Dist. 37, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/37/q/bon-sent-II-d37-a2-q3
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### Article II.
### Question III. *Whether a false enunciation, insofar as it is false, is from God.*

Thirdly it is asked whether a false enunciation, insofar as it is such, is from God. And that it is so, seems to be the case.

1. Whenever any two things are founded upon the same thing in reality, if the one is from God, so also is the other; but the falsity of some proposition and the truth of its opposite are founded upon the same thing — for by this very fact, that "a man is an animal" is true, "a man is not an animal" is false — therefore, since the truth of every proposition is from God, it seems that the falsity of every proposition is from God.

2. Likewise, "truth is the adequation of thing and intellect," and falsity, by the opposite, is the inadequation of thing and intellect; but as equality and inequality stand in things, so do equality and inequality stand in propositions; but equality and inequality in things are from God himself — for just as it is from God that two things are equal, so it is from God that two things stand thus, that one exceeds the other; whence Augustine says that "if they were equal, they would not be all things" — therefore by parity of reasoning the adequation and inadequation of sign to thing-signified is from the same Principle.

3. Likewise, the falsity of a proposition is from him who alone can make the proposition itself to be false; but, a certain sinner having been pointed out, this is true: "he
is not just"; and no one can make this false except God alone, who can give him justice: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, it is of greater dignity and power to falsify this proposition: "he is a sinner," than to verify it; for whoever sins, by the very fact that he sins, verifies it, and this belongs to indignity: therefore, if the truth of every proposition is from God, it seems much more strongly that the falsity of such a proposition is from God.

**On the contrary:** 1. Everything that God can make has its exemplar in God; but a false enunciation, insofar as it is false, does not have an exemplar in God, since truth itself is the ground of exemplifying: therefore a false enunciation, insofar as it is false, is not from God.

2. Likewise, as goodness stands to malice, so truth stands to falsity; but from the highest goodness malice can in no way arise: therefore from the highest truth falsity can in no way arise.

3. Likewise, "the true and being are convertible"; but from God nothing can be which is not in some way being — for if it were pure nothing, it would not be from God — therefore from God there can be nothing but the true. But a false enunciation, insofar as it is such, asserts a privation of the true: therefore it seems that it ought not to be caused by God, insofar as it is such.

4. Likewise, everything that God can make, he can say; but he cannot say what is false: therefore he cannot make it. Proof of the minor: if he says what is false, then either knowingly or unknowingly. Not unknowingly; this is clear. If knowingly — but whoever says what is false knowingly, lies: therefore God would lie; which it is profane and impious to say.

### Conclusion.

> A false enunciation under the aspect of falsity is not from God; yet God does make something by which some discourse is necessarily false.

**I respond:** It must be said that falsity is nothing other than a defect of truth in a thing which is apt to be made true; just as malice asserts a privation of goodness and rectitude concerning an action which is apt to be made right; and therefore, just as an evil action, insofar as it is action, is from God, but insofar as it is evil and unjust, is not from God: so too a false enunciation, insofar as it is enunciation, is from God, but insofar as it is false, is not from God. — Whence, just as in an action a twofold goodness is considered: one of nature, and the other of morals, and the one is essential, and the other accidental; and therefore the one is taken away, the other remains, and by reason of that goodness which remains, that action is from God: so in every enunciation there is a twofold truth: one essential, and this is the truth by which a proposition represents that for the representing of which it was instituted; and this is never taken away from the enunciation; for every enunciation signifies that for which it was instituted, whether it be true or false. But the other is accidental truth, which is regarded in a proposition in this, that it represents a thing according as it is — for then the sign is said to be made adequate to the thing-signified; and the truth of an enunciation is nothing other than a certain adequation — and this truth is taken away by falsity. For a proposition or enunciation is then false, when the sign does not represent the thing as it is, or the thing is not as it is represented by the sign. And this is what the Philosopher says: "From the fact that a thing is, or is not, a statement is called true, or false"; that is to say, from the fact that the thing is, as it is represented, the statement is called true; from the fact that the thing is not, as it is represented, the statement is called false. Therefore, just as injustice is a privation of rectitude, so falsity is a defect of adequation; and therefore, just as injustice of action is not attributed to God as its author, so falsity of discourse ought not to be attributed to him. For in both ways it is a defect, and no defect is to be attributed to God.

It must be noted, however, that although no defect is from God, yet one defect is more removed from the causality of God than another, according as there are diverse modes of failing. For there is a certain defect which asserts a privation of some position and order, such as is a culpable defect; and this is a blameworthy defect and renders the agent blameworthy; and such a defect God does not make, nor even does he make anything by which a creature necessarily fails through such a defect. Whence God neither makes sin, nor makes anyone sin, nor makes anything by which sin necessarily follows by reason of that which God makes. I say this on account of the infusion of the soul, in which original guilt is necessarily contracted; but this is not from the act of God, but from the prevarication of the first parent. — And there is another defect, which is a privation of some position, yet is not a privation of order; for it happens that some defects are ordered. And such a defect, although it cannot be attributed to God insofar as it is a defect, can nevertheless be attributed to him insofar as it is ordered; and of such a defect, although it cannot be said that God makes it, because to make a defect
is to fail; nevertheless it can be said that he makes something by which that defect necessarily follows; and such a defect is falsity and ignorance and blindness and the like. Whence, although it cannot be conceded that God makes the falsity of a discourse or a false discourse, insofar as it is false; it can nevertheless be conceded that God makes something by which some discourse is necessarily false; just as, when he justifies the impious, he makes something by which this enunciation becomes false: "he is impious." — The arguments showing that a false enunciation, insofar as it is false, is not from God are therefore to be conceded.

1. To that, then, which is objected, that truth and falsity are founded upon the same thing; it must be said that this is true; but yet in one way and another, because truth is founded by mode of position, and falsity by mode of privation; and therefore it does not follow that they are from the same. But when it is said that those things which are founded upon the same thing are from the same, this is understood when they are founded upon that same thing and in the same way.

2. To that which is objected, that equality and inequality in things are from the same principle; it must be answered that it is not similar: because in things in one way inequality asserts a privation of equality, where it ought to be; and then it is not from God, since it is a defect. In another way inequality asserts a grade and order which ought to be among things; and in this way, even though it may seem to assert a privation, yet because it asserts a position, it is from God. But the inadequation of sign to thing-signified always asserts a defect, for the reason that the sign was instituted to represent the thing-signified, according as it is; and therefore the inadequation of sign to thing-signified is falsity; but inadequation in things is not falsity. And for this reason it does not follow that, if the inadequation of thing to thing is from God, the inadequation of sign to thing-signified is from God. — Yet it could be said that inadequation, insofar as it is such, since it asserts a defect of equality, is not from God, although that which underlies it is from God.

3. To that which is objected, that God can falsify an enunciation; it must be said that this is true and proper: God makes something by which some proposition is false; but this is less proper: God makes some proposition false; but this is simply improper: God makes falsity in a proposition; and this, because falsity names precisely the defect itself. And therefore in that argument there is a fallacy of accident, by which it argues thus: he makes something by which the proposition is false: therefore he makes the proposition false or makes falsity in the proposition.

4. To that which is objected, that it is of greater dignity to falsify some proposition than to verify it; it must be said that truth can be compared to falsity in two ways: either by speaking formally, or causally, that is, by reason of that which underlies. If by speaking formally; then since truth asserts adequation, and falsity inadequation, and so falsity privation, truth position; it is altogether more worthy to verify something than to falsify it, whatever that be, since truth is more worthy than falsity; if indeed it can be said to be more worthy with respect to that in which there is no dignity. But if we compare truth to falsity by reason of that which corresponds on the part of the thing; then I say plainly that sometimes that which on the part of the thing renders that proposition false is more worthy than that which renders the proposition true, as is evident; for it is more worthy that which renders this proposition false: "he is not good"; than that which renders it true. — And the reason for this is this, that, although truth of itself asserts position, because it asserts adequation, that adequation on the part of the other extreme can just as well regard a privation as a position, and a defect as an effect. For just as a defect is orderable, and yet is a defect, so it is knowable, and so it is signifiable. Therefore when it is asked upon what the truth of an enunciation is founded; it is not necessary that on the part of the thing some truth correspond. For just as it happens that a true being is truly signified to be, so also of that which in no way is, it happens that it is truly signified that it is not. For just as signification asserts a relation which does not require the thing-signified to be in act; so also the truth of a sign, which indeed asserts the condition of that relation, does not require to be founded upon some actually existing thing. Nevertheless, since every relation and order is from God, such signification and such truth is from God; nor does it follow from this that the thing-signified is from God, but rather there is here a fallacy of accident, just as if one were to argue: the ordering of guilt and punishment is from God, therefore guilt is from God. So it does not follow in the matter at hand: the true signification of theft is from God, therefore theft is from God. — And so it is evident that, although there does not always correspond to truth, on the part of the thing-signified, something more excellent than to falsity, yet truth is nobler than falsity; and therefore it does not follow that, if the verification of a proposition is from God, from the same is the falsification of the proposition or the false enunciation, insofar as it is false. — And so the things sought are evident.

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