Dist. 37, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/37/q/bon-sent-II-d37-a1-q3
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### QUESTION III.
### *Whether every composition is from God.*

Thirdly it is asked, whether every composition is from God. And that it is, it seems.

1. Wherever there is any composition, there is some action of a composer; but every action is from God: therefore every composition is from God.

2. Likewise, just as it belongs to potency and power to distinguish and separate, so it belongs to potency and power to unite and compose things; but everything that belongs to potency is from the omnipotence of the Creator: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, wherever there is composition, there is some union; and wherever there is union, there is some unity; but every unity is from the first unity; but the first and highest unity is God: therefore every composition is from God.

4. Likewise, Augustine *On True Religion*: « Every thing has these three, namely that it be some *one* thing, and be discerned by its proper *species*, and not exceed the *order* of things »; but, as Augustine says in the eleventh [book] *On the City of God*, « from him is every *mode*, and every *species*, and every *order*, without which nothing can exist or be conceived »: therefore if every composite and every composition in some manner exists, it seems therefore that every composition is from God.

**On the contrary:**

1. Upon that text of the first [letter] to the Corinthians, eighth [chapter]: *We know that an idol is nothing;* the Gloss: « The matter of the idol God formed, but the foolishness of men gave it form ». And after: « Whatever things are in creatures, were made through the Word; but the form of the man in the idol was not made through the Word, just as sin was not made through the Word »: it seems therefore that the composition of such a form with such matter is not from God.

2. Likewise, there are certain things which are impossible to be conjoined, not only by nature, but even by God, such as that something be at once and at the same time white and black, but our imaginative intellect frequently composes such things; but the composition of none of them is from God, except of those which are composable by God: if therefore opposites are not composable by God and are composed by the intellect; it seems that not every composition is from God.

3. Likewise, there are certain things which cannot be conjoined in the same [subject] without monstrousness, such as two heads in the same body; and such a composition cannot be from nature except with error and beside intention: if therefore God errs in no composition nor makes [anything] to err, it seems that the composition of such things is in no way from God.

4. Likewise, there are some things which it is impossible to conjoin without disordering, as for instance if a human were mingled with a brute, or conversely: if therefore such a composition is nothing other than a disordering of the composables — for by this very fact they are disordered, that they are thus composed — and disordering is not from God; it seems that some composition is not from God.

### Conclusion.

> Every composition, insofar as it is composition, is from God.

**I respond:** It must be said that, since the name of composition is taken in three ways, in each of its acceptations it states something. For composition is called the action of a composer; composition is also called the passion of the composable; in a third way composition is called the disposition of the composed thing. And since *action* as well as *passion* as well as also the *disposition* of the composed thing, insofar as it is composed, states something; and everything that states some positing is from God: it must be granted simply that every composition is from God, insofar as it is composition, just as also is every action and conservation.

Yet it must be attended to that, just as there are certain actions « which, the moment they are named, are conjoined with evil », such as lying and adultery; so there are certain compositions of certain things which some deformity and disorder inseparably accompanies. Whence just as an action which is inseparably conjoined to a defect of malice is said to be from God, yet in such a way that the defect of malice is not from God, but from a defect of the creature, namely of free

will; so a composition, to which deformity and disorder is joined, is from God in such a way that that deformity or disordering, which is truly a defect, is from a defect of some created composing cause, or from a defect of the composables themselves. — The reasons therefore are to be granted which show that every composition is from God.

1. To that therefore which is first objected concerning the composition which is in an idol; it must be said that the idol, insofar as it is of this kind, names some artifact, containing in itself something of deity or divinity: and according to this, composition is there understood in two ways, namely [the composition] of the form of *art* to the matter, and of *divinity* to the artifact; and the first composition indeed is on the part of the *thing*, but the second is only according to the estimation of the idolater. As to the first composition the idol *is something*, but as to the second *there is nothing in the world* in reality, although something is estimated [to be there]. — I grant therefore that the conjunction of such a form with this matter, since it is really a being, is from God. It must nevertheless be granted that that estimation, insofar as it is an act of the soul, is from God; but the composition of divinity to that artifact, which is estimated to exist, is altogether nothing; and this is not from God, because there is no such composition in reality. Likewise the ordering of that artificial form to the containment of divinity, that indeed is rather a disordering than any positing; and this indeed is not from God, but from a defect of cognition and of faith. When therefore it is said that the form of the idol in such matter is not from God, it is not denied that the composition of this form with this matter is absolutely from God; but this is denied, that it is not from God with respect to that for which the human makes that effigy. — And thus it is plain in what sense *the idol is said to be nothing*, namely for the reason that it is a name imposed by a fiction, beneath which lies falsity. It is also plain that the idol, as to something which it names, is from God, and as to something, is not, since whatever is of *positing* there, is from God; but that which is of *privation* or of defection is not from God, but from our defect.

2. To that which is objected, that the intellect composes some things which are incomposable to be composed; it must be said that such things are impossible to be composed on account of the inseparability of the disordering. For never can anything be, nor be understood, at once and at the same time under two opposites, without confusion and disorder being understood. And since in the action of God, which God does of himself as the *whole* cause, there cannot be a defect of order — because if there were, his power in operating would now be deficient — hence it is that such things cannot be composed by God. But since God cooperates with an intellect able to fail, it can be so, that that which is there of *positing*, is from the power of God; but that which is of *privation*, is from a defect of the created intellect. Therefore that reasoning does not hold, [that] if God cannot of himself make that composition, [it follows] that he cannot cooperate with another in making it.

3. To that which is objected concerning those things which cannot be composed without monstrousness; the response is already plain; since, when I say a monstrous composition, I say two things: I both say a composition, and I further say an attached deformity. And the composition indeed is from God, but the deformity of the monstrousness is from a defect and error of nature, which comes from the disproportion of the power to the matter upon which it acts, either for the reason that the matter superabounds, or for the reason that it is deficient; and in both cases there is a defect of due proportion.

4. To that which is objected, that there is a certain composition which cannot exist nor be understood apart from disorder, as for instance if a foot were placed in the chest, [or] if a human were to couple with a beast; it must be said that, even if one necessarily follows upon the other, and the understanding of the one inseparably follows from the understanding of the other; nevertheless they have a diversity, because the one states a *privation*, and the other states a *positing*; and therefore the one can be attributed to God, although the other be not attributed.

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