Dist. 36, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/36/q/bon-sent-II-d36-a2-q1
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### ARTICLE II.
### *On the comparison of guilt to punishment according to inseparability.*

Consequently it is asked concerning the comparison of guilt to punishment according to inseparability. And concerning this two questions are asked.

First it is asked, whether in anything it can happen to posit guilt without punishment following.

Second it is asked, whether in anything it can happen to find punishment without the merit of preceding guilt.

### QUESTION I.
### *Whether in anything it can happen to posit guilt without punishment following.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether in anything it can happen to posit guilt without punishment following. And that it can, it seems:

1. Ecclesiasticus, fifth [chapter]: *The Most High is a patient rewarder*; but the patient one does not at once avenge his wrath, but waits even until a [later] time: therefore it seems that

God does not at once punish the sinner: therefore it can happen that in something there is guilt without punishment.

2. Likewise, God is more inclined to have mercy than to condemn; but merit does not at once have a reward joined [to it]: therefore it seems likewise that guilt does not at once have a punishment joined [to it]: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, « punishment is, as Augustine says, involuntary labor »; but to the impious and to sinners many prosperous things come in this life; and there are many who rejoice so much in evil that they feel no grief: therefore it seems that there can be sin without punishment, at least for a time.

4. Likewise, if a sinner is at once punished when he sins, he is either punished *sufficiently* or *not sufficiently*. If sufficiently: therefore he ought not to be punished further in hell. If not sufficiently: therefore something of the guilt remains for a time unpunished. But by whatever reason something remains unpunished, by the same reason also the whole: therefore it seems that sin can at least for a time be separated from punishment.

5. Likewise, God is much more merciful and kind than any human is; but it pertains to the praise of human kindness that one avenge in no way an injury done to oneself: therefore much more strongly does it befit God to do this: therefore it seems that at least for a time he ought to leave sin unpunished.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine, first [book] of the Confessions: « Thou hast commanded, O Lord, and so it is, that every disordered soul be its own punishment to itself »: if therefore disorder of soul necessarily follows upon guilt, therefore some punishment necessarily follows upon guilt.

2. Likewise, wherever there is sin, there is the privation of mode, species, and order; but wherever this is, there is damage; but wherever there is damage by the merit of guilt, there is just punishment: therefore it is impossible that guilt be in something without punishment.

3. Likewise, whoever is disorderedly turned toward a good as-of-now is turned away from the good without qualification; and whoever acquires carnal delight loses spiritual consolation; but to lose the spiritual consolation for which the soul is born, and to lose God, who is the whole good of the soul, this is to incur the greatest damage and punishment: therefore it seems that sin is never committed without punishment.

4. Likewise, the universe is said to be very good because it is most-well ordered; but in that which is most-well ordered there cannot be a corruption of order, neither without qualification nor for a time; but sin without punishment is disordered: therefore it is impossible that for a moment sin be unpunished.

5. Likewise, it pertains to the perfection of justice to overcome injustice, just as it pertains to the perfection of wisdom to conquer malice, as is said in Wisdom, seventh [chapter]: *Wisdom conquers malice*; but because wisdom conquers malice, it is impossible that there be any evil which the divine wisdom does not at once order and from thence draw out some good: therefore since the justice of God likewise overcomes all injustice, it is impossible that any guilt be committed without some punishment at once following upon it.

### Conclusion.

> It is impossible that guilt be in anything without punishment following upon it inseparably.

**I respond:** It must be said that it is impossible that guilt be in anything without punishment following upon it inseparably. — And the reason for this can be taken from the perfection of the divine equity, and from the beauty of the universe, and from the disorder of guilt, and from the condition of the sinning nature.

From the perfection of the divine equity the reason is taken. For God, who is the judge of all, is of such great equity that he does not allow the shame of sin to be even for a little while without the comeliness of justice; for in every way justice ought to overcome injustice. — From the beauty of the universe the reason is taken. For the universe has its beauty from order, and such is this beauty as it befit to be made for the showing of the highest wisdom; and therefore it can in no way be defiled, and through this neither can there be in it for a moment anything disordered, and so neither sin separated from punishment. — From the corruption of guilt the reason is taken. For never is guilt committed without the mode, species, and order being deprived as regards the action of the will; and while the will voluntarily disorders itself in its act, it bends itself in upon itself; and while it is bent inward, it is deprived of mode, species, and order as to its aptitude for the good. But such a privation is a great damage and harm in the soul itself. And therefore Augustine says in a certain sermon on the Innocents: « No one has unjust gain without just loss; where there is gain, there is loss; gain in the chest, and loss in the conscience; he took the garment, and lost faith; he acquires money, and loses justice ». — From the condition of the sinning nature the reason is taken. Because the rational will, which is the cause of sin, is as it were midway between sensuality and synderesis, it is also midway between God and the other creatures; and when it turns itself toward these lower things, it withdraws from him who is above

it; and while it acquires a small good, it loses a great good, because, while it acquires a good as-of-now, it loses the good without qualification; and that which was midway makes itself lowest. Likewise, when in sinning it accords with sensuality, it discords with synderesis; and while it discords with synderesis, it incurs from that conflict a certain remorse and inner affliction. And so, while it sins, it loses a great good, it loses its proper honor, it loses solace, and incurs remorse. — And thus it is clear that punishment follows upon guilt inseparably, whether the punishment be called a certain damage, or whether the punishment be called affliction or involuntary suffering. But the punishment which is damage always follows both in act and in habit, because the human is never in guilt without always being in damage. But the affliction or remorse follows at least in habit; although on account of intense delight, or inconsideration or distraction of mind, it is not felt.

And from this it is clear how sin encloses in itself punishment, and how sin can be called the punishment of sin, and even the punishment of itself. For according to the diverse comparison of the will of the sinner to synderesis and sensuality, the very same thing both has the character of sin and has the character of punishment, as has been shown. — The reasons therefore are to be granted which prove that punishment follows upon guilt inseparably.

1. To that therefore which is first objected to the contrary, that the Most High is a patient rewarder; it must be said that there is a twofold way of speaking of punishment, namely as to the state of inception, and as to the state of consummation. And in the first way the human is punished remediably, in the second irremediably. The punishment therefore according to the state of inception and remediability God inflicts at once, because this befits his justice. But according to the state of consummation and irremediability he defers [it]; for this befits his kindness and patience, according to whose riches he awaits us unto repentance.

2. To that which is objected, that God does not at once reward; it must be said that just as in punishment the magnitude of affliction is deferred, and the interior affliction and remorse accompanies the sin, so also in good deeds a multitude of sweetness is hidden away from those doing good; nevertheless some first-fruits of the spirit are tasted, and in every good work a certain joy of conscience and tranquillity is granted to the one working well, which is as it were the fruit and reward of that work. And this is what the Apostle says: *The laboring husbandman ought first to eat of the fruits*.

3. To that which is objected, that punishment is an involuntary and afflictive suffering; the response is already clear from those things which have been said. For there is there both damage and affliction, although it is not always felt.

4. To that which is objected, that God punishes sufficiently, or not; it must be said that to punish sufficiently is [understood] in two ways: either without qualification, or according to what befits the state. In the present [life] therefore guilt is punished sufficiently; but this not without qualification, but as befits the present state. And therefore in such punishment the due order is preserved; and nonetheless after the departure of the soul from the body there ought to be an accumulation of punishment; nor does anything remain unpunished, either in the present or in the future, but the whole is punished, although also more and less, according as time and place require.

5. To that which is objected, that the kind human forgives all; it must be said that it is not similar, for the reason that, since God is justice itself, if he were to dismiss his own offense unpunished, he would do an injury to justice itself; but it is not so concerning the human. *Furthermore*, since he is the last judge, to him are reserved all things to be punished; whence what he dismisses unpunished, another cannot punish. But it is not so concerning the human, who has another higher judge, and what he himself does not punish he as it were remits to God.