good.

#### Chapter IV.

#### *That the cause of evils is not save in a good thing.*

The origin of evil having been shown, it remains to see in what thing evil is, namely whether in a good thing or in an evil thing. — He who rightly and keenly understands, understands evil to be not save in a good, that is, in a good nature. For evil is the corruption or privation of good; but where good is not, there cannot be corruption or privation of good. Sin, therefore, cannot be save in a good thing. For just as bodies are corrupted by diseases and wounds, which, as Augustine says in the Enchiridion, "are privations of that good which is called health; so also whatever are the vices of the soul are privations of natural goods. For what else is that which is called evil, but the privation of good?" "For to diminish good is an evil; yet however much it be diminished, it is necessary that something remain, if it is still a nature. For the good which is a nature cannot be consumed, unless the nature itself also be consumed. But when it is corrupted, the corruption of it is therefore an evil, because it deprives it of good in whatever degree. For if it deprives of no good, it does not harm; but it does harm: therefore it takes away good. As long, therefore, as a nature is corrupted, there is in it a good of which it is deprived." "And through this there is nothing that is called evil, if there is no good; but a good, altogether lacking evil, is an entire good. But that in which there is evil is a vitiated or vicious good; nor can there ever be any evil where there is no good. Whence a wondrous thing comes about, that since every nature, insofar as it is a nature, is a good, nothing else seems to be said, when a vicious nature is said to be an evil nature, except that the evil is that which is good, and that there is no evil save what is good." By this connection it is evidently intimated that evil cannot be save in a good thing; where also, although it may seem absurd, it is plainly said that there is an evil which is a good. From which it is gathered that nothing else is signified, when a man is called evil, but a good evil. Whence Augustine in the same place adds: "What is an evil man but an evil nature? for man is a nature. Moreover, if man is some good, because he is a nature, what else is an evil man but an evil good? Yet when we distinguish these two, we find that he is not evil because he is a man, nor good because he is iniquitous; but good because he is a man, evil because he is iniquitous. Every nature, therefore, even if it be vicious, insofar as it is a nature, is good; insofar as it is vicious, it is evil."

#### Chapter V.

#### *That in these things the dialecticians' rule concerning contraries fails.*

And therefore "in these contraries, which are called evil and good, that rule of the dialecticians fails, by which they say that two contraries cannot be in one thing at the same time. For no drink or food is at the same time sweet and bitter; no body is at the same time white where it is, and there black; and this is found in many and almost all contraries, that they cannot be at the same time in one thing. But since no one doubts that good and evil are contraries, not only can they be at the same time, but evils altogether cannot be without goods and save in goods. And these two contraries are so together that, if there were no good in which the evil could be, there could not possibly be any evil at all, since corruption would have not only no place where it might subsist, but nothing whence it might arise, unless there were something that could be corrupted; for corruption is nothing else than the extermination of good. From goods, therefore, evils arose, and they are not save in goods"; "nor was there at all anything whence any evil nature might arise, save from the good nature of the angel and of man, whence first arose the evil will."

From these things it is opened up what we said above must be investigated, first and second, namely what was the origin of evil, and in what thing it is. That it arose from a good thing and consists in a good thing is proved by the foregoing testimonies.

But against what has been said, "that there is an evil which is a good," some object thus: if we say that a good is an evil, we fall into that prophetic sentence where it is read: Woe to those who call good evil, and evil good. Therefore, if we wish to avoid this curse, we ought by no means to say that a good is an evil, and conversely. But Augustine determines this in the same book, saying: "What was said in the pro-

phecy is to be understood of the very things by which men are evil, not of men. Whence he who calls adultery good, upon him falls that prophetic detestation," and upon him who "says that a man is evil, or that an iniquity is good. For he who says that a man, insofar as he is a man, is evil, and that goodness is iniquity, blames the work of God, which is man, and praises the vice of man, which is iniquity."

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