Dist. 37, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/37/q/bon-sent-II-d37-a2-q1
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### ARTICLE II.
### *Whether a defective action is to be attributed to God.*

Consequently it is asked concerning the second article, about a defective action, whether it is to be attributed to God. And concerning this three things are asked.

First it is asked whether an unjust action, insofar as it is unjust, is from God.

Secondly it is asked whether a fortuitous operation, insofar as it is fortuitous, is from God.

Thirdly it is asked whether a false statement, insofar as it is false, is from God.

### QUESTION I.
### *Whether an unjust action, insofar as it is unjust, is from God.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus and it is asked, whether an unjust action, insofar as it is of this kind, is from God. And that it is, it seems:

1. Third [book] of Kings, last [chapter]: *Who shall deceive Achab, king of Israel?* and afterward it is added that the Lord said to the lying spirit: *Go forth and do [it];* but what comes to be by God's commanding comes to be by God willing and authoring [it]: if therefore that malign spirit lied and deceived Achab, with God commanding him to lie and to deceive; it seems that both the lie and the deception, insofar as they are of this kind, are from God. And if this is true, then an unjust action, insofar as it is unjust, is from God.

2. Likewise, as the Philosopher holds: « If something by its presence is the cause of something, by its absence it is the cause of the opposite »; but God by his presence is the cause of a just operation, insofar as it is just: therefore *from the opposite*, by his absence he will be the cause of injustice in an action.

3. Likewise, he who knowingly helps someone toward an action of theft, whether he wills to help him toward the theft or not, is nonetheless said to *run with the thief*, and the fault of the thief is attributed to him. If therefore God helps a human toward an action underlying malice and injustice, it seems that such deformity is to be attributed to God as to its author.

4. Likewise, to give alms for the sake of vainglory is sin; and by this very fact it is sin and injustice, by which that action is referred to such an end; but just as the giving of alms is not nothing, so the relation to such an end is not nothing: if therefore such a relation was the reason why that action is evil, and such a relation is from God, since it is not altogether nothing, it seems that such an action is from God.

5. Likewise, he who sins in loving a creature, by this very fact sins, by which he rests in the creature; but to rest in a creature is not altogether nothing, indeed by this very fact, that it is a resting, it is something: therefore since everything that is something is from God, such a rest is from God, and such was the reason of the fault: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, the power of the will is nobler as it is deliberative than as it is a certain nature; but everything that is from the will, as it is nature, is from God: therefore everything that is from the deliberative will is from God. But an unjust action, insofar as it is of this kind, is from the deliberative will: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. John, first [chapter]: *Without him was made nothing;* the Gloss: « that is, sin »: therefore it seems that sin is not from God.

2. Likewise, to the Romans, first [chapter]: *He delivered them up, that they should afflict their own bodies with contumelies in themselves;* the Gloss: « The unclean and contumelious actions, by which they afflict and infect their own bodies, they have *in themselves,* namely the wicked, that is not from elsewhere, but from themselves; for the human does not have this from God »; but this cannot be said of actions insofar as they are actions: therefore it is said of actions insofar as they are unjust.

3. Likewise, whoever does injustice is unjust; but God cannot be unjust: therefore he cannot do injustice: therefore the injustice of an action, or an action insofar as it is unjust, is not from God.

4. Likewise, whoever does injustice offends God, who is the highest justice; but God cannot offend himself nor *deny himself,* as the Apostle says: therefore God cannot do injustice: therefore neither [can he do] an unjust action, insofar as it is of this kind.

5. Likewise, injustice is a defect; therefore to do injustice is to be deficient; but the divine *power* cannot be deficient: therefore neither [can it] do injustice: therefore an action, insofar as it is unjust, is not from God.

6. Likewise, whatever is from God praises God; but injustice in no way praises God, nor [does] an unjust operation, insofar as it is of this kind: in no way therefore is an action, insofar as it is unjust or evil, to be attributed to God.

### Conclusion.

> An evil and unjust action, insofar as it is of this kind, is not from God.

**I respond:** It must be said that, since injustice or malice concerning an action states a defect and a privation, and a defect disordered of itself and a defect lacking the due end; *to do an unjust action* is repugnant to [God's] power, wisdom, and goodness. For there is there a pri-

vation of utility and of order and of entity; and because nothing is to be attributed to God except what befits his power, wisdom, and goodness: therefore to attribute an evil action to God is not only [a matter] of falsity, but also of blasphemy and impiety. — It is to be granted therefore that an evil and unjust action, insofar as it is of this kind, is not from God. And therefore the reasons which show this are to be granted.

1. To that therefore which is objected from the last [chapter] of the third [book] of Kings, it must be said that *go forth and do [it]* is not understood there *imperatively,* but is understood there *permissively.* Whence a verb of the imperative mood is taken in many ways in Scripture: sometimes *preceptively,* sometimes *consultively,* sometimes *insinuatively,* and sometimes *permissively,* of which examples can be taken from diverse places of Scripture.

2. To that which is objected concerning the same cause, that by its presence and absence it is the cause of opposites; it must be said that that holds true of a cause which voluntarily absents itself, such that its absenting is principally from itself. But this is not so in the case at hand; for God absents himself from no one, indeed he is ready to help all and to give grace to all.

3. To that which is objected, that he who helps a thief in [his] action is said to run with the thief, if he does this knowingly; it must be said that this is not similar: because it is becoming and fitting that a human not help his neighbor in that action in which one *walks not rightly*, indeed he ought rather to hinder [it]; since he himself neither knows nor is able to draw out a good thereby, nor is he bound by any law to that assistance, but is rather forbidden [it]. But it is not so in the case at hand, both because it befits the divine liberality that he *make his sun to rise upon the good and the evil*; nor ought he to withdraw the influence of his power either from the good or from the evil, especially according to that influence which regards *the first being.* Secondly indeed, because it befits the divine providence « so to administer the things which it founded, as to let them act their own proper motions ». Thirdly indeed, because he himself knows and understands how to draw out a good thereby; and therefore, when he cooperates with the sinner in the action, he acts praiseworthily; and therefore in no way is the malice, which renders its actor culpable, to be attributed to him.

4. To that which is objected, that the relation of the action to vainglory as to an end is from God; it must be said that the relation states two things; namely the act of the will and of the reason extending itself to that end by means of that action; and this indeed is good and is from God. Besides this it imports a disordering. For to such an action is conjoined a disorder, because such an end does not befit such a work; and as to this, there is there malice; and therefore the injustice is there by reason of the defect which is in such a relation. On account of this it is not necessary that it be from God. And it is similar in limping, in which there is a walking with a defect; so also in the case at hand it is to be understood.

5. To that which is objected concerning rest, it must similarly be responded that rest states a certain *position* in this, that it states a love of the creature; and it states a *privation* of rectitude in this, that it states the privation of the ultimate end. For in this, that it there rests and does not tend beyond, when it ought to tend beyond, there is not only *position,* but also *privation,* which indeed is not from God.

6. To that which is objected, that whatever is from the natural will is from God; it must be said that it is true, insofar as it is the *natural* will; and similarly that which is from the *deliberative* will precisely, must be granted to be from God. But malice is not from the will properly, as it is *deliberative,* but rather as it is *defective,* although that defect does not occur except concerning a deliberative act; and therefore, although it be from the *deliberative* will, it does not follow that it is from God, because it is not insofar as it is *deliberative,* but insofar as it is *defective.* And for this reason, as was said above, if such an argument be made: the deliberative will is from God; and malice is from the deliberative will: therefore it is from God; it errs *by accident,* because it errs against that rule: « Whatever is the cause of a cause is the cause of the caused ». For there can thus be a sophism *by accident* in *causing,* just as in *inhering.*