Dist. 35, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/35/q/bon-sent-II-d35-a1-q3
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### QUESTION III.
### *Whether sin, from the fact that it corrupts the good, is contrary to the uncreated good.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether sin, from the fact that it corrupts the good, is contrary to the uncreated good. And that it is, it seems:

*Arguments for the affirmative part.*

1. First, by Augustine, in the twelfth [book] *On the City of God*: « A vice is contrary to God as evil to good; but to the nature which it vitiates it is not only contrary, but also noxious »: therefore it seems that evil, in that it corrupts a nature, is contrary to the highest good.

2. Likewise, that which makes a human rebellious and contrary to God, that is especially contrary to God; but sin makes the human an enemy of God, and [makes him] fight against God and resist [him], as can be gathered from various places of Scripture: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, contrariety of effects attests to a contrariety of causes, especially when the cause is so toward one of the contraries that it cannot be toward the other; but it belongs to the highest good to make justice, whereas it belongs to sin to deprive of justice, and God cannot deprive of justice, nor can evil make justice: therefore it seems that malice is contrary to the highest good in this, that it deprives of justice.

4. Likewise, that which is contrary to someone's precept is contrary to the one commanding it; but evil is contrary to the words and commandments of God in this, that it is corruption, and corrupts that which the commandments of God enjoin to be kept: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, charity and cupidity are opposed, and similarly grace and guilt are opposed; but charity and grace unite [us] to God and make [us] like [him], and in this they have the greatest agreement with the highest good: therefore conversely cupidity and guilt render the soul deformed before God and separate [it] from him; and if so, then they have contrariety and repugnance toward God.

**On the contrary:**

*For the negative part.*

1. Evil is contrary to nothing except that to which it is an evil, and is an evil to nothing except that to which it does harm: if therefore no evil can harm the highest good, because then it would no longer be the highest; it seems that, by reason of the privation of the good, no evil is contrary to the highest good.

2. Likewise, all « contraries are by nature apt to come to be about the same [subject] »; but evil is in no way apt to come to be about the highest good: therefore it is in no way contrary to the highest good.

3. Likewise, of all contraries there is some proportion; but of evil to the uncreated good there is no proportion: therefore there is no contrariety of this evil to that highest good.

4. Likewise, every contrary in some way resists and is repugnant to its contrary; but nothing can resist the divine power, since it is most omnipotent: therefore it is impossible that evil be contrary to God, neither in itself nor in his work.

5. Likewise, nothing that contributes to the beauty of a work is contrary to the wisdom of the artificer; but the evils which are perpetrated contribute to the adornment of the universe: therefore in no way are they contrary either to the goodness or to the wisdom of the Creator.

It is asked therefore in what measure that is to be understood, [namely] that evil makes the human an enemy and adversary of God, since the will of God is fulfilled out of all things, and all things lie subject to his will and command.

### Conclusion.

> Sin, corrupting the good, is contrary to the uncreated good only in its effect, and indeed in part, not simply and universally.

**I respond:** It must be said that some evil being contrary to some good can be understood in two ways: either in itself and according to form, or in its *effect* and in operation. *(Conclusion 1.)* In the first way evil cannot be contrary to the highest good, since that is good by essence, to which nothing whatever is contrary. *(Conclusion 2.)* But in the second way it can be contrary in a *certain* manner, and in a *certain* manner not. For in two ways one can be repugnant to another in its effect: either because it is repugnant on the part of the *power of the agent itself*, or because it is repugnant on the part of the *fitness of the recipient itself*. *(Conclusion 3.)* — In the first way nothing can be repugnant to God in his work, since the power of God is most omnipotent, and therefore can find no obstacle. In the second way a subdistinction must be made, because to inflict harm on the effect can be twofold: either *simply and universally*, or *in part*. *(Conclusion 4.)* — In the first way nothing can be contrary to God in his work. For so great and such is the order of the universe, which the Creator gave to it, that it cannot be perturbed by any evil, according to what Augustine holds in many places. *(Conclusion 5.)* But in the last way something can be repugnant to God in his effect, because through evil it well happens that some effect of God is rendered less fit for the reception of the divine influence toward attaining the perfection and beatitude to which it is ordained by its primary condition. — And thus it is clear that in one way evil can be said to be contrary to God in his effect, as the reasons adduced for the first part show; but in the other ways not, as the reasons show which are adduced for the second part; and thus by diverse ways they conclude truly and are to be granted.

*(To the incidental question.)* By this same manner there must also be a solution to that which was last asked, namely in what measure someone is called an enemy of God. For according to the aforesaid manner the *will of good-pleasure* and the *will of sign* are to be distinguished. The will of good-pleasure is God himself; but the will of sign signifies some created effect. When therefore it is said that some human is adverse to God, this is not understood [to mean] that he is adverse and hostile to the will of good-pleasure, which no one can resist, but rather it is always fulfilled either *by the human* or *concerning the human*; but this is said as regards the will of *sign*, because, since God commands one thing, the evil human does the contrary and so is adverse to God; and such a human, who is thus adverse to God, God hates, not by *affection* and repugnance of will, but by the *effect* of punishment; for thus he afflicts the human, just as one would afflict his adversary; and thus by afflicting him, he orders him to his own honor and renders him subject to himself. And thus to the will of good-pleasure the other wills are subservient

and do service, although some seem contrary by reason of that which is repugnant to the will of sign. So too all evils are ordered by God, although they seem to be repugnant to the divine order in some particular effect. And by these things which have been said, the things asked can readily enough be answered.