Dist. 35, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/35/q/bon-sent-II-d35-dubia
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### Doubts concerning the text of the Master.

**Doubt I.** In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about that definition which he first sets down: *Sin is a thing said, or done, or desired against the law of God.* For it seems to say what is false. For either this is understood *disjunctively*, or *subdisjunctively*. If *subdisjunctively*: then the members cannot stand together: therefore no one and the same sin is both desired and done; but this is false, because every sin done is desired. — Likewise, it seems that it does not suit *every* sin, because the sin of omission is neither done nor desired nor said: therefore it seems that it is badly assigned, because it does not suit every actual mortal sin.

**I respond:** It must be said that the aforesaid definition is of *actual* and *mortal* sin. For that which belongs to *actual* sin, it is said to be *a thing said, or done, or desired*, according to the threefold act, namely of the *interpretative* and *operative* and *affective* power, which are all in a certain manner motive powers. Insofar as it is *mortal*, it is said to be *against the law of God*; and thus it suits all and only [such sins]. All, because every actual sin is either only desired, or is both desired and outwardly consummated, and this either by word or by deed. And it suits only [such], because it does not suit the venial [sin], since this is not *against the law of God*; nor original [sin], since this is not *a thing said, or done.* — To that which is asked, whether it is to be held there *disjunctively* or *subdisjunctively*; it must be said, *disjunctively*; but the last member is to be understood with precision, the rest by no means. Hence the sense is, that every sin is either said and desired, or done and desired, or only desired.

But to that which is objected concerning the sin of omission, it must be said that every sin, as Augustine holds, has for its root an evil love; and therefore, although in the sin of omission there is the privation of some principal act; yet because that privation takes its origin from the love of some changeable good — which is plain, because someone is unwilling to rise for matins, because he wishes to rest in bed — therefore the sin of omission falls under this member, which is called *desired*.

**Doubt II.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *Sin is the will of retaining, or of obtaining, that which justice forbids.* For there is some sin in which one neither wishes to retain anything nor to obtain anything, but rather intends to destroy, as is the case in anger and hatred and envy. — Likewise, to wish to obtain or to retain that which justice forbids, this belongs to avarice or to rapine: therefore every sin will be rapine.

There is therefore a question, since sins are as much against the other virtues as against justice: why is sin rather defined by what is opposed to justice, than by what is opposed to the other virtues?

**I respond:** It must be said that Augustine defines sin by that which is the root of all evil; but this is libidinous love. And since all libidinous love is either of a thing possessed or to be possessed, and this apart from the order and rule of the eternal law; therefore he says that sin is the will of obtaining, or of retaining, that which justice forbids, so that he describes the inordinate love, which is the root of all sin, both by *that toward which* it is, and by *that against which* it is.

As for that, then, which is objected concerning anger and hatred, it must be said that although there is there a consequent detestation, yet there is there an antecedent delight, and therefore it is contained under this assignation.

To that which is objected, that then every sin will be rapine; it must be said that *obtaining* there stands not only for the cupidity of earthly things, but indeed of any appetible whatever: but *justice* does not there stand only insofar as it is the *cardinal* virtue, but insofar as it is the *general* virtue, which embraces all the virtues, and to which all vices are opposed.

**Doubt III.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *In each assignation it is treated of actual and mortal sin, not venial.* For it seems that the assignation of sin is badly made. For if a right description or assignation ought to suit everything described; and the aforesaid definitions do not suit every sin: then they are not rightly assigned. If you say that sin is not said of them *univocally*, but *equivocally; on the contrary*: things which agree in cause and effect have *univocation*. But every genus of sin takes its origin from the sin of Adam, both original and actual and also venial; all the genera of sins also agree in this, that they render the soul worthy of punishment and deprive it of some good, which is justice, or ordered to justice: therefore it seems that sin is said of them *univocally*; and if this: then it seems that one common account ought to be assigned of sin, insofar as it is said of all these genera.

There is therefore a question, whether it happens that one common account may be assigned to every genus of sin; that is to ask, whether sin is said of them *univocally.* And if you say that yes; on the contrary it stands, because things which are univocated in something have a *proportion*: but between mortal and venial there is no proportion: therefore neither univocation. — Likewise, he seems to say what is false, when he says that the aforesaid assignations do not suit venial sin. For venial sin is a thing said, or done, or desired, and against the law of God, as it is said in Romans seven upon that text: *You shall not covet*, Gloss: «The law is good, which, while it forbids concupiscence, forbids all evils»; therefore venial [sins] are forbidden by the law of God, they are therefore against the law of God: therefore the aforesaid account suits the venial [sin].

**I respond:** It must be said that sin, insofar as it is said of original, actual mortal, and venial [sin], is neither said altogether *univocally* nor said altogether *equivocally*, but as it were in a *middle manner*, namely *analogically.* For the formal character of culpability is found first and principally in actual mortal sin, and consequently in original [sin], and lastly in venial [sin]; and therefore the notifications which are given of sin *simply* are most of all referred to actual mortal sin, which is sin simply.

And by this the answer to those things which are objected becomes plain. For from this, that those three genera of sins agree in cause and in effect, it is not concluded that sin is said of them *univocally*, but *analogically*, because in these they do not communicate equally, but according to prior and posterior.

And therefore when it is asked whether one common account can be assigned, it must be said that one account can be assigned which suits them according to prior and posterior, and thus according to the *analogical* commonness, as for instance if it be said that sin is the meriting of punishment or the privation of good. — To that, then, which is objected, that there is no proportion; it must be said that although there is no proportion with regard to the commensuration of the quantity of demerit, yet there is a proportion between venial and mortal according to a like comparison both to the origin and to the consequent effect.

**Doubt IV.** Likewise it is asked about the other definition of Ambrose, which he sets down: *Sin is the transgression of the divine law and the disobedience to the heavenly commandments.* For it seems that this account does not suit every sin. For some things, as Augustine says, are *evil because forbidden*; some *forbidden because evil*: therefore if there were no law, nor any precepts given, there would still be sins: therefore not every sin is the transgression of a law, etc. — Likewise, just as obedience is distinguished from the other virtues, so disobedience [is distinguished] from the other vices: therefore every sin is badly defined by disobedience. — Likewise, he sins who does not obey a prelate, just as he who does not obey God: therefore sin is not only the disobedience to the heavenly precepts, but also to the earthly.

**I respond:** It must be said that *law* is sometimes taken *strictly* for the written or given law; sometimes *broadly*, insofar as it comprehends the law of nature and the law of Scripture and the law of grace. And in the aforesaid notification law is taken *broadly.*

To that which is objected concerning obedience, it must be said that obedience is taken in two ways: in one way, insofar as it bespeaks the observance of the commandments of God, and thus it is common to all the virtues; in another way, insofar as it specially considers the formal character of precept, and thus it is a virtue divided from the others, because it has its use most of all in those things which are good for the reason that they are commanded. And thus obedience is taken in two ways, namely *broadly* and *strictly*, and in the aforesaid notification it is taken *broadly.* — To that which is objected concerning obedience to a prelate, it must be said that the whole depends on the commandment of God, because God commands that one obey man.

**Doubt V.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *Sin not existing, virtue perhaps would not be.* For it seems to say what is false, because, if there were no fault, charity would be purer: therefore virtue more perfect and truer. If you say that he does not assert this, but says it under doubt; *on the contrary*: he speaks as falsely who proposes what is certain as doubtful, as he who asserts what is doubtful as certain.

And it must be said that in that word it is neither posited nor signified that virtue does not exist, malice not existing, but this is signified, that it would not so appear as it now appears; and therefore he says: *perhaps it would not be*, that is, it would not be known to be so.

**Doubt VI.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says in that chapter: *It can also be asked, since sin is the privation or corruption of good.* For if privation and position are opposed, and sin was rightly defined above: *sin is a thing said, or done* etc.: then it is badly defined by privation.

In connection with this it is asked, since of one thing there is one definition: whence is it, that sin is so manifoldly and variously defined by the Saints? It is also asked, by what those definitions are distinguished.

**I respond:** It must be said that of sin one may speak *formally*, and one may speak *materially*, namely by reason of the substratum. And because, speaking *formally*, it is a privation, but speaking *materially* it spreads beneath itself an act; therefore it is sometimes defined by *privation*, sometimes by *position*, because some definitions are *formal*, some *material*; and in each way manifoldly.

For if we consider sin insofar as it bespeaks *privation*, this can be in three ways: either insofar as it *simply* bespeaks a withdrawal *from good*, or insofar as it bespeaks a withdrawal *from the rectitude of nature*, or insofar as it bespeaks a withdrawal *from the completion and perfection of all good.*

In the first manner is taken a threefold definition from Augustine, which all express the same thing in different words, of which the first is taken in the book *On the City of God*, and is this: «Sin is the absence of good, where it ought to be». — The second, from the book *On True Religion*: «Sin is not the appetite of evil natures, but the desertion of better ones». — The third, from the book *On the Nature of Good*: «Sin is the corruption of measure, species, and order».

In the second manner, namely insofar as sin bespeaks a withdrawal *from the rectitude of nature*, three definitions are found, which express the same thing, though in different ways; of which one is of Damascene, which is: «Sin is the turning-away from that which is according to nature into that which is beside nature». — Another is of Anselm: «Sin is the lack of due justice». — The third is of Augustine: «Sin is a certain defect from the light of truth, not destroying nature, but obscuring it».

In the third manner, namely insofar as it bespeaks a withdrawal *from the completion and perfection of all good*, there is found a threefold definition, which differs only in the manner of speaking, of which the first is taken from Augustine in the book *On Free Choice*: «Evil is a turning-away from the unchangeable good». — The other from the same, in the book *On True Religion*: «Sin is to be without the unchangeable goods, which are to be enjoyed.» — The third is taken from the same Augustine: «Sin is an intelligible darkness»; for this was said insofar as it deprives [one] of the vision of the eternal light. — All these are as it were *formal* notifications of sin.

There are also other notifications, which concern the *underlying act.* And these vary according to the threefold consideration of sin, which it has under this aspect: namely either to *God*, whom it offends; or to *virtue*, which it excludes; or to *the good as now*, which it puts forward.

If in comparison to *God*, whom it offends, thus it is threefold, of which one is taken from Augustine, in the book *Against the Manichees*: «Sin is to err in the precepts of truth, or in the truth itself». — Another from Ambrose, in the book *On Paradise*: «Sin is the transgression of the divine law and the disobedience to the heavenly precepts». — The third from the same Augustine, and it is had in the text: «Sin is a thing said, or done, or desired against the law of God».

In the second manner, namely by comparison to *virtue*, which it excludes, there is found a threefold definition, of which one is taken from Basil: «Sin is a disposition of the soul holding itself contrarily to virtue». — The second from Augustine, in the book *On the Two Souls*: «Sin is the will of retaining, or of obtaining, that which justice forbids»; for justice is there taken *generally*, insofar as it embraces every virtue. — The third from the same Augustine, in the book *On True Religion*: «Sin is to desire those things which Christ despised, or to despise those things which Christ desired». For Christ was the mirror and exemplar of every virtue.

In the third manner, namely by comparison to *the good* which it puts forward, there is likewise found a threefold assignation agreeing in reality, although it differs in the manner of speaking, of which one is from Augustine, in the book *On the City of God*: «Sin is to use a good badly». — The second, in the book *On the Trinity*: «Sin is to use the things to be enjoyed and to enjoy the things to be used»; and likewise in the book *Of the Eighty-three Questions.* — The third is of the same Augustine, in the book *On Free Choice*: «Sin is, the unchangeable good being spurned, to cleave to changeable things».

But perhaps still other notifications beyond these eighteen will be able to be found. For there are two others, which seem to express sin according to either acceptation, as is that one: *Sin is an act befalling from the defect of good*. And that one: *Sin is the meriting of eternal punishment.* — And thus in all there are twenty.

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