Dist. 36, Art. 3, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/36/q/bon-sent-II-d36-a3-q2
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### QUESTION II.
### *Whether every punishment is from God.*

Secondly it is asked, whether every punishment is from God. And that it is, it seems.

*To the opposite.*

1. Romans, twelfth [chapter]: *Vengeance is mine, and I will repay*: therefore vengeance properly belongs to God himself; but every punishing is a certain vengeance: therefore every penalty and punishment is from God.

2. Likewise, Augustine says, and it is found in the [Master's] text: « Every punishment, if it is the punishment of sin, is just and is called a chastisement »; but everything that is just is from God: therefore every punishment is from God.

3. Likewise, Romans, first [chapter]: *God delivered them up to passions of ignominy*; the Gloss a little before: « God deserts [them] by not bestowing grace, or by withdrawing grace once bestowed ». If therefore no punishment lacks the character of the good and the beautiful more than the withdrawal of grace and the passion of ignominy; and punishments of this kind are from God, as is clear from the text and from the Gloss: therefore [so is] every punishment.

4. Likewise, no punishment is more bitter than the punishment of hell, no punishment has more of the character of privation and defect than the punishment of death; but each of these is from God: therefore [so is] every other punishment.

5. Likewise, the withdrawal of grace is directly opposed to the bestowal of grace; but to give grace pleases the divine goodness most of all: therefore among all punishments this punishment is least from God as author. But this is from God as author: therefore [so is] every other. Proof of the minor: In the withdrawal of grace there is the annihilation of grace and a certain expulsion of God from the dwelling of the heart; but the operation of annihilation is possible to God alone, as Hugh says, since there is an infinite distance between the extremes; and besides, nothing can cast out God: therefore it seems that such a withdrawal of grace cannot be except from God as from author.

6. Likewise, everything which orders the disordered and restores to God the honor taken away, is from the supreme Orderer and Zealot of his own honor; but every punishment, insofar as it is of this kind, is ordering of guilt — in every punishment too honor is rendered to God, of whom [it] was withdrawn through guilt — therefore every punishment, according to that which it is, proceeds from divine justice.

**On the contrary:**

1. Blinding is a certain punishment; but blinding is not from God, but from one's own malice, as is said in Wisdom, second [chapter]: *Their own malice blinded them*: therefore not every punishment is from God. But that blinding is not from God is apparent both from the text and from the words of Augustine, who says, upon that place of John, first [chapter]: *The light shines in the darkness*, there he says, that « as bodily light is present to a blind man, and he himself is not present to the light »; so it is to be understood in regard to spiritual light, and the text itself suggests this.

2. Likewise, the loss or despoiling of the gratuitous [gifts] is a certain punishment; but this is not from God, but rather from the devil, according to what is said, in Luke, tenth [chapter], of the man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, who by robbers was wounded and despoiled: therefore not every punishment is from God. But that the despoiling of the gratuitous [gifts] is not from God is apparent through what Anselm says, that « the human does not have grace, not because God does not give [it], but because he himself does not receive [it] ».

3. Likewise, the deformation of the image is a certain punishment; but God in no way deforms his image, but rather is indignant against the one deforming [it]: therefore not every punishment is from God. But that the deformation of the image is not from God is apparent, because to deform the image of God is to inflict an affront upon God; but God never does an affront to himself: therefore he never deforms his image.

4. Likewise, no pure defect is from God; some punishment is a pure defect: therefore some punishment is not from God. The major is manifest of itself, because a defect does not have an efficient cause, but a deficient one;

but God is the deficient cause of nothing. The minor is proven, because ignorance is nothing other than spiritual darkness: therefore it is pure privation; and ignorance is a punishment: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, no vice is from God; some punishment is a vice, such as malice and concupiscence: therefore there is some punishment which is not from God. The major and minor are manifest of themselves.

6. Likewise, no sin is from God; but some sin is a punishment, as has been shown above, and it is manifestly apparent in that deformity which remains in the soul after guilt has been perpetrated: therefore there is some punishment which is not from God.

### Conclusion.

> Every punishment, insofar as it holds the character of punishment, is from God; yet that which is called punishment is not from God, if it imports a defect simply, or some position with disorder.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that punishment, in its general acceptation, states an *ordered harm*. But harm has a relation both to the harmful thing itself, and to that which suffers the harm, and to that according to whose privation that harm is regarded. And according to this threefold relation the name of punishment has a threefold acceptation. Whence punishment is sometimes called the *action* of the thing inflicting harm, according to which the burning of the infernal fire is said to be the punishment of the reprobate. Punishment is also called the *passion* of the thing harmed or punished, according to which it is said: the affliction of the reprobate is their eternal punishment. It is also called the *defect* of some good, into which one falls from that passion, as the defect of rest, of health, and of peace is the punishment of the reprobate.

But in whichever of these modes punishment is called, whether action, or passion, or defect, the name of punishment, as it is so, is always imposed from order; and what it states it names as ordered. And since everything ordered, as such, proceeds from God, from whom is all order; in whatever mode punishment is called, and whatever is called punishment, insofar as it is punishment, is from God, because everything ordered is from God. For from God it has, that it is ordered, and to God all order is pleasing, and it is the same to come about with God as author and with God willing [it].

But if we speak of punishment according to that which underlies this order, from which the name of punishment is imposed; then it must be said that if punishment is called the defect or lack of some good, thus it must be said that such a defect is not from God; for it does not have an efficient cause, but a deficient one, nor is the punishment, which names such a defect, from God. — But if punishment is called the very passion of the thing punished, which is the way to the defect of some good, then it must be distinguished: because there is a certain passion which is *ordered simply*; another, indeed, which, although it be ordered in a certain respect, is nevertheless disordered simply; and another holding in a middle mode. That passion which is ordered simply, that is the passion which is purely penal, such as the passion of hunger and thirst, and such a passion is from God; whence hunger and thirst are said to be from God. — But the passion which is disordered simply, but ordered in a certain respect, is that which is culpable, such as is the deformation of the image and the corruption of the aptitude for the good; and such is not to be granted to be from God. — But the middle passion is that which is the vicious passion, such as that which is from the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, which in a certain mode is ordered to a preceding guilt, in a certain mode is disordered, because it is inclining toward a following guilt; and this is not granted to be from God. And the Master said above, in the thirty-second distinction, that « the tinder [of sin] and concupiscence do not have God as author, but the devil or the human ». — And just as it has been distinguished concerning punishment, insofar as it is called the passion of the thing punished, so it must be distinguished concerning punishment, insofar as it is called the action of the punishing thing.

From the foregoing therefore it is clear that, although every punishment is from God insofar as it holds the character of punishment, yet not everything which is called punishment is from God; rather a certain [punishment] is from God, a certain [punishment] not. That is from God which states some position, in such a way that it does not name disorder; and this is simply punishment. But that is not to be granted to be from God which names simply a defect, or which names some position with disorder. Whence neither is it granted to be from God that there be blinding, nor hardening, nor deformation of the image, nor withdrawal of grace or despoiling, nor error, nor ignorance, nor concupiscence, nor things like these; for all these either state a defect, or some disorder. — The reasons showing that not every punishment is from God are therefore to be granted.

1. 2. To that which is objected, that every vengeance is from God, and likewise to the following, by which it is said that every punishment is just; it must be said that those

two reasons conclude only that punishment is from God under the character of punishment; for thus it states something which regards the order which is regarded according to the avenging of divine justice. But concerning that which underlies [it], it is not necessary to understand it to be from God; for « crimes are avenged by crimes », according to what the Saints say, and as was shown above.

3. To that which is objected, that the passion of ignominy and the withdrawal of grace is from God; it must be said that, properly speaking, neither is granted to be from God except permissively, according to which God is said to harden, because, with him not bestowing grace, the human is hardened; just as also God is said to deliver up into the desires of the heart. Whence the Gloss says in the same place: « To deliver up is to permit, and not to incite, but to let go; for, with the causes of guilt going before, they are by right and merit deserted by God »; and through this, that they are deserted, they are delivered up to [their] desires. Likewise, that God is said to withdraw grace, this is not that he takes away what was given, but because, with the human turning himself away, God does not continue it.

4. To that which is objected concerning the punishment of death and of eternal damnation, it must be said that each is from God; for each names some position or disposition without any disorder. — And if one object, that the punishment of hell is most bitter; it must be said that bitterness does not prevent the punishment from being from God, but rather disorder and defect do. — And if one object, that death states a defect; I say that death does not only state a defect, but rather states a passion and a passage from being into non-being, which indeed is through the separation of soul and body, where therefore there is pain and affliction. And although a defect follows upon that passion, death nevertheless does not name a pure defect, but rather that passion and passage; and therefore death is granted to be from God, although it not be granted concerning the other punishments, whose names are imposed from the defect itself.

5. To that which is objected, that the withdrawal of grace is from God; it must be said that it is false, properly speaking, unless it be called [so] permissively, as has been said. — But to that which is objected, that there is in it annihilation and the expulsion of God; it must be said that for God to be expelled is nothing other than for the grace of God to be repelled. But for the grace of God to be repelled is nothing other than for grace to be corrupted, for the reason that it, since it is an accident, cannot be preserved except in a rational substance. But grace is corrupted and annihilated not through the action of a contrary agent, but on account of a defect in itself. And it *fails* in itself for this reason, that the subject fails it. For the soul is not born to be the subject of grace except through its conversion to God; and therefore, when it turns itself away from God, now sanctifying grace cannot be preserved in it, and so it fails in itself. — To that therefore which is objected, that nothing can annihilate grace and cast God out of his dwelling; it must be said that that argument proceeds as if such annihilation or ejection were brought about through *the power of some agent*. But this does not come about; rather it comes about on account of the unfitness of the recipient, as has been seen.

6. To that which is objected, that everything ordered, and what renders honor to God, is from God; it must be said that it is true insofar as [it is] such. But when it assumes that every punishment is of this kind; it is true insofar as [it is] punishment; and then the conclusion is true, namely, that every punishment, insofar as [it is] punishment, is from God. But if from this it be argued further, that everything which is called punishment is from God, such as guilt or vice or defect, there will be a fallacy of accident, because there are certain things which to attribute to God sounds rather to [his] reproach than to [his] glory. — And therefore if anywhere it ever be found that concupiscence or ignorance or the rest of such things are from God, the words are to be expounded, either [in the sense] that they are said to be from God because they are [so] permissively, or because they are said to be from God insofar as they are punishments, or [because] they are said to be from God according as they concern some being, not according to that from which they are first and principally imposed.

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