Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/38/q/bon-sent-II-d38-a1-q1
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### Article I. *On the comparison of the will to its end.*
### Question I. *Whether the will is good and praiseworthy by reason of a good end.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether the will is good and praiseworthy by reason of a good end. And that it is so, seems [to be the case].

1. Matthew six: *If thy eye be single, thy whole body shall be lightsome.* If, then, the eye is the intention by which the will is ordered to the end, according to the exposition given there, and the body is the aggregate of works; it seems that, if the end is good, every operation of the will is good and praiseworthy.

2. Likewise, Augustine says in the eleventh book of *On the Trinity*: « All wills are right, if that one is good to which all are ordered »; but that to which all are ordered is the will of the end: if, then, the end is good, it remains that the will of the end and every will ordered to it is good and right.

3. Likewise, there is a maxim of the Philosopher: « That whose end is good is itself also good »: therefore if the act of the will of the end is good, then it too is good.

4. Likewise, in a natural action, in which the form is the end, the goodness of the generation and of the operation is regarded according to the end and the form: therefore, since the intention of the end is equally essential to the moral act as to the natural one, and the goodness of the act of the will pertains to morals; it seems that the goodness of the will and its rectification must be regarded and known according to the goodness of the end.

**On the contrary:** 1. « The end of good [persons] is beatitude », as the Master says in the text; but « all desire beatitude », as Augustine says, and « all finally intend it, as Boethius says in the book *On Consolation*, although they run to it by diverse paths »: therefore if all wills share in that end, then all will be good, and none evil.

2. Likewise, Dionysius says that « no one acts looking toward evil », therefore everyone who acts finally looks toward some good; whence the Philosopher also says that « the good and the end are the same »: therefore if every will intends some good, it seems that either every will is good, or that goodness does not belong to the will from the end.

3. Likewise, however much someone finally desires good, nevertheless his operation will never be meritorious unless it is informed by charity, and the soul is pleasing and acceptable to God: therefore it seems that the goodness of the will in act comes rather from the principle than from the end.

4. Likewise, if the goodness of the will comes from the end, since the end of every good will is God and is equally good; it seems that all good wills are equally good. If therefore all wills are not equally good, it seems that the goodness of the will is not theirs from the end.

5. Likewise, to eat is good: therefore if someone finally preaches in order that he may eat, since that operation has a good end, it seems that to preach thus is good and laudable. If therefore such an action is judged to be evil, it seems that the will is not good from the will of the end.

6. Likewise, if someone lies for the salvation of his neighbor, since to save one's neighbor is good, that lie would be good and meritorious, if the work of the will had goodness from the end; but it is established that « a lie is never good », as Augustine says: therefore it seems that the goodness of the end does not suffice for the goodness of the will.

It is asked, then, whence rectitude and goodness are caused in the will, whether from the end, as the Master seems to say, or from elsewhere.

### Conclusio

> The will is good from the end, if two conditions are present on the side of the end, and two on the side of the ordering.

**I respond:** It must be said that when the will is said to be good from the goodness of the end, this is to say that the will is good from being ordered to a good end. — But for there to be a right ordering to a good end, it is required that the end be good in two ways, namely according to *that which it is*, and under the formal character of ending [finiendi]. For something is good *in itself* which nevertheless is not rightly ordered to another *under the formal character of an end*; just as a lesser good, although it is good, is nevertheless not a good end of a greater good, for the reason that « the better end ought to be [superior] to those things which are toward the end ». — Likewise on the side of the *ordering* two things are required, namely *suitability* on the side of *what is orderable*, and *actual conversion* on the side of *the ordering will*. — And when these concur, then without doubt the will is judged good from a good end. But when any of these is lacking, the goodness of the end does not suffice for the goodness of the will, as for instance if the end is good *in itself*, yet does not suffice *for ending* or for completing that which is done for its sake; just as eating, although it is good in itself, nevertheless does not have the complete formal character of ending with respect to preaching. Likewise a lie is not orderable to good, since it is *of itself* evil; and therefore, however much one may lie for the sake of some good, the lie is not good, because there is lacking there the rectitude of ordering on account of the defect of suitability on the side of the act, which the will refers to that end. — And thus the response to the truth of the question is plain, since it must be conceded, as the Master says, that the will is good and right from the end; for this is understood under the aforesaid conditions. And according to this mode the arguments for the first part are to be conceded.

**And through this also the response to those two [arguments] which are last opposed, namely concerning preaching and lying, is plain.**

1. But to that which is first objected, that beatitude is the end of good wills and indeed of all; it must be said that the end of good wills is one thing, and of evil wills another. For beatitude, which is the end of good wills, is true beatitude; but beatitude, which is the end of evil [wills], is not true beatitude, but a simulated one. For the avaricious man estimates that beatitude is in riches, and the proud man, in honors, and so in the other vices: whence just as the end of evil wills has a certain image of the truly good end, namely of beatitude, so also evil wills hold forth an appearance of virtue. When, therefore, it is said that every will tends to beatitude; this is understood of beatitude considered in its *generality*, in the desire for which all share, as Augustine says; but as beatitude is taken determinately for that which consists in the vision of God, it is neither desired by all, nor do all tend toward it.

2. To that which is objected, that no one acts looking toward evil; it must be said that that which moves [the will] is sometimes good *according to truth*, sometimes good *according to estimation*; and for the affection to be moved, the estimation of goodness alone suffices; and without this estimation the will is not moved to desire anything, at least by a deliberative appetite. And therefore Dionysius says that « no one acts looking toward evil », because there is no operation of the will which the estimation of good does not precede. But because that which is estimated to be good is frequently evil, therefore one frequently acts evilly, even though one never looks toward evil under the formal character of evil. When, therefore, it is said that the will is good from the intention of a good end; this is not understood of an end which is good only in the estimation of the one desiring, but also of real goodness.

3. To that which is objected, that no act of the will is good except that which is from charity; it must be said that charity does not render a work good except from this, that it refers the good itself to the highest good. Nor is a sufficient relation of any effect or work to the highest good, nor can it be, except from the help of charity, which makes that end outweigh all others and be reckoned more dear than the rest, and [makes the will] rest in it as in the ultimate end. And hence it is that the goodness of every will is attributed to charity. Nevertheless it is also attributed to the goodness of the end, because where one [is] for the sake of another, there is only one; whence he who holds a horse by the bridle is not said to hold but one. And so it must be understood in the matter at hand.

4. 5. 6. To that which is objected, that the end is equally good; it must be said that even if the end is equally good, nevertheless not all wills are equally ordered to and approach that end, because the goodness of the end does not redound into the will except by reason

of the will's ordering to that end. And therefore, although the end is equally good, nevertheless, on account of the degrees found in the approach and ordering of the wills to that end, the wills are not equally good. — To the two last [arguments] the response is already plain from what has been said.