Dist. 36, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/36/q/bon-sent-II-d36-dubia
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### Doubts concerning the text of the Master.

**Doubt I.** In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked about that which is said in the first chapter, that *sin is the cause of sin.* But on the contrary: sin is the cause of sin either as a *voluntary* cause, or as a *necessary* one. Not as *voluntary*, because nothing acts voluntarily except what it knows and desires; but such is the rational creature, not fault: therefore it is not a voluntary cause. Likewise, it is not a *necessary* cause,

because he who has sinned by one sin, it is not necessary that he sin by another: therefore it does not seem that in any way it is a cause. — Likewise, if sin is the cause of sin, [it is so] either by reason of some *underlying good*, or by reason of *defect.* Not by reason of an *underlying good*, because then good ought rather to be called the cause of evil, than sin the cause of sin. Not by reason of *defect*, because what is nothing is the cause of nothing; for the intention of causality is found only in beings.

On account of which there is the question, whether sin be the *cause of sin*, and by reason of *what* sin is the cause of sin.

**I respond:** It must be said that, since in sin there are two things, namely *conversion* and *aversion*, by reason of each sin has it to dispose toward another sin, and through this one sin is said to cause another. By reason of *aversion*, indeed, because in this, that it turns away from God, it withdraws from good, and through this man is rendered powerless to resist evil. By reason of *conversion*, just as the act of one virtue disposes toward the act of another, as the act of the nutritive [power disposes] toward the generative, so one fault has it to dispose toward another, as gluttony toward lust. Sin is therefore the cause of sin, that is, a disposition drawing or inclining toward another sin, both by reason of *aversion* and by reason of *conversion.* But by reason of *aversion*, in which all sins communicate, any is the cause of any; whereas by reason of *conversion*, in which they are distinguished, not *any* is the cause of *any*, but a sin of *one* genus disposes toward a sin of the *nearest* genus, as the spiritual toward the spiritual, as pride toward envy, and the carnal toward the carnal, as gluttony toward lust.

To that, then, which is objected, that it is neither a voluntary nor a necessary cause; it must be said that sin is not the *sufficient* cause of sin; but it is called a cause in this, that it draws the will to commit another fault, and thus it is reduced to a *voluntary* cause.

To that which is asked, whether it be a cause by reason of *position* or of *defect*; I say that [it is so] by reason of each, as has been seen. For inordinate conversion disposes toward another inordinate conversion. For from inordinate conversion concupiscence and the proneness to evil are increased in us, and while proneness and concupiscence are increased, a kind of weight is, as it were, placed in the soul. «For what weight is in bodies, this is love in spirits». And therefore Gregory well says that «the sin which is not washed away by penance soon by its own weight draws toward another». And thus neither does defect of itself effect [it], nor good of itself, but the one together with the other. — Yet that argument is not valid: namely, *defect cannot be the cause of anything, therefore it cannot be the cause of sin.* For to cause sin is not to cause something, but rather to be deficient. Hence there is here a sophism *in a certain respect* and *simply*.

**Doubt II.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *As soon as man sins, there arises in man a corruption, which nonetheless arises with God as author.* But against this is that this corruption of good, whether it be called *active* or *passive*, is a deformation of the image of God. But the deformation of the image displeases God; and nothing which displeases God is from God — «for it is the same to come to be with God as author and with God willing it» — therefore such a corruption is not from God. — Likewise, the principles of action and of passion are the same: therefore if the corruption-action is not from God, it seems likewise that neither [is] the corruption-passion.

**I respond:** It must be said that that word is not said according to the opinion of the Master, but according to the opinion of others, as is plain from the very course of the text. But because nevertheless the Master seems to have said the same thing in the last chapter of the preceding distinction; it must be answered otherwise, that in that corruption there is both to consider a *defect* and a *deordination*; there is nonetheless there to consider a *passion* and an *order* to the preceding action; and as to these two last, that corruption holds the formal character of *punishment*, and as to this it is said to be from God, namely insofar as it is punishment. But *simply* speaking, so that the corruption of *measure, species, and order* be said to be from God, or the *deformation of the image*, it is not admitted; as the reasons show, on account of this, that such a corruption both bespeaks a *defect* and also a *deordination*, which is fault, as was shown above. And such a corruption is a punishment not *inflicted* nor *contracted*, but *enacted*; and therefore in a certain manner it holds the formal character of fault, as was shown in the preceding distinction. And as to this, that which is said in the text is not understood [thus]. — And by this are made plain those things which are objected in the text.

**Doubt III.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *If anyone should say that those things which are sins are essentially punishments, in no way is prejudice done to the truth.* And afterward he subjoins,

that *such chastisements are just and are from God, nor nevertheless* *are sins from God.* For it seems to be an implication of contradiction. For first he says that one and the same thing, speaking *essentially*, is punishment and fault; and afterward he says that the same very thing both *is from God* and *is not from God.*

**I respond:** It must be said to this, that this and like statements are to be understood *with reduplication*, as when it is said that some sin is the punishment of sin, and that that punishment is from God; this is understood according as it is punishment, that is, according to the formal character of ordination. And the Master intimates this in the text, when he says that not *insofar as they are sins* are they punishments, nor *insofar as they are sins* are they from God, as if to say: since in the same thing there concur the account of *deordination* and of *ordination* through a relation to diverse things, the ordination is from God, but the deordination by no means.

**Doubt IV.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that *there are certain things to be reproved which are done by necessity.* The contrary of this Augustine seems to say in the book *On the Two Souls*. For he says that that alone is sin from which «it is free to abstain».

And it must be said to this, that, as the Master determines below, there is a certain necessity for venial sins, at least in general. But that account and word which there follows is understood of actual mortal sin. But in what manner there is necessity for venial sins, this will have its question below in its own place, where the Master inquires, in the forty-first distinction.

**Doubt V.** Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *They add also that certain acts are good not only in essence, but also in genus, as to refresh one who is hungry.* For it is asked: for how much is a thing called *good in genus*? If because he calls it good without any added circumstance, then it seems that to refresh one in need is not good in genus, because there is there a due circumstance in him who is refreshed. If you say that it is called *good in genus* because it is common and universal: then it seems that likewise it ought to be called *good in species*, since the general is said with respect to the species.

There is therefore a question, for how much something is said to be *good in genus.* There is also a question concerning the sufficiency of that division itself by three members; for it seems to be insufficient, because there is not only *good in genus* and *good from intention and cause*, but also *good of grace* and *good of glory.*

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master here divides good not in any way whatever, but good insofar as it is in act. But good of this kind has to be considered *in itself* or *according to itself*; and thus it is the *good of nature.* It has again to be considered according to *comparison* to a due matter; and thus it is called *good in genus.* It has again to be considered according to the other three genera of causes, namely in comparison to the *efficient* and the *form* and the *end*; and thus it is *perfect good.*

And thus the sufficiency is plain, because every act either is compared to its *efficient* principle alone; or is compared to its *efficient* principle, insofar as it regards a due object; or is compared to its *efficient* principle, insofar as it regards a due object and a fitting end. But good, according as it regards a due matter, is said to be *good in genus*, for the reason that, just as genus bespeaks being in potency to a complete being, which is completed by the advent of *differences*, so in an act passing over upon a due matter the good of *conduct* is in a certain manner begun; but that good of *conduct* is specified and completed by the advent of circumstances, whence it can be done both well and ill. Likewise is it to be understood of evil in genus. — But although good and evil can be done differently both well and ill; nevertheless good, as regards itself, bespeaks the inchoation of good, and evil likewise of evil; and therefore it holds the name of good, because in it the account of genus is preserved. Hence the *good of nature* with respect to the *good of conduct* is as it were in *material* potency, which is passive potency; but *good in genus* is in some manner the *good of conduct*, from this, that it passes over upon a due matter: and therefore it is likened to the potency of genus, which is in some manner active. For genus is form, as the Philosopher says, although by comparison to the differences in the definition it is as matter.

And by this the answer to the objections is plain. For good from circumstance can be contained under *perfect good*, or under *good in genus.* For if it is clothed in all good circumstances, it is contained under *perfect good.* But if it is deficient in some circumstance,

it is reduced to *good in genus.* But under *perfect good* is comprehended the *gratuitous* and *glorious* act.

But more could be asked concerning this matter, but elsewhere they have place more than here.

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