Dist. 35, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/35/q/bon-sent-II-d35-a2-q1
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### ARTICLE II.
### *On the manner in which sin corrupts the good.*

Consequently, with respect to the second principal point, it is asked concerning the manner of corrupting the good through sin. And since Augustine says that « evil is the corruption of mode, species, and order », concerning this three things are asked.

First it is asked, whether by any evil these three are corrupted simultaneously and inseparably.

Secondly it is asked, whether these three are corrupted by evil equally or as-equally-principally.

Thirdly it is asked, whether they can be corrupted totally.

### QUESTION I.
### *Whether mode, species, and order are corrupted by any evil simultaneously and inseparably.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether by any evil these three, namely mode, species, and order, must be corrupted simultaneously and inseparably. And that it is so, it seems:

1. First, by the definition of evil which Augustine sets down: « Evil is the privation of mode, species, and order ». For if this account is correct, then it ought to apply to any evil: therefore any evil is privative of these three.

2. Likewise, it is impossible that there be mode without species and order, and conversely; but things which necessarily accompany one another in being, necessarily accompany one another in privation. If therefore evil is the privation of any of these, it is necessary that it corrupt those three together.

3. Likewise, there is a greater connection in these three, namely mode, species, and order, than there is in the habits of the virtues, which are formally diverse according to species; but on account of the connection of the habits, when one habit is lost, necessarily all of them too are lost: therefore much more strongly, when by evil order is taken away, species and mode are taken away together.

4. Likewise, by the gift of grace the soul and its capacity are bettered with respect to these three, namely mode, species, and order — for grace renders the soul better and more beautiful and more upright — therefore since guilt is directly opposed to grace and takes away grace itself, it seems that it corrupts and diminishes these three simultaneously and inseparably.

**On the contrary:**

*To the opposite.*

1. Mode is regarded in a creature by comparison to God under the character of *efficient* [cause], and species under the character of *exemplar*, and order under the character of *end*; but although a creature be disordered from God according to comparison under the character of *end*, nevertheless its comparison to God under the character of *efficient* and *exemplar* is preserved: therefore upon the cor-

ruption of order there does not necessarily follow the corruption of mode and species.

2. Likewise, in bodies we see that mode is removed without species, and that species too can be removed without order by some evil which harms the good of nature — for someone having an undue quantity has [yet] the beauty of form, and conversely, and similarly it is in order — but the evil of guilt stands to mode, species, and order in spiritual things just as the evil which harms nature [stands] to mode, species, and order in corporeal things: if therefore in corporeal things those three are not deprived simultaneously and inseparably, it seems that neither [are they] in spiritual things.

3. Likewise, we see that other natural goods are so disposed that one can be removed without the other, as fortitude without eloquence, and conversely: therefore if mode, species, and order state natural goods of the soul itself; it seems that one ought to be deprived without the other by the evil of guilt.

4. Likewise, « only one is opposed to one »: therefore one evil is opposed to one good; either therefore any sin encloses within itself three sins or evils, or, if the sin or evil is single, it seems that it does not remove these three simultaneously and at once. *If you say* that these three concur together into one good; I ask how this can be understood, since they seem to differ formally. — And again, since they must be found in all things, how are they said to be deprived through the evil of guilt, which is not found except in the rational creature alone?

### Conclusion.

> Every sin corrupts, concerning the will, these three — mode, species, and order — simultaneously and inseparably.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it is to be noted that there was a threefold manner of distinguishing and assigning mode, species, and order in things.

For some took these three according to diverse *properties* considered in the same thing, such that mode states something pertaining to the genus of quantity, and species something pertaining to the genus of quality, and order something pertaining to the genus of relation. — But this manner of assigning does not accord with the words of Augustine. For he holds that in any good however small, not only in substance, but also in the property of substance, these three are to be found; whence these three extend to all the genera of beings and of the predicaments.

But another manner of assigning and distinguishing these three was by comparison to diverse [things]. For any thing can be considered in three ways, namely in itself and by comparison to other things of the universe and in comparison to an end. As it is considered in itself, so mode is regarded in it; for each thing is in itself finite and modified. As it is compared to other things, so species is regarded in it, just as the beauty of the parts is regarded according to the position which they have in the whole. As it is compared in relation to an end, so order is regarded in it; for each thing is ordered when it directly tends to the end for which it is. — But this manner of speaking, although it seem more probably to be elicited from the words of Augustine, yet does not perfectly attain the truth. For with all other things set aside, one sole soul remaining, it can still sin, and there can still be regarded in it mode, species, and order.

And therefore there is a third manner of speaking, more reasonable than the aforesaid, that mode, species, and order are considered in the same thing according to diverse comparisons or relations to the same. For they are regarded in each creature, insofar as it is a vestige of the Creator; which vestige indeed consists in the comparison of the creature to the Creator according to the threefold genus of cause, as was said in the first book, such that mode is regarded according to the comparison of the creature to the Creator in the character of efficient cause, species in the character of exemplar cause, and order in the character of final cause. And because any being, however small, has this comparison to God, in any created being these three are found.

According to this manner, therefore, it is to be considered that the rational creature both is a certain nature, and is further, beyond other creatures, operating through the will. And in each way it is to be compared to God; and in each way there are to be found in it mode, species, and order; in each way also there is to be found concerning it the evil which is corruptive of these three. But the evil of guilt properly consists concerning it, insofar as it is voluntarily operating; and therefore it deprives [it of] mode, species, and order, insofar as they consist concerning the will itself, as it is voluntarily operating. But the will, when it ha-

s mode, species, and order, as it ought, is good. But our will is good when, in moving or operating, it is continued to the divine power as to the moving principle, and is conformed to it as to the directing rule, and is united to it as to the quieting end; and in the first mode is regarded, in the second species, in the third order, according to comparison in the threefold genus of cause. But whenever anyone sins, he is necessarily discontinued from God as from a moving principle, because God never moves to sin; he is discordant from God as from a directing rule; and he removes himself and is disordered as from a quieting end, setting up the creature as his end. And in every sin it is necessary that these three concur. — And thus it is clear that every sin corrupts, concerning the will, these three, namely mode, species, and order, simultaneously and inseparably. — And the reasons showing this are to be granted. But to the reasons adduced to the opposite it is easy to respond.

1. To the first then which is objected, that the comparison to the efficient and the exemplar always remains preserved; it must be said that the will, as it is a certain nature, has to be compared to God by that threefold genus of cause; and according to this it has a certain mode, species, and order, in which it communicates with every genus of creature; and the evil of guilt does not in this mode deprive [it of] those. In another mode, as was said before, it has to be compared to God as moving and directing and quieting; and in this mode the comparison to God under the character of exemplar or directing rule does not remain preserved, nor even under the character of mover, just as it does not remain under the character of end.

2. To that which is objected, that in bodies one can be taken away without the other; it must be said that these in bodies can be taken in two ways: in one way, as they are taken according to diverse dispositions; and in this way one can be taken away without the other, but in this way the character of vestige is not regarded in them. In another way, as they are regarded according to the same according to comparisons, namely as the same substantial form gives mode, species, and order according to diverse comparisons in the threefold genus of cause; and this I say as to first being; or as the same accidental form gives [them] as to well-being; and in this way it never fails but that, if corruption occurs in mode, consequently it also occurs in species and order, and conversely.

3. To that which is objected, that in other natural goods it is not so; it must be said that it is not similar, because the other natural goods differ essentially; and therefore one can be corrupted and removed without the other. But it is not so in mode, species, and order, rather they are founded concerning the same, as has been shown.

4. And through this the response to the last [objection] is clear. For although mode, species, and order seem to be three goods, yet they are not diverse by essence, but state three comparisons of the same good. — There is clear also that which was lastly asked, namely why guilt is not in all things in which mode, species, and order are found, [the reason being] that it is not the privation of those three insofar as in them consists the general character of vestige, and they consist concerning every creature, but [it is the privation of them] insofar as they consist concerning the deliberative will.