Dist. 36
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/36/q/bon-sent-II-d36-littera
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### DISTINCTION XXXVI.

#### Chapter I.

#### *Certain things are at once sin and the penalty of sin, certain ones sin and the cause of sin, and others sin and both the cause and the penalty of sin.*

It must be known, however, that certain things are so sins that they are also the penalties of sins. Whence Augustine, on that passage of the fifty-seventh Psalm, *Fire fell upon them, and they did not see the sun*, says: "It is understood of the fire of pride and concupiscence and anger. Few see these penalties; therefore the Apostle especially commemorates them in the Epistle to the Romans and enumerates many things which are sins and the penalty of sin. For between the first sin of apostasy and the last penalty of eternal fire, the things that are in between are both *sins* and the *penalty* of sin." Gregory too, on Ezekiel, says: "On the one who despises and is unwilling to repent, God places a stumbling-block, that he may strike the more grievously. For sin which is not the sooner blotted out through penance is either *sin* and the *cause* of sin, or *sin* and the *penalty* of sin, or at once *sin* and the *cause* and the *penalty* of sin. Whence Moses: *The sins of the Amorrhites are not yet complete*; and David says: *Add iniquity upon their iniquity*; and another Prophet: *Blood has touched blood*, that is, sin has been added to sin. Paul too says: *Therefore God delivered them up to passions of ignominy* etc.; and likewise: *That they may always fill up their sins*. To John too it is said through the Angel: *He who is in filth, let him be filthy still*." — From these testimonies it is gathered that some sin is both a sin and the penalty of sin.

#### Chapter II.

#### *Whether sin is the cause of sin, insofar as it is sin.*

And therefore it is rightly asked whether, insofar as it is sin, it is the penalty of sin. — This does not seem to be so, since every penalty of sin is just. Whence Augustine in the book of Retractations: "Every penalty of sin is just and is called a punishment." If, therefore, the sin which is sin and the penalty of sin, insofar as it is sin, is the penalty of sin; since every just penalty comes from the justice of God, it seems that, insofar as it is sin, it is just and comes from God. — To which those men respond that sin is so called the penalty of sin because *through sin*, into which a man falls by the merit of a preceding sin, with God deserting, the good nature is corrupted. Just as eternal fire is called the penalty of the wicked, because they are tormented by it; yet the torment itself of the wicked is not *fire*, but comes to be in man *through fire*. So *through sin* nature is corrupted, and the good of nature is diminished; and that very diminution and corruption of good is a *passion* and a *penalty*; and it is not *essentially* the sin itself, through which it comes to be, but it is called sin, as was premised, because through sin, the moment a man sins, there comes to be in man that corruption, which nevertheless comes to be with God as author. For that penalty or passion, which is the corruption of good, is from God. Yet its *matter* and *cause*, so to say, is the sin, which is not from God. Which Augustine seems to have noted and to have understood according to this sense, when he says in the book On the Predestination of the Saints: "By predestination God foreknew the things which He Himself was going to do. But God also foreknew the things which He Himself is not going to do, that is, all evils, because, although there are certain things which are so *sins* that they are also *penalties* of sin, according to that saying of the Apostle, *God delivered them up to passions* etc., yet it is not God's sin, but His *judgment*" — namely the penalty. For in Scripture by the name of *judgment* a penalty is often understood. — Here he seems to suggest to those attending diligently that the things which are sins and penalties of sin are said to be of God, not insofar as they are *sins*, but insofar as they are *penalties*. For when he had said that God would not do any evils, that is sins; since it could be objected to him that certain sins are also *penalties* of sin — and every *penalty* of sin is just, and therefore is from God — as if determining according to what He does them, or according to what He does not do, he added the rest. But according to the aforesaid understanding sins are rightly called *penalties*. Whence the Apostle calls them *passions of ignominy*, because, as the authority says, "although there are certain sins which give delight, they are nevertheless passions of nature not to be named," because through them nature is corrupted.

#### Chapter III.

#### *That not every sin is the penalty of sin.*

And although from this sense every mortal sin can be called a *penalty*, yet not every one can be called the *penalty* of sin. For the penalty of *sin*, as has been said, is that whose cause is another preceding sin. For sin is so called the *penalty* of sin in respect of the preceding one, as it is called the *cause* of sin in respect of the following one. Whence it comes about that the same sin is both the *cause* and the *penalty* of sin, but the penalty of *one* sin and the cause of *another*. For as Gregory in the Morals says: "Sin which is not washed away by penance soon by its own weight draws toward another. Whence

it comes about that it is not only *sin*, but also the *cause* of sin, since from it the following fault arises. But sin which arises from sin is not only sin, but also the *penalty* of sin, because by His just judgment God darkens the heart of the sinner, so that by the merit of the preceding sin he falls also into another. For whom He was unwilling to free, by deserting He struck." Hence, as Augustine says: "This is the *penalty* of the preceding sin, and yet it too is *sin*." "For by the judgment of the most just God they were *delivered up*, as the Apostle says of certain men — whether by deserting, or in some other way explicable or inexplicable — *to passions of ignominy*, that crimes might be punished by crimes, and that the punishments of sinners might be not only torments, but also increases of vices." Therefore those sins which the Apostle enumerates, because they are of pride, are not only *sins*, but also *punishments*. — Behold, from these things it now becomes clear that certain sins are also *penalties* and *causes* of sin; and that that sin is the *penalty* of sin which has a preceding sin as its cause; and that that sin is the *cause* of sin which is the merit of a following fault.

#### Chapter IV.

#### *Whether any sins are essentially penalties of sin.*

But when he says that crimes are punished by crimes, he seems to suggest that those very things which are sins are *essentially* penalties of sin, that is, punishments of sin. But to this those men say that these and similar things are said according to the aforesaid reasoning, and therefore are to be understood according to the foregoing exposition. "For the understanding of the things said is to be derived from the causes of the speaking". Yet it is judged that no prejudice is done to the truth if anyone says that those same things which are sins are *essentially*, so to say, penalties, that is, punishments of preceding sins, which are just and are from God. Yet neither, insofar as they are *sins*, are they from God, nor, insofar as they are *sins*, are they penalties of sin; and yet, insofar as they are *sins*, they are *privations* of good; but as has been said above, they are called privations *causally* and *actively*.

#### Chapter V.

#### *That, since sin is also the penalty of sin, sin is from man, the penalty from God.*

But that certain sins are penalties, and that this penalty is just and is from God, Augustine evidently hands down, saying in the first book of Retractations that certain things which are evil come to be by necessity from man, and these same are the just penalty of sin. "There are, he says, certain things done by necessity, things to be reproved, where a man wills to act rightly and cannot. Whence comes that saying of the Apostle: *I do not the good that I will, but the evil that I hate, that I do*. And that other: *The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh. For these are mutually opposed to one another, so that you do not the things that you will*; but all these things are from that condemnation of death. For if this is not a penalty of man, but *nature*, these are not sins at all. For if there is no departure from the mode in which man was naturally made, when he does these things, he assuredly does the things which he ought. But if man, because he is so, is not good nor has it in his power to be good — whether by not seeing what he ought to be, or by seeing and not being able to be what he sees he ought to be — who would doubt that this is a penalty? But every *penalty*, if it is the penalty of sin, is *just* and is called a *punishment*. But if the penalty is *unjust* — since no one doubts that it is a penalty — it has been imposed on man by some unjust one dominating him. Moreover, since to doubt of the omnipotence and justice of God is the mark of a madman, this penalty is *just* and is paid out for some sin. For no one unjustly dominating could either steal man away, as though God were ignorant, or wrest him away unwilling, as though from one less strong, so as to torment man with an unjust penalty. It remains, therefore, that this just penalty comes from the condemnation of man." — By these and many other testimonies it is taught that certain things are sins and penalties of sin essentially.

#### Chapter VI.

#### *Concerning certain things which are undoubtedly sins and penalties, and insofar as we suffer them, are not sins.*

Moreover, it is in no way to be doubted that certain sins are without any scruple penalties, such as envy, which is grief at another's good, and anger, which also, not insofar as they are penalties, are sins; so too must we think concerning cupidity and fear and other such things. Whence Augustine in the book of the Eighty-three Questions says: "Every disturbance is a passion; every cupidity is a disturbance: therefore every cupidity is a passion. But every passion, when it is in us, we suffer by that very passion. Therefore every cupidity, when it is in us, we suffer by that very cupidity, and insofar as it is cupidity, we suffer. But every passion, insofar as we suffer it, is not sin; so too concerning fear. For it does not follow that, if we suffer fear, therefore it is not sin, because there are many sins which we suffer, but not insofar as we suffer them."

But it must be diligently noted that to the words of Augustine set down above, saying that certain things done by necessity are to be reproved and are evil, there seems to be opposed what Jerome says in the Explanation of the Faith; which, although it was set down above, yet, that it may be more perfectly known, it is no burden to repeat. "We execrate, he says, the blasphemy of those

who say that something impossible has been commanded to man by God, and that the commandments of God can be kept not by individuals, but by all in common." And a little after: "And we say that those err who with Manichaeus say that man cannot avoid sin, as much as those who with Jovinian assert that man cannot sin." — Behold, Jerome says that it is an error if anyone says that man cannot avoid sin. But he who says that certain things come to be by necessity, says that certain things cannot be avoided. Since, therefore, Augustine says this, it seems either that what he hands down is erroneous, or that what Jerome says is not true.

To which it can be said that Augustine handed that down according to the state of this misery — to which pertain ignorance and difficulty, as the same one says in the book On Free Choice, which have descended from a just condemnation — wherein he also included venial sins. But Jerome speaks only of mortal sins, which each one, illumined by grace, is able to avoid; or he says that of man according to the state of free choice before sin.

Diligently enough have we set forth the opinion of those who say that all acts are *natures*, and, insofar as they are, are *good*. In which treatment we have interspersed certain things which are not to be taken from their person only, since they are held by all who are catholically wise without hesitation; and by the testimonies of authorities and by reasons we have fortified the tradition of those who say that all acts by their own essence, that is, insofar as they are, are good, but that certain ones, insofar as they come to be in a disordered way, are sins. They add too that certain ones are good not only by *essence*, but also by *genus*, as to feed the hungry, which act is of the genus of works of mercy; and certain acts they call absolutely and perfectly good, which not only *essence* or *genus*, but also *cause* and *end* commend, such as are those which proceed from a good will and are measured by a good end.

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