Dist. 37, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/37/q/bon-sent-II-d37-dubia
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked about that saying of Augustine, who says: *The works of the devil, which are called vices, are acts, not things.* But on the contrary: Fulgentius says, and it is found in the Gloss on the third chapter of Romans: «God is the avenger of that thing of which He is not the author»: therefore if God is the avenger of sin, sin is a thing. — Likewise, it seems that contraries are involved in that saying: for every being is some thing; but a vice is an act, as he himself says, and act is a certain difference of being: therefore it is the same thing to say that vices are acts and not things, which is to affirm below and to deny above concerning the same thing; which is impossible. — Likewise, Augustine himself seems to contradict himself, when he says in the Enchiridion that «there are certain things by which men are evil»; such things are nothing but vices and sins: therefore vices are things.

**I respond:** It must be said that *thing* is taken commonly, properly, and more properly. A thing, according as it is said commonly, is named from *reor, reris* [to reckon]; and thus it comprehends everything that falls under cognition, whether it be a thing externally or in opinion alone. But properly a thing is named from *ratus, rata, ratum* [reckoned, fixed], according as that is said to be fixed which is not only in cognition but rather is in the nature of things, whether it be a being in itself or in another; and in this mode thing is convertible with being. In the third mode a thing is said more properly, according as it is named from *ratus, rata, ratum*, inasmuch as that is called fixed which is a being *per se* and fixed; and thus thing is said only of creatures and of substances that are beings per se. — If, therefore, thing be taken in the first mode, sin is a thing both as regards the underlying action and as regards the deformity; and thus Fulgentius takes it. But if thing be said in the second mode, then sin is called a thing not by reason of the deformity, but by reason of the underlying act; and thus Augustine takes it in the Enchiridion. Taking this name *thing* in the third mode, sin is neither a thing by reason of the deformity nor by reason of the underlying act; and thus Augustine takes it in the saying proposed, when he says that the works of the devil are vices, not things. And by this the response to the whole is clear.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *What is not a nature God did not make.* For this seems to be false, because there are many things which come about beyond nature, and yet it is established that they are from God, as many accidents which are induced through acquisition and through violence, and also through grace and through miracle. — Likewise, everything that is some nature is either a substance or a property naturally inhering in it; but there are many things which neither inhere naturally nor exist per se: therefore that which is said does not seem to be true, namely that God did not make that which is not a nature.

**I respond:** It must be said that just as this name *thing* is taken in three ways, so too this name *nature*. For in one mode a nature is called a thing which exists naturally, or a property which inheres naturally. In the second mode nature is said more broadly, not only a thing being per se, or a property naturally inhering, but also everything that conserves nature, or that at least does not deprive of some good; and these two modes the Master sets down in the text. In the third mode nature is said most broadly of every being which is in some natural thing, whether it inheres naturally or not; whether it be conserving or not. — When, therefore, Augustine says that nature is everything that God made, nature can be taken in three modes, according as God's making is taken in three ways. For in one mode God is said to *make* by creating; in the second mode by con-creating; in the third mode by cooperating; and so, according as the word of making is extended, the name of nature is extended; just as God is said to *make* by cooperating with free will in the action underlying sin, so too the name of nature extends itself to that action; and just as God's making never extends itself to *deformity*, so neither does *nature*. And therefore from this authority it cannot be held that the *underlying action* of the deformity is not from God, but only this is held, that the *deformity* is not from God.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about that argument which the Master in the text leaves unsolved. For he says thus: *What wonder is it, if God is not said to be the author of sins, inasmuch as they are nothing, since no author of what is nothing can exist.* For it seems to argue effectively. For since sin in some mode has an author, and cannot have one according as it is nothing: it has one, therefore, according as it is something. If therefore it in no way has God as author, it seems that sin, inasmuch as it is an act, is not from God.

**I respond:** It must be said to this that that argument fails, because in one way sin is nothing, in another way that is nothing which in no way exists. For sin is formally nothing, yet nonetheless it is about something, and is the privation of some good. And although that which *in no way* exists cannot have an author, nonetheless that which states a defect about a being can have an author — not, I say, an efficient author, but a deficient one. And thus it is clear that that argument does not rightly proceed.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *Iniquity itself is not a substance.* For either substance is said properly, or it is said commonly. If it is said *properly*, then neither is justice a substance. If it is said *commonly*, then everything that has some essence is called a substance. But an evil habit has some essence, inasmuch as it is a habit: therefore it seems that it can be called a substance: therefore it seems that an evil habit, such as lust, ought to praise God.

**I respond:** It must be said that just as the name *nature* is taken in many ways, so too the name *substance*. For besides those four modes which the Philosopher states — that substance is said to be *matter, form, the composite,* and the *essence* of each thing — substance can be otherwise distinguished according to the words of blessed Augustine: in one mode, so that it be called a thing permanent and standing per se; in another mode, so that it be called a thing permanent, yet not standing per se, but inhering in another; in the third mode, so that any essence actually a being be called a substance, whether standing per se or not; and in this mode substance extends itself to every being. And thus Augustine takes it, when he says: «What is no substance is altogether nothing». When, therefore, it is said that iniquity is not a substance, it must be said that *iniquity* is taken abstractly for the deformity itself, not for the habit about which the deformity consists.

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *God is the author of punishments.* For this seems to be false, because God is the author of nothing except what has an exemplar in God; but punishment, according as it is punishment, has no exemplar in God: therefore it seems that God is not the author of punishment. — Likewise, «it is the same thing to come about with God as author and with God as willing». But, as Damascene says, «God did not fashion us for punishing»: therefore if the evils of punishment do not please God, it seems that they are not from Him as from an author.

**I respond:** It must be said that there are certain things which have an exemplar in God according to a conformity which is regarded as to their *special* being; but certain others according to a conformity which is regarded as to their *general* being. Although, therefore, punishment or passion has no corresponding passion or punishment in God, it nonetheless has something corresponding in the genus of *being* and in the genus of *order*; and this suffices for something to have an exemplar in God.

To the other it must be said that the will in God is twofold, namely antecedent and consequent; and although punishment is not from the antecedent will, nonetheless it is from the consequent will.

But in what manner punishment is from God, and which [punishment], this was determined above in the preceding distinction. For although the Master says that punishments are from God, yet this is not to be understood universally. — Therefore, in order that these words, which are said in this distinction, may be understood soundly, it is necessary to presuppose these four propositions as infallible rules. Of these the first is, that everything that states some position is from God. The second is, that everything that states some order, inasmuch as it is such, is from God. The third is, that no defect, according as it is such, is from God, on account of the fact that this is repugnant to the divine power. The fourth is this, that nothing disordered, according as it is such, is from God, because it is repugnant to the divine wisdom.

These things being presupposed as manifest, it is also necessary to know how to distinguish. First, concerning punishment as to the formal account of punishment, and as to that which is subjected. Secondly, it must be known that some punishment is *done*, some *contracted*, some *inflicted*. Thirdly, one must understand the distinction of this name *thing*, since it is said in three ways. Fourthly, one must understand the distinction of this name *nature* and *substance*, according as they were distinguished above. And these things being understood, those things which are said in the text are made manifest.

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