Dist. 38, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/38/q/bon-sent-II-d38-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the difference of intention and will.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the second principal point, namely concerning the difference of intention and will. And about this two things are asked.

First it is asked, whether intention is in rational beings alone.

Second, whether intention, in those things that share in reason, denotes something on the side of the intellect, or on the side of the affection.

### Question I. *Whether intention is only in those things which share in reason.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether intention is only in those things which share in reason. And that it is so, seems [to be the case].

1. As the Gloss says upon that passage of Luke, chapter eleven: *Take heed, lest the light* etc.; the Gloss: «The *light* of the soul is intention»; but it is established that intention is not a corporeal light, but a spiritual one: if therefore spiritual light is in spiritual substances alone, which are born to be

illumined by the highest light, and these are the only rational creatures; it seems therefore that intention is in rational beings alone.

2. Likewise, intention is an act of the comparative power — for he who intends tends from one thing to another and compares one thing to another — if therefore the comparative power is only in those which share in reason, it seems that intention is found in them alone.

3. Likewise, intention is that by which the soul is most immediately joined to the ultimate end: therefore intention is to be found only in those which have the power by means of which they can lay hold of God and be united to Him; but such are the rational beings alone, since they alone are unto the image of God: therefore it seems that it is in these alone that intention can be found.

4. Likewise, intention is the highest thing in the soul, whence it is called our head and our eye; but those things in which we have community with irrational creatures are the lowest and below reason: therefore it seems that in no creature other than the rational can intention be found.

**On the contrary:**
1. In everything which operates through intention, intention is to be found; but «nature, as the Philosopher says, is something that operates through intention»: therefore it seems that in a natural thing intention is to be found and posited.

2. Likewise, everything which is moved toward something and, once that is obtained, comes to rest, was intending that thing when it was being moved; for unless it intended that thing, it would not be moved toward its absence, nor come to rest at its presence. If therefore natural things are of this kind, as is evident, since a stone is moved downward; it seems that intention is not only in rational beings, but also in natural things.

3. Likewise, everything which makes some work ordered to an end distinct from itself operates through intention; but irrational natures are of this kind, as is evident in the spider, which makes its web for catching flies: therefore it seems, etc.

4. Likewise, intention is the rule of appetite: therefore if nothing in the universe is to be posited as deprived of governance and order, it seems that wherever there is appetite to be posited, there intention is to be posited. But appetite is not only in rational substances, but also in irrational ones: therefore, etc.

> **Conclusion.** Intention is properly in rational beings alone, in sensual ones less properly, in natural ones improperly.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said it must be noted that concerning this question there is a twofold mode of speaking which presents itself at present. The one is that we distinguish in the mode of operating through intention according to what is proper and what is alien. For it seems that it can be said with sufficient reasonableness that there are certain things which are moved by their own intention, and certain things which are moved by an alien intention. By their own intention are moved those things which foreknow the end and direct and refer their operation to the end. By an alien intention are moved those things which within themselves do not have the power of discerning; yet they are governed and directed by him who discerns, just as an arrow shot from a bow can be said to be moved through intention — not, I say, the intention of the bow or of the arrow, but of the one who shoots. — In this mode, indeed, it could be said with sufficient reasonableness that all natural things are said to be moved through intention, inasmuch as they are moved as God has appointed and as He governs and rules; for He Himself in every operation is the principal mover. And according to this mode of speaking intention is properly found in rational substances alone, although irrational things may, according to some mode of speaking, be said to operate through intention. — But although this mode of speaking is reasonable and states the truth, nevertheless it does not seem to state it sufficiently, when it says that nature is said to operate through intention not by reason of its own intention, but by reason of an alien intention; because it does not state it sufficiently, while it assigns to natures only an alien intention. For according to this, chance and fortuitous events, since they do not come to pass apart from the divine intention, ought not to be said to come to pass apart from intention. Again, since we see that natural things have appetite, by means of which they tend from one thing to another, and each thing has its own governing power, by means of which it is inclined to its proper end; it seems that natural things not only are moved by an extrinsic and alien intention, but also that they are moved by a proper and intrinsic intention.

And therefore there is another mode of speaking, since, just as appetite is threefold, namely natural, sensual or animal, and rational, and each of these appetites has its own governance, not absurdly is the governance of each of these three called intention; yet most properly is intention called the governance of the rational appetite. — And the reason for this is that to the governance and direction of the natural appetite it pertains rather to be directed than to direct; but to the directing of the rational appetite it properly pertains to direct: while the directing of the brute appetite holds, as it were, a middle position. And hence it is that natural things are moved by a certain necessity, rational things by pure liberty, but brutes are moved by a certain impetuosity, which is below liberty and above necessity; for they cannot altogether restrain themselves, and yet they can tend toward opposite directions. As therefore the directive rule of operation is found in rational beings properly, in sensual ones less properly, in natural ones improperly; so also is intention.

**And through this is evident the answer to the proposed question, and to the reasons on both sides.** For intention properly taken, according as it denotes a light through which there is comparison and tending toward God, is regarded as belonging to the highest part of the soul; and therefore in this mode it is found in rational beings alone, as those reasons show. But intention, according as it denotes the ordering and direction of appetite toward some terminus or quieting end, is not only in rational beings, but even in brutes, as the other reasons for the other side show. And so it is evident that both [sets of reasons] conclude what is true by different ways, and therefore are to be conceded.