Dist. 35, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/35/q/bon-sent-II-d35-a2-q3
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### QUESTION III.
### *Whether mode, species, and order can be totally corrupted by evil.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether it can happen that these three be totally corrupted by evil. And that they cannot, it seems:

*Fundamenta.*

1. By Augustine in the *Enchiridion*: « To diminish the good is evil, although, however much it is diminished, something remains »: therefore by guilt the whole good is never taken away which is corrupted by evil; but such good is reckoned in mode, species, and order: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book *On the Nature of the Good*, speaking of these three: « Where these are great, the good is great; where small, [it is] small; where none, [it is] nothing »: therefore if by guilt there were made a total removal of these three, there would be made an annihilation of the sinner; but this is impossible, that the soul should be annihilated by sinning: therefore it is impossible that these three be totally corrupted.

3. Likewise, evil, if it is evil, takes away something; but it is impossible that anyone should commit so many evils and sin so much that he could not still sin: therefore he never sins so much that guilt does not still find in him some good which it can take away. But this good consists in mode, species, and order: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, no one is to be despaired of while he is on the way: therefore however much he sins, he still has the aptitude for doing well; but as long as he has the aptitude for doing well, he still has some good which evil can corrupt; and if this, he has mode, species, and order: therefore these are never totally corrupted by the evil of guilt.

5. Likewise, let us grant that in someone they are totally corrupted; then it is asked: either he ceases to be, or not. If so: therefore by sin it happens that an immortal and incorruptible substance is corrupted, namely the rational soul; which is impossible. But if he does not cease to be: then either he can sin, or he cannot. If he can sin: therefore he can lose some good; and if this, he still has something of aptitude and of mode and species and order, which are corrupted by the evil of guilt. If he cannot, then the rational substance which cannot sin, having

a free will, is better than that which can sin, because it is more like God: therefore through a multitude of sins a man would arrive at a better state. But this is false and impossible: therefore so also is that from which it follows, namely that mode, species, and order are totally taken away by sin.

**On the contrary:**

*To the opposite.*

1. Everything from which removal and subtraction is made, if it is not infinite, is at some time totally removed; but every good which is in the soul, whether it be an aptitude or a power, is finite: therefore if by the evil of guilt it is taken away and removed, it is necessary that at some time it be totally removed.

2. Likewise, if a given evil takes away a given amount of good: then a greater evil takes away more, and a double evil takes away double; but there is no sin so great that it could not still be greater: therefore if one small sin takes away something of the good, it is possible that the soul commit so great a sin that it totally lose the good of which it is deprived by sin.

3. Likewise, given any corporeal quantity, however little is taken away from it — as if from the sea a drop of water were taken — it can be understood that at some time the whole is taken away: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems [to hold] in the quantity of power, that however little is taken away by evil, if a man sins continually, at some time the whole will be consumed.

4. Likewise, as grace stands to proneness, so does guilt stand to good aptitude; but grace can so increase that it altogether takes away proneness, as appears in Christ and the blessed Virgin, in whom there was so much grace that there was in them no proneness to evil: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that guilt can so increase that aptitude for the good is totally lost.

5. Likewise, as the state of glory confirms in the good, so the state of damnation confirms in evil: therefore as through glory a man is rendered incapable of evil, so through eternal damnation he is rendered incapable of the good; but wherever there is an incapacity for the good, there is no aptitude for the good: if therefore the aptitude for the good is that which is taken away by sin, and whose mode, species, and order is taken away by guilt; it seems that these are at some time totally removed.

### Conclusion.

> The will's aptitude for the good, and in it mode, species, and order, can by guilt always be diminished, but never totally taken away.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt by the evil of guilt it does not happen that the will's aptitude for the good is altogether removed and deprived, nor [its] mode, species, and order, which are reckoned according to it. And this manifestly appears, because the will can never be without a natural aptitude and fitness for the good. As therefore the will cannot by sinning cease to be, so it cannot lose that whole aptitude and totally lose the mode and species and order which are reckoned according to it. And this indeed Augustine says expressly, and all the doctors commonly agree in this. — But how that aptitude is continually diminished by sin and yet never finished or consumed, is difficult to assign; and on this diverse [authors] have thought in diverse ways.

For some wished to say *(opinion 1)* that that aptitude is never totally taken away, on account of this, that, even though it be finite in itself, it is nevertheless orderable to an infinite good and to infinite acts; and therefore it can never be taken away, neither through the magnitude of sin nor through the multitude of sin. — But this manner of speaking does not satisfy. For the aptitude, however much it is diminished by sin, is still [ordered] to an infinite good, is still also [ordered] to infinite acts: therefore on that side it is as great as it was before: therefore in nothing is it diminished: therefore the ordering to the infinity of the good, or to the multitude of acts, contributes nothing to the diminution of that aptitude; nay rather from this it could be argued that it is in no way diminished, since the infinite is not less than the infinite on that side on which it is infinite.

And therefore others said otherwise, *(opinion 2)* that that aptitude, even though it be always diminished, is never totally taken away, because it is *divisible to infinity.* For just as in corporeal things the quantity of mass is divisible to infinity and can never be so diminished by division that it could not still be made smaller; so in spiritual things the aptitude of the power, which is a quantity of strength, can never be made so small by sin that it could not still be made smaller; and this in no way prevents that something be finite in act and infinite in division, and thus that it be always diminishable and never totally consumable. — But neither does this manner of speaking satisfy. For although the continuum is divisible to infinity, nevertheless there is never any continuum so great that, if it be diminished by a diminution however small, and then consequently there be made a removal of a part as small as before, and so proceeding consequently, [it can fail] at some time to be wholly consumed — as is clear, if from a mountain there were taken away something as small as a single atom — therefore if evil takes away something of that aptitude, since there are not there infinitely many such [parts], at some time it will be totally consumed. If you say that this would be true if in the following sin as much were taken away as in the first; but now it is not

so, because ever less and less is taken away, and thus it is never finished — for if someone in diminishing should take the thousandth part of the diminishable, and then the thousandth part of the remainder, and so proceeding never totally take [it] away — if, I say, you speak in this manner, you do not satisfy, on account of this, that a greater guilt takes away more of the good; and a greater guilt can follow upon a lesser preceding guilt, and so proceeding consequently: therefore a greater and greater removal can always be made, and thus necessarily at some time the consuming of that whole good will be able to come about.

And therefore some said otherwise, *(opinion 3)* namely that the fact that that aptitude is always diminished and never finished comes from this, that it is durable and continuable to infinity, although it be finite in act. Hence *(example)* just as the water which is in a gushing spring is finite in act; yet it can never be so drained that it does not always remain, on account of this, that there is in it the power of continually flowing in: so also in the case at hand they say it stands, that that aptitude for the good has its origin from the freedom of the will; and however much the will renders itself unfit in act, yet because it always remains free, it can always make itself fit for the good. And therefore, just as if someone were to withdraw the rays from the illuminating sun, the sun could continually restore its rays, although they have finitude in act; so also in the case at hand they say it stands. And therefore, since sin cannot destroy the will itself, which is the root and principle of that aptitude, and the will can always continue that aptitude; the evil of guilt can never totally consume it, although in some manner it can diminish [it]. — But neither does this manner of speaking satisfy. For if the aptitude were not finished on account of this, that it is continually restored; then two unsuitable [consequences] would follow, of which one would be that the aptitude would be diminished only for a time, just as neither [is] the water of the spring; the other would be that a man could rise again from sin by himself, if the will could without grace restore that aptitude and by restoring continue [it].

And therefore there is a fourth manner of speaking, *(opinion 4)* namely that the aptitude can always be diminished and never totally consumed, and this because it is *capable of being drawn away from rectitude to infinity.* For just as a curved line can be drawn away from rectitude infinitely, *(example)* that is, never so drawn away that it could not [be drawn] still more; so since evil corrupts the aptitude by drawing it away from rectitude, on account of this, that evil itself or malice is a crookedness, and intensity in evil is by withdrawal from the good; that aptitude is never so diminished that it could not still be diminished more, because it is never so drawn away that it could not be drawn away more, and never so curved that it could not be curved more; and therefore it can always be diminished by evil and never totally taken away. — But this manner of speaking, among the others foregoing, *(is more approved)* seems to be more reasonable, on account of this, that it is founded upon the manner of taking-away of evil itself. For it corrupts, as has been said, by drawing-away from the good, as Augustine says, and as the Master relates at the end of the distinction in the text.

For the fuller understanding therefore of this manner *(it is confirmed)* it must be noted that guilt corrupts and diminishes that aptitude in the way that it is opposed to it. *(To be noted.)* But it is not opposed to that aptitude according to that which it is, as was said above, or insofar as it is founded in nature, but according to that to which it is, that is, insofar as it is ordered to grace; and therefore it never corrupts it nor diminishes it in such a way that it takes away any part of it according to that which it is, but because it disorders [it] from that to which it is; and through this it so diminishes that it leaves [it remaining]; and therefore it so corrupts that it never totally takes [it] away. Hence, as the Master says, that concupiscence is by the exercise of charity continually diminished and never finished, because charity is not opposed to concupiscence itself according to its root and according to that in which it is rooted, but according to that to which it inclines; so it is to be understood in the case at hand. — And this is better made manifest *(example)* if an example be taken in [its] terms. For that aptitude which we say is diminished is nothing other than the fitness of the soul for receiving grace and for cooperating with grace already received. In this therefore guilt is said to diminish that aptitude, in that it renders the soul less fit for both. For when a man sins, he offends God, *(it is confirmed)* and from this he is made unworthy and unfit for receiving the grace of God. In this also, that he sins, he is rendered prone to evil, and in this he is made unfit for the works of the virtues. — But it is plain that no one is ever so unworthy of the grace of God that he could not still be more unworthy, because he never offends so much that he could not still offend; he is never so unworthy that, as long as he is in the state of the way, he is not capable of grace; and thus he is never on that side made unfit in the highest [degree] for the reception of grace. — Likewise on the side of proneness no one is so prone that he could not still be made more prone, on account

of this, that the will is always free; and therefore proneness in the will can never become necessity; and thus a man can always be made more and more prone and more unfit for cooperating with grace. And through this on neither side is he totally rendered unfit.

*(Conclusion.)* — And so it is clear that that aptitude can by guilt always be diminished and never totally taken away. And the reason for this is that it is diminished not by the removal of some part, but by drawing-away, not according to that which it is, but according to that to which it is. For in this manner it is opposed to that aptitude, and therefore in this manner is it diminished by it. — The reasons therefore which show this are to be granted. To the reasons for the opposite the response is sufficiently plain.

*Solution of the opposing [arguments].*

1. 2. 3. For what is objected first and secondly and thirdly is solved by this, that those three reasons proceed from a wrong understanding of diminution. For they argue as if the aptitude were diminished according to that which it is, and some aliquot part of it were taken away; but it is not so, but by drawing-away, as has been said. And therefore it can never be rendered unfit by so many sins that it could not [be rendered unfit] still more by more, nor even by so great a sin that it could not [be] by a greater. *(To be noted.)* And therefore Dionysius says that « evil is infinite »; not because there is some highest evil, than which nothing could be worse; but because there is no evil so great that it could not still be worse. And therefore by however great an evil the aptitude is never taken away according to the whole; for although it be finite, nevertheless the manner of taking it away extends itself unto infinity, not by actual infinity, but by potential [infinity], by which namely we say that the curved can recede from the straight to infinity.

4. But to that which is objected, that grace totally takes away concupiscence; it must be said that *(To be noted.)* there is a certain grace which is opposed to concupiscence itself according to that which it is; and a certain [grace] which is opposed to it only according to that to which it is. And the first is a certain grace freely given, and it can totally take away concupiscence, when it heals and reintegrates the vitiated nature. But the other is the grace that makes [one] pleasing; and of this Augustine says that although it diminishes concupiscence, yet it never finishes it; and to this grace guilt is likened with respect to the aptitude, not to the other. For as has been said, it is not opposed to that aptitude according to itself or according to that in which it is, but according to that to which it is.

5. To that which is objected, that glory renders [one] incapable of evil; it must be said that punishment also renders [one] incapable of the good; but yet in different ways, because glory renders [one] incapable of evil in this, that in it the root of evil is taken away, namely concupiscence itself, and the fullness of the good is given. But eternal damnation renders [one] incapable of the good not because there is there the fullness of all evil, nor even because the natural fitness for the good is taken away, but because the space of meriting is taken away, and God no longer offers grace helping toward the good. *(To be noted.)* And therefore that incapacity is not said [to be] through a privation of the aptitude of every kind, but rather on account of the impediments to doing well. Hence if some damned [person] were led back to the state of the way, no aptitude being conferred on him, he would anew have the aptitude for the reception of grace. And therefore, although the ordering of the aptitude be impeded, nevertheless the aptitude is never totally taken away. — But let it be, *(Otherwise.)* that it were granted that it be taken away in hell, still it would not follow that it be totally taken away by sin. For no guilt puts a man outside the state of the way; and therefore neither does it take away from man the aptitude for the reception of grace.