Dist. 37, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/37/q/bon-sent-II-d37-a2-q2
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### QUESTION II.
### *Whether a fortuitous operation, insofar as it is fortuitous, is from God.*

Secondly it is asked, whether a fortuitous operation, insofar as it is fortuitous, is from God. And that it is, it seems:

1. Because both a fortuitous and a chance action is from causes converging, undertaken for the sake of something else; whence Boethius in the fifth [book] *On Consolation*: « Chance is the unlooked-for outcome of a thing from causes concurring, undertaken for the sake of something else ». But both the concurrence of causes and the inception for the sake of another are from God: therefore if nothing more is required for something to be fortuitous or by chance; it seems that both fortuitous and chance things, insofar as they are such, are from God.

2. Likewise, just as *being per se* is from God insofar as it is per se, so also *accident* is from God insofar as it is an accident: therefore just as the operation of a *cause per se* is from God, so also the operation of a *cause per accidens.* But the chance and the fortuitous, insofar as they are such, denote the operation or effect of a *cause per accidens*, whereas the natural and the artificial denote the effect of a *cause per se*: therefore just as every natural and artificial thing is from God, insofar as it is such, so every chance thing and every fortuitous thing, insofar as it is such, is from God.

3. Likewise, whenever diverse things concur toward the production of one effect, it is necessary that they be joined through some one thing; but the causes from which both the chance and the fortuitous arise are diverse as to the *thing* and are diverse as to the *intention*: therefore if they are united, they are joined through something which is above them. But nothing is above a natural agent and an agent acting from purpose except God alone: therefore the concurrence of such causes is from God; and the concurrence of such causes makes a chance or fortuitous effect: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, a *cause per se* is more powerful in acting than a *cause per accidens*; but a *cause per se* can produce no effect unless it be helped by God: therefore neither [can] a *cause per accidens.* But chance and fortune are *causes per accidens*, as the Philosopher holds in the second [book] of the *Physics*: therefore since their effects are the chance and the fortuitous, insofar as they are such, it seems etc. *If you say* that the chance thing, according to that which it is, is from God, yet not insofar as it is chance, because it denotes a privation of intention, not a position; *on the contrary* there is this: because, just as nature operates through intention, so it also operates uniformly and in the accustomed manner; but when some operation comes to be beyond the usual course of nature, that operation indeed is called a miracle, and such an operation is ascribed to God, insofar as it is such. If therefore an operation which comes to be beyond custom, insofar as it is such, is from God, by parity of reasoning an operation also which comes to be beyond intention, insofar as it is such, is from God.

5. Likewise, the fortuitous is by this very fact called fortuitous, because it is from some agent intending something else, just as the finding of a treasure is from one who intends to plow the earth; but that he intend something else, this is good and is from God; similarly, that he find that treasure, this is good and is from God: therefore the fortuitous, as it is fortuitous, seems to be from God.

*Fundamenta.*

1. But against this Augustine argues in the book *On the Eighty-three Questions* thus: « Whatever happens by chance, happens at random:

whatever happens at random, does not happen by providence »: if therefore everything that comes to be from God comes to be through providence, since God does nothing without providence; it seems that the chance and the fortuitous, insofar as they are such, is not from God.

2. Likewise, chance and fortune happen through a defect of foreknowledge; but God can make nothing except foreknowing and foreseeing: therefore nothing chance, insofar as it is such, is from God.

3. Likewise, just as the good is repugnant to the evil, so fortune is repugnant to providence: but from God, who is supremely good, no unjust operation can proceed: therefore by parity of reasoning, since he is supremely prudent, no fortuitous operation can come forth from him.

4. Likewise, the fortuitous, insofar as it is fortuitous, has its origin from a *cause per accidens*: therefore if God were the cause of the fortuitous, insofar as it is such, God would be the cause of some thing *per accidens.* But a *cause per accidens* has to be reduced to a nobler cause: therefore some cause would be nobler than God: which is absurd.

5. Likewise, just as injustice stands to its cause, so the chance and the fortuitous to theirs; but injustice cannot be from anyone except one acting unjustly: therefore the chance and the fortuitous cannot be, except from one who operates by chance and fortuitously. But God in no way operates by chance nor fortuitously: therefore a chance or fortuitous operation, insofar as it is such, is not from God.

### CONCLUSION.

> The chance and the fortuitous, insofar as they are such, is not from God, even though it is from God according to that which it is.

**I respond:** It must be said that although the chance or the fortuitous, according to that which it is, is from God; yet insofar as it is chance or fortuitous, it is not from God. *(Conclusion.)* And the reason of this is that the fortuitous and the chance posit something, namely an effect, which is from the concurrence of causes undertaken for the sake of something else; they also privatively take something away; for chance and fortune denote a *defect* of intention and of foreknowledge. *(Reason.)* And since the operation of the causes and their concurrence toward producing such effects is something, therefore it is from God; but since the privation of intention is a defect, therefore it is not from God. And since the chance and the fortuitous, as they are so named, are imposed from such a defect; hence it is that they are not to be granted to be from God. And this is what Augustine means to say in the book *On the Eighty-three Questions*, when he says: « What happens by chance, happens at random »; and therefore, just as we do not grant that the *random*, insofar as it is such, is from God; so it is not to be granted that the chance or the fortuitous, insofar as it is such, is from God. —

*(The chance and the fortuitous are twofold.)* And since both the chance and the fortuitous, as it is so, is a name imposed from the privation of intention; according as the privation of intention can be understood in two ways, accordingly the chance and the fortuitous is said in two ways. *(Corollary 1.)* For in one way the privation of intention can be understood universally with respect to any agent whatsoever, whether particular or universal, whether operating or cooperating, whether executing or governing. And in this way nothing is chance, and chance and fortune in this way are nothing. And in this way certain philosophers posited chance, and Augustine disproves it in the book *On the Eighty-three Questions* by this, that the whole world is administered by providence; and so nothing comes to be which does not pertain to the work of providence. *(Corollary 2.)* In another way the privation of intention can be understood with respect to a particular agent, namely of a particular created nature and intellect; and in this way something is chance, and chance is something, according as Boethius says in the book *On Consolation* defining chance and showing in what way one can operate by chance, namely when one attains something unlooked-for; and therefore he says: « Chance is the unlooked-for outcome of a thing », where at once he touches the privation and the position: the position by this, that he says *outcome*; the privation in this, that he says *unlooked-for*; and that privation indeed is not with respect to God, because God can make nothing unlooked-for or unforeseen, nor is it from God, since it is a defect, but rather from the defectibility of the creature. — There are therefore to be granted the reasons showing that nothing chance is from God, and that the chance, insofar as it is chance, is not from God.

*(Solution of the opposing [arguments].)*

1. To that which is first objected to the contrary, that the concurrence of causes is from God; the response is already plain. For it argues of chance according as it denotes a position, not according as it denotes a defect.

2. *(To be noted.)* To that which is objected, that the cause per se and per accidens is from God; it must be said that *accident* is said in one way of being, insofar as it is a *difference of being*, in another way insofar as it is a *difference of cause.* For insofar as it is a *difference of being*, it denotes a relation to a subject, which indeed is a position, not a privation. But insofar as it is a *difference of cause*, it denotes a privation of intention, by which something is said to be a *cause of something per se*.

And therefore it does not follow that, if the mode of *being per accidens*, insofar as it is such, is from God, then the mode of *operating per accidens*, insofar as it is such, is also from God.

3. To that which is objected, that diverse causes need some superior thing joining them in order that they may produce one effect; it must be said that this can be understood in two ways: in one way *truly*, in another way *falsely.* *(It is understood in two ways.)* For if it be understood thus, that in order that any two causes concur, a new influence of a superior cause is necessary, more than if they did not concur and each operated per se; thus it does not hold true. For by this very fact that someone hides a treasure in the earth, and someone digs in the same earth, without a new influence those two operations cause the finding of the treasure. But if it be understood thus, that all the causes which concur toward one effect are reduced to some one principle; thus it holds true, for the reason that those things which cannot be reduced to one principle are wholly diverse; and therefore they can never concur toward one effect. For if they did not agree in one principle, they would now have nothing in common at all; and therefore it is necessary to posit that both the concurring causes and their concurrence are from one first principle. But nevertheless from this it does not follow that the chance, insofar as it is such, is from God, although it is from God according to that which it is; because chance denotes not only the *outcome*, but also the *unlooked-for outcome*.

4. To that which is objected, that a *cause per accidens* needs help, just as a *cause per se*; it must be said that this is true with respect to that which it *effects*, but it does not need help with respect to that in which it *fails*; for of itself it can *fail*, but it cannot of itself *effect.* And therefore it does not follow from this that the chance is from God, except according to that, according to which something posits, not according as it denotes a *privation of intention.* *(To be noted.)* And if it be objected that a miracle, insofar as it is such, is from God, and yet denotes a privation of custom, since it comes to be beyond the usual course; it must be said that a miracle comes to be beyond the usual course in one way, and the fortuitous beyond intention in another way. For a *miracle* comes to be thus beyond the usual course, in such a way that it is *above* the course of nature, whence it denotes more of position than of privation; but the chance does not so come to be beyond intention that it should come to be *above* intention, but it falls short of intention.

5. *(To be noted.)* To that which is objected, that God is able to bring it about that some agent attain one thing and intend another, in such a way that both be from God; it must be said that this is true; but to *attain one thing* and *intend another* — this chance or fortune does not do, insofar as one *intends something else* than that which he attains, but insofar as he *does not foresee nor intend* that which he attains. For if he intended both it and the other, he would no longer operate by chance or fortuitously. But although to intend toward another be from God, yet it is not from God not to intend that which he attains, because the first denotes a position, and the second a privation; and the chance or fortuitous, insofar as it is such, is denominated not from the first, but from the second: and therefore, insofar as it is such, it is not from God, but from a defect found in the created agent.

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