Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/38/q/bon-sent-II-d38-a1-q4
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### Question IV. *Whether evil wills have a single end.*

Fourthly it is asked whether evil wills have a single end. And that they do, it seems.

1. Augustine, on that passage of the Psalm: *Searching hearts* etc.: « The end of human care and thought is the delight to which each one strives to attain »: if therefore all evil wills finally seek delight, it seems that one end can be assigned for all evil wills.

2. Likewise, of evil wills there is one evil outcome or terminus, as is said in Romans, chapter six: *Whose end is death:* therefore, if it happens that they have one terminus, by parity of reasoning it seems that it happens that they have one ultimate end.

3. Likewise, things that agree in their beginning agree also in their ultimate end; but all evil wills agree in their beginning, as Augustine says in the book *On True Religion*: « It is plain, he says, that in the whole class of wrongdoing nothing else holds sway than lust ». If therefore they agree in one beginning, namely in lust, by parity of reasoning it seems that they agree in one end.

4. Likewise, vice imitates virtue according to appearance; whence, just as virtue never rests short of true beatitude, so vice seeks a feigned beatitude: therefore, just as all virtues make the will tend to one end, namely beatitude; so it seems that all vices make the will tend to one end, namely one that has a likeness to the true end.

**On the contrary:** 1. Of contrary wills the delights are contrary, and where there are contrary delights, there are diverse ends; but pleasures make wills mutually repugnant: therefore they make them have diverse ends.

2. Likewise, an evil will sets its end in a creature; but it is impossible that in one creature our will should find sufficiency, since nothing suffices for the human will except the Trinity alone: if therefore the will does not rest except in that end in which it sets its sufficiency; it seems necessary that the evil will constitutes diverse ends for itself.

3. Likewise, the appetite of an evil will has its origin and root from lust; but lust is that by which one loves one's own good: if therefore one's own good is necessarily diversified in diverse persons, it is necessary that diverse ends be found for diverse wills.

4. Likewise, the unity and conformity of good wills comes from the unity of love, in which they are united and bound together. If therefore love, in which diverse persons are bound together and united, ought to have a single root, found in many, since this does not belong to the love of lust, but only to the love of charity, which is the love of the Holy Spirit; it seems that of evil wills there is not a single end, but diverse ones.

### Conclusion

> Differing evil wills constitute for themselves not one, but diverse ends.

**I respond:** It must be said that it is the contrary in good wills and in evil ones. For of good wills there is a single end, whether the good wills be diverse by numerical diversity or by formal diversity. I call diversity numerical when several men are affected in the same genus of affection toward something; and I call diversity formal when the same man is affected by diverse habits of the virtues toward diverse things. For whether in the one way or the other, although it may happen that several proximate and proper ends are assigned, nevertheless the ultimate and principal end must necessarily be single, namely God himself.

And the ground of this is both the perfection of the moving love and the perfection of the desirable thing that gives rest. For because the love of charity is liberal, and does not seek what is its own, but the common good; hence it is that several men, moved by charity, finally seek the same good. Again, because that desirable thing is most complete, in which one can find not only a perfect good, but also every good; hence it is that all wills, however diverse, find their end, in which they rest.

— On the contrary, it is otherwise in evil wills, on account of the imperfection of love and of the desirable thing. For on account of the imperfection of lustful love, wills differing in number alone have diverse ends, because lustful love always seeks what is its own; and because it always seeks its own good, therefore, even if many through lustful love agree in one act, nevertheless each one seeks his own proper end, as is plain in the adulterer and the harlot, for the one seeks delight and the other seeks money. — On account of the imperfection of the desirable thing as well, it is necessary that diverse wills formally differing have diverse ends. For because luxury seeks pleasantness and gladness, and avarice sufficiency, and pride excellence; and all these cannot be found in the same created thing, but in diverse things: hence it is that evil wills formally differing constitute for themselves not one, but diverse ends. — Whence the arguments which show this are to be granted.

1. To that which is objected first, that delight is the end of care and thought: it must be said that in that argument there is a figure of diction, for the reason that it is not the same delight that is the end of human care and of thought, but diverse ones. Whence delight there stands in its generality and has there rather a simple supposition than a personal one; and therefore, when through delight one descends to a unity of end, a sophism arises according to the figure of diction from a commutation of supposition.

2. To that which is objected, that of evil wills there is one evil outcome, therefore one evil end: it must be said that it is not alike. For evil wills differ in conversion, but agree in aversion; and the evil outcome regards aversion more principally than conversion, whereas the moving end regards conversion more principally than aversion. Therefore it does not follow that, although there is one outcome as regards the death of damnation, that on account of this there is one motive end as regards the rest of delight.

3. To that which is objected, that evil wills agree in their beginning, namely in lust; it must be said that in their beginning they agree only by a certain conformity. For the lust in one is one thing, and that in another is another; and therefore it does not follow from this that they agree in a single end. And yet, even if they agreed in their beginning, it would not on account of this be necessary that they agree in their terminus. For evil always proceeds toward dispersion, but good always returns to unity. For the more a thing is gathered together, the more it is strengthened and is more perfect; but the more it is dispersed, the more it recedes from perfection and completion. And therefore the Philosopher says that « evil is in many ways, and good in one way ».

4. To that which is objected, that vice imitates virtue; it must be said that it imitates in such a way that it has more of dissimilarity than of similarity; for it is more contrary to virtue than conformed to it. And therefore it can rather be inferred that evil wills have diverse ends, if good wills have a single one, than the converse. For because the perfection of virtue consists in this, vice falls short of virtue in this more than it can imitate it. And thus it is plain that of evil wills there is not one end, but diverse ones.

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