Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/35/q/bon-sent-II-d35-a1-q1
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### ARTICLE I.
### *Whether the good is corrupted through sin.*

### QUESTION I.
### *Whether sin is a corruption of the good.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether sin has the power to corrupt some good. And that it does, it seems.

1. Augustine in the *Enchiridion*: « What else is that which is called evil, except the privation of good »? « For to lessen the good is evil ». Since therefore guilt is commit-

ted, necessarily there some good is deprived; but it cannot be granted that it be deprived by anything other than by guilt: therefore it is necessary to posit that sin has [the power] to deprive the good and by depriving to corrupt it. And this Augustine intimates more expressly a little afterward, when he subjoins: « Therefore evil is a corruption of nature, because it deprives it of good in whatever way ».

2. Likewise, this same thing Augustine shows by such a reasoning: « That which deprives of no good does no harm », therefore that which harms deprives of some good; but evil harms, this is manifest: therefore it takes away some good and deprives of some good; but that which deprives and takes away good, that corrupts: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, as the vices of bodies stand to bodies, so the vices of souls to souls; but the vices of bodies injure and in some manner corrupt bodies: therefore the vices of souls corrupt something about the soul itself; but such vices are sins: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, when someone sins, either he loses something of good, or nothing. If nothing: therefore he is as good afterward as before: therefore he who sins is as good as he who does not sin: therefore one ought to please God as much as the other; which is manifestly false. It remains therefore that he loses something of good. But that good which is lost, is corrupted: therefore it is corruptive of some good.

**On the contrary** it is argued thus:

*To the opposite.*

1. First, by the authority of Augustine, who says that « sin is a corruption of mode, species, and order »; but it does not belong to a corruption to corrupt — for if a corruption corrupted, by parity of reasoning so would another corruption, and so to infinity; and again, it does not belong to an action to act — therefore it seems that, if sin is a corruption, it does not belong to it to corrupt.

2. Likewise, if sin corrupts — either by reason of the underlying good, or by reason of the defect. By reason of the underlying good, no, because, since to corrupt the good is evil, the good, insofar as it is good, would be the cause of evil; which is false. If by reason of the defect; but on the contrary: to corrupt is to act; no defect is a principle of action: therefore sin does not corrupt by reason of the defect.

3. Likewise, if it corrupts, then either it corrupts the one sinning, or another. Another, no; this is established, because there are many sins which are not committed against another. If it corrupts the one sinning; but on the contrary: nothing corrupts itself; and nothing is by nature apt to be agent and patient with respect to the same [thing]; and again, no evil of punishment corrupts the one punishing: therefore it seems that the evil of guilt corrupts neither the one sinning nor any other: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if it corrupts, [it does so] either on the part of the flesh, or on the part of the soul. On the part of the flesh, no, because there are many sins which contribute to the regimen of bodily health and to the delight of the flesh. If on the part of the soul; but on the contrary: the soul is immortal, therefore in it no corruption falls; for if corruption did fall, it would be impossible for it to be perpetual.

5. Likewise, if it corrupts, either it corrupts as to substance, or as to the powers, or as to the act. As to substance, no; this is established. As to the powers, no, as it seems, because the powers are incorruptible, like also the substance; furthermore, they are neither intensified nor remitted, nor does anyone have a lesser power of will after guilt than before guilt. As to the act, no, as it seems, because sin lays the act under itself and presupposes it; and nothing corrupts that without which it cannot be and through which it goes forth into being: therefore sin does not corrupt as to the act nor as to the power, as has been seen: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, if sin corrupts some good, then either it corrupts the good of nature, or the good of grace. Not the good of nature, because it is not opposed to it, and as Dionysius holds, « nothing of existing things is corrupted in that which is essence or nature ». If therefore it corrupts the good of grace: therefore no one can sin except one having grace, because good is not corrupted except in that in which it is. But this is false, because sinners can sin: therefore etc.

The question therefore is, what is that good which sin has [the power] to corrupt in us?

### Conclusion.

> The evil of guilt corrupts the good, not by taking away or diminishing the power, but by removing the habit of rectitude and diminishing the intermediate aptitude.

**I respond:** It must be said that, without doubt, as Augustine in many places says, sin corrupts and deprives of some good. For since through sin there comes about a deformation and darkening of the soul, nor can it be understood that anything is deformed or darkened without the loss of some light and beauty; it is necessary to understand that through sin some good in us is corrupted.

For the understanding of which it is to be noted that sin is not just any privation, nor of just any good, nor found in just any creature, but sin or guilt is the privation of justice. « But justice, as Anselm says, is the rectitude of the will ». But the will is in the rational creature alone, and through this also justice; and just as justice is the rectitude of the will, so guilt, which is injustice, is the bending-aside of the will. Just as therefore through the bending-aside there comes about a turning-away from rectitude and a certain destruction of rectitude, so in the commission of guilt there comes about in the soul a certain removal or corruption of rectitude. — And it is to be attended to that, since for the rectitude of the will three [things] concur, namely the rectifiable power itself and the habit of rectitude itself and the intermediate aptitude itself; sin does not corrupt the power itself, insofar as it is a power, neither simply nor in a qualified way; but the habit of rectitude itself it simply removes; the intermediate aptitude itself it in some manner corrupts and in some manner leaves. Therefore it neither diminishes nor takes away the power, it simply removes justice, but it diminishes the intermediate aptitude, while a human through sin is rendered less and less apt for the rectitude of justice, according as a line which is more and more curved is less apt for the disposition of rectitude. — It is to be granted therefore, as the reasons show, that the evil of guilt has [the power] to corrupt the good.

1. To that indeed which is objected, that it does not belong to a privation to deprive, nor to a corruption to corrupt; it must be said that, although an act does not have [the power] to generate another act, yet a habit has [the power] to be generated from acts; and therefore the evil of guilt, insofar as it is a corruption and disorder existing in the act, can be the cause of the disorder of the will as to the habit. And therefore sin or the evil of guilt is said to corrupt, because the inordinate act renders the will unapt; nor is it signified by this that an action is from an action, but that the disorder in the habit is from the disorder in the act.

2. To that which is asked, whether evil corrupts by reason of the underlying good, or by reason of the defect; it must be said that to corrupt states two [things], namely to act and to fail; for corruption is an action with a defect. I say therefore that the evil of guilt has [the power] to corrupt, such that by reason of the underlying good there is the ground of acting, but by reason of the defect there is the ground of failing. And this is plain: for the will, while it sins, corrupts itself, because, while it moves itself inordinately, it renders itself disordered and less apt for the good; nor can it disorder itself except by willing and by moving itself. And when I say it moves itself, I state some underlying good; but when I say inordinate, I state a defect. And of this Augustine puts a sufficiently fitting example, and the Master recites it in the text, that malice corrupts, just as abstinence corrupts. For toward the corruption of abstinence there concur both the natural consuming force and the defect of nourishment, and thus action with a defect. Similarly it is to be understood in the matter at hand.

3. To that which is asked: whether the one sinning corrupts himself, or another; it must be said that he corrupts himself. But as to what is subjoined, that nothing corrupts itself; it must be said that it is true, if it acts according to the operation due to its nature; but guilt does not come about according to the order of nature, but beside nature. And if one objects that nothing is agent and patient with respect to the same; it must be said that that is false in those powers which can reflect upon themselves. For, as Anselm says, « the will is an instrument moving itself »; and when it moves itself inordinately, it injures itself and inflicts harm upon itself, for the reason that either it deprives itself of right order, or it withdraws itself from right order.

4. To that which is asked, whether sin corrupts by reason of the flesh, or of the soul; it must be said that [it does so] principally by reason of the soul. For even if some sin corrupts by reason of the flesh, this happens just as the superfluity of intercourse or of food and drink harms the body. But in the soul sin always makes some corruption, not as to substance, according to which it is immortal and incorruptible, but as to rectitude and the aptitude toward it, according to which the soul is changeable and scarcely remains in the same state, as is plain by experience, as long as we are in this misery.

5. To that which is asked, whether it corrupts as to substance, or as to power, or as to act; it must be said that the evil of guilt corrupts as to the act, not simply, but insofar as that act is orderable to the end; for guilt does not deprive [it of] the act itself, but deprives [it of] the order of the act to the end. And in this same way I say that it does not corrupt the power, but the aptitude or orderability through which it is ordered to its completion. But that objection runs as if it diminished the powers under the character of power, and the act under the character of act; and therefore that [point] is plain.

6. To that which is asked, whether it corrupts the good of grace, or of nature; it must be said that, speaking properly and generally, the evil of guilt is the privation of the intermediate aptitude between the good of nature and the good of grace, which in some manner holds the middle between

the good of grace and the good of nature. And by reason of that whereby it orders toward the good of grace, the moral good and evil are reckoned with respect to it; but by reason of that whereby it is natural, it has being not only in the just, but also in sinners; and therefore sin, whether it be done by someone who has justice, or be done by a sinner, always finds something which it deprives and corrupts.