Dist. 36, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/36/q/bon-sent-II-d36-a1-q1
----------------------------------------
### ARTICLE I.
### *On the comparison of guilt to punishment with respect to identity.*

### QUESTION I.
### *Whether sin is the punishment of sin.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether sin is the punishment of sin. And that it is, it seems:

1. The Apocalypse, last [chapter]: *Let him who is in filth be filthy still*; the Gloss: « it is just ». But to be in filth is nothing other than to be in sins, and to grow filthy is nothing other than to sin: therefore sin is the merit of another sin: therefore, *from relatives*, the following sin is the retribution of the preceding; but the retribution of sin is nothing other than punishment: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Gregory says it more expressly, and it is had in the text: « Between the first sin of apostasy and the last punishment of eternal fire, the things that are in between are both sins and the punishment of sin ».

3. Likewise, Isidore: « God avenges the hidden pride of clerics through manifest lust »; but the avenging of sin is punishment: therefore manifest lust is the punishment of pride.

4. Likewise, from the fact that the human sins, he merits to be abandoned by God; but from the fact that he is abandoned, he consequently falls into another sin: therefore if this is just, he who has committed one sin consequently merits to be allowed to fall into another: therefore if, abandoned, he falls into another sin, that which is perpetrated in the second place has an ordering to the first as to a merit. But every such thing is the punishment of sin: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, everything is the punishment of sin in which the human is damaged and harmed, and into which he is led through that sin; but the proud man, by the very fact that he wishes to excel another, necessarily falls into envy, when he sees another surpass [him]. For as Augustine says in the book *On True Religion*: « He who does not wish to be surpassed by another necessarily envies another ». Therefore it seems that envy is the punishment of pride; and envy is without doubt a sin: therefore sin is the punishment of sin.

**On the contrary:**

1. Every punishment of sin is praiseworthy; no guilt is praiseworthy: therefore no guilt is the punishment of sin. The major is proved, because everything that is just is praiseworthy; but « every punishment of sin is just », as Augustine says, and it is had in the text. The minor is plain of itself.

2. Likewise, every punishment is ordinative of guilt, and through this contributes to the beauty of the universe; but the subsequent guilt does not order the preceding guilt nor adorn [it], but rather more disfigures [it]: therefore guilt is not the punishment of sin.

3. Likewise, if the subsequent guilt is the punishment of the preceding: therefore, *from relatives*, the preceding guilt is the merit of the following: by parity of reasoning, that guilt which is subsequent is the merit of another, and so on. If therefore no sin ought to remain unpunished, it seems that the human ought to sin forever. If therefore this is unfitting and unworthy, it is plain that sin is not the merit of sin: therefore neither is one sin punitive of another.

4. Likewise, if the following sin punishes the preceding: therefore since God *does not punish twice in the self-same thing*, once the following guilt has been perpetrated, the preceding guilt ought not to be punished; or if it is punished, it ought not to be punished as much. But if this were true, one would derive an advantage from malice; but if this is unfitting, the point is plain etc.

5. Likewise, if sin is the punishment of sin, and God does not punish beyond the condign, the following sin would never be a greater sin than the preceding. But if this is plainly false, because one passes from a lesser sin to a greater, it is plain that sin is not the punishment of sin.

### Conclusion.

> The following sin is the punishment of the preceding sin not only causally, but also essentially.

**I respond:** It must be said that without doubt, as the authorities of the Saints expressly say, it must be held that sin is the punishment of sin.

But it is to be attended to that concerning this there is a twofold mode of understanding, according to what the Master intimates in the text. For some have wished to say that sin is the punishment of sin; yet not essentially, that is, according to that which it is, but by reason of that which accompanies [it], or by reason of that which follows [it]; just as it is clear that a manifest sin, from which there arises infamy, is said to be the avenging of a hidden sin, not by reason of the transgression itself, but by reason of the consequent infamy; or a sin, in which there is manifest ignominy, is the punishment of the sin of pride, just as the sin against nature and other things of this kind, which the Apostle calls *passions of ignominy*, is punishment by reason of the ignominy, not by reason of the guilt. And in brief any sin can be called the punishment of a preceding sin by reason of the *harm* which it inflicts; and thus the same thing is called *sin* and *the punishment* of sin, yet in such a way that it is called *sin* essentially, and the punishment of sin *causally*.

But since according to this mode not only could one sin be called the punishment of *another*, but also one sin could be called the punishment of *itself*, speaking causally, since the one who sins harms himself; and again, as was shown in the preceding, not only is the *disordered action* guilt, but also the very *deformity* which *remains* in the soul, and the deformation of the soul itself is no small punishment to it; and again, as the first reasons show, there is a certain ordering of merit and retribution between the preceding guilt and the following, even as regards that which they are as *guilt*: therefore there is another opinion, to which the Master seems rather to consent, that the following sin is the punishment of the preceding sin not only *causally*, but also *essentially*, so to speak. And in saying this, as the Master says, no prejudice at all is done to the truth, but rather this is plain enough. For *punishment* states two things: it states *evil* or *harm*, and it states an *ordering* to a preceding merit; and these two things are found to occur in the following sin. For *damage* and harm is in it, insofar as it is *sin*; for it is sin by the very thing whereby it harms; and one incurs a great evil when one falls into sin, even if he ought to have nothing else afterward. But it has *ordering* in that it is *following*; for by the very fact that the human is in sin, he is worthy to be allowed to fall into another, according to that of the Apocalypse, last [chapter], as is said in the Gloss: « It is just », that *he who is in filth be filthy still*. — It must therefore be granted simply that sin can be the punishment of sin, as the authorities of the Saints expressly say.

1. To that, however, which is first objected, that every punishment is praiseworthy; it must be said that that proposition can be understood in two ways: either that praise be attributed to punishment according to *that which it is*; or insofar as it is *punishment*. If it is attributed to punishment according to *that which it is*, thus it is false; for there are many punishments which are passions of ignominy and are not praiseworthy, but blameworthy. But if it is attributed to punishment under the character of punishment, that is, insofar as it is punitive of a preceding sin; thus every punishment is praiseworthy, because it is ordered. And in the same way is this proposition to be understood: every punishment is just. When therefore it is inferred that sin is just or that it is praiseworthy, there is here a fallacy *of accident*, because one proceeds from the praiseworthiness of the *order* to the praise of the *orderable thing*. But this does not follow, because frequently the praise of the *order* is foreign to the *orderable thing*, especially when that which is blameworthy is ordered fittingly and praiseworthily.

2. To that which is objected, that every punishment is ordinative of guilt; it must be said that it is true, that it orders in the same way in which it punishes; and that which is *simply* punishment and simply punishes, is *simply* ordinative; and that which punishes *sufficiently*, orders *sufficiently*. But that which is punishment *in a certain respect* and does not punish sufficiently, orders only *in a certain respect*. And that is true, that just as a certain order is praiseworthy — though more manifest — of the infernal punishment to guilt; so a certain order is praiseworthy — though less manifest — of the subsequent sin to the preceding sin; and in this order the divine justice is praised, which by a just judgment permitted him who committed one sin to slip into another.

3. To that which is objected, that the preceding guilt is not the merit of the following; it must be said that there is a merit of congruity, and there is a merit of condignity. And when the preceding guilt is said to be the merit of the following, this is not as regards the merit of condignity, but of congruity, which congruity indeed can easily be recompensed by another congruity. For just as it is congruous that God permit the sinner to slip into another sin, so also it is congruous that, because he has used life ill, He take it away from him and plunge [him] into hell. Just as it is also congruous that He let him fall into another sin, so also it is congruous that, if he wishes to abstain, He give him help, that he may not fall into another guilt.

4. To that which is objected, that God does not punish twice in the self-same thing; it must be said that the following sin was not a punishment in which a retribution *of condignity* should be made, but only *of congruity*. And just as the retri-

bution of that which one merits as regards the merit of *congruity* does not prejudice that which he merits as regards the merit of *condignity* — for God gives the just good things in the present, [and] does not on this account give them lesser ones in the future — so it is to be understood to be in the case at hand.

5. To that which is objected last, that God does not punish beyond the condign etc.; the response is now plain. For this is understood of the punishment which is inflicted by God *properly*, and of that which, concerning the preceding sin, regards the merit *of condignity*; but both of these are lacking in the case at hand. For the following guilt, according to *that which it is*, is not from God; the following guilt also is not ordered to the preceding sin according to the character *of condignity*, but according to the character *of congruity*. For this is congruous to the order of divine justice, as has been shown.