Dist. 38, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/38/q/bon-sent-II-d38-a2-q2
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### Question II. *Whether in rational beings intention belongs to the side of the intellect, or to the side of the affection.*

Secondly it is asked concerning intention, according as it is found in rational beings: whether it belongs to the side of the intellect, or to the side of the affection. And that it belongs to the side of the affection seems [to be the case].

1. Bernard *to Eugene*: "That the eye may be simple, two things are necessary, namely charity in intention and truth in election"; but charity exists only in the will: therefore if charity is in intention, intention belongs to the side of the will.

2. Likewise, Augustine says, and it is contained in the text [of the Master]: "Intention is that by which I will thus to attain the end"; but no one wills to attain the end except through the will: therefore intention is on the side of the will.

3. Likewise, intention joins with the end itself; but "the will does not only name the appetite for those things that are toward the end, but also of the end itself," as the Philosopher holds. If therefore that which principally joins with the end is intention, and this same thing is the will; it seems that intention is the will.

4. Likewise, merit principally resides with intention; but that with which merit and demerit principally reside is the will itself: therefore it seems that intention belongs to the side of the will or of the affection.

**On the contrary:**
5. *St. Matthew* the sixth: *If thy eye be simple* etc.; there the Gloss explains that by the eye is understood intention: if therefore the eye of the soul is not affection, but intellect; it seems that intention does not belong to the side of the affection, but rather to the side of the intellect.

6. Likewise, on that passage of *Luke* the eleventh: *See that the light which is in thee* etc.; the Gloss: "Intention, by which we do whatever good, is light"; but light belongs to the side of the cognitive power: therefore etc.

7. Likewise, it belongs to intention to *refer* the work or the will to the end; but it belongs to that one to *refer* whose it is to *confer*; and to confer is properly of reason itself: therefore intention also [is of reason].

8. Likewise, just as the will never wills anything willed unless it be foreknown by reason, so it never seeks the end unless reason or the affection of reason run before it, to show it that end: if therefore intention is that which points out the end, it seems that intention belongs to the side of reason.

*If perhaps you should say* that it belongs to the side of *reason and will together*:

**On the contrary:**
1. To intend is one act: therefore it is of one power: therefore it cannot be of will and reason at once and together.

2. Likewise, if intention belongs to the side of reason and will, then either as a *power*, or as a *passion*, or as a *habit*. As a *power*, it does not seem [so], because, since will and reason are not one power, and in one man with respect to one end there is one intention, by the name *intention* a power cannot be understood. By like reasoning neither a *habit*, because there is not one habit in two powers. That neither is it a *passion* is established, because by passions we neither merit nor demerit; but concerning intention there is merit and demerit. In no way therefore does it seem that intention regards reason and will at once.

3. Likewise, if it regards reason and will at once; I ask: which *principally*? And it seems principally to belong to the side of *reason*, through this, that the Glosses say that *intention* is *light* and *eye*, which indeed is properly of reason alone. But that it principally belongs to the side of *the will* seems [so] through this, that intention principally regards the end; and the power in us which principally regards the end is the will, since "the good and the end are the same." Therefore if it cannot principally be on the side of both, it seems that it does not consist in both powers, namely in reason and will.

4. Likewise, the inferior does not extend to more than its superior; but *intelligence* is more universal than intention; whence Damascene: "Intelligence is the first motion; but that which is intelligence concerning something is called intention." If therefore *intelligence* does not extend to reason and will at once, but only consists in reason, by like reasoning it seems that neither does *intention*.

### Conclusion.

> *In the name of intention there is enclosed at once the act of reason and of will.*

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that frequently we are led to the knowledge of a thing through the consideration of words. For those who imposed the first words considered most of all the properties of things and imposed words according to them. If therefore we wish to attend [to it], this word *to intend* (*intendere*) is composed of *in* and *tendere* (to tend). Now this preposition *in*, when it is joined to this verb *tendere*, can import a twofold relation: either as to an *object* or as to an ultimate *terminus*.

And in the first way this which is *to intend* signifies only the *turning* of the power with respect to the object; but in the second way it not only signifies the *turning*, but signifies along with this a certain *collation* and a conjoined *rest*. And according to this twofold acceptation this word *to intend* has a diverse construction. For it differs to say *I intend toward this* and *I intend this*. For when I say *I intend toward this*, "to intend" signifies the turning of the power to something as to an *object*. But when I say *I intend this*, "to intend" signifies the turning of the power to something as to an *ultimate end*, which it intends to attain and to which it wills to be united. And therefore in the first acceptation of this verb *to intend*, between it and its case-word there falls a middle preposition, so that thereby may be signified the direction and turning of the power to that as to an *object upon which*. But in the other signification a middle preposition does not fall, for the reason that this verb *tendere* of itself was signifying an inclination and ordination to something; and this preposition *in*, joined to it, adds upon this *rest*; whence the sense is: I intend beatitude, that is, I tend toward beatitude; and therefore it is not necessary to add the preposition externally. — And according to this last mode of taking it is this discourse concerning intention. And since this word imports two things, namely a certain *collation*, and besides this a certain *turning with collation* and a certain *tending with rest*; and one of these is of *reason* and the other of *will*: hence it is that in the name *intention* there is enclosed at once the act of *reason* and of *will*. For although it is one word, yet according as it is composite, it thus implies the conjoined acts of two powers toward accomplishing one [thing], which the act of one could not do without the act of the other. — And it is similar concerning the verb *to consent*, which, although it may seem to import a single act, yet necessarily includes two. For *consent* is nothing other than the concord of *will* together with *reason* toward doing some one thing, the one as *judging* and discerning, the other as *preferring*. And therefore it is rightly so named and regards free choice itself, which indeed at once stands about will and reason, as was shown above.

Whence just as the whole disposition of a household depends on the consent of the father and mother of the family, so the whole *disposition of things to be done* in the house of the soul depends on the consent of will and reason. And just as *disposition* and governance depend on consent, so *direction* and *deflection* depend on intention. For just as toward a right progressive motion there concur at once the operation of sight showing the way and the operation of the foot walking; so in the act of intending there is enclosed at once the act of reason and of will, of the one as looking, of the other as tending. And because these acts are conjoined, therefore they are imported by one composite word.

**To the arguments, the first and the second:** From these things the response to the question proposed and to the reasons on either part is clear. For it must be granted that intention names something on the side of the *will*, as the reasons for the first part conclude. It is also true that intention names something on the side of *reason*, by reason of which it is called both *eye* and *light*, as the other reasons show; and with respect to these two intention has to be directed by *faith* and *charity*: by faith clarifying the eye of the intellect, and by charity rectifying the foot of the affection.

**Solution of the opposing [arguments]:**
1. To that, therefore, which is objected against this, that it cannot be at once in reason and will, because *to intend* signifies a single act; it must be said that this is false; rather it imports several acts, like *to consent* also, as has been shown.

2. To that, however, which is asked, whether it is as a power, or as a passion, or as a habit; it must be said that, although intention is sometimes called the *power* intending, sometimes called the *habit* according to which it intends, sometimes called the *act* of intending, sometimes the *thing intended* itself; yet principally the name *intention* is imposed on the *act* itself; nonetheless it happens sometimes to be found in the other acceptations. For when it is said that intention is the *eye*, intention is taken for the *power*. When it is said, intention is *light*, intention is taken for the *directing habit*. But when it is said that intention is *the end itself*, as the Master says in the text, intention is taken for the *thing intended*. But when it is said that one intention is *right*, another is *crooked*, intention is taken for the *act*. — When therefore the Philosopher says that "everything that is in the soul is power, or passion, or habit"; it must be said that the Philosopher comprehends *acts* under *habits*, or speaks of those things which are in the soul by way of *rest*, not by way of *becoming*. For such things are rather said to be

from the soul than in the soul. — And so it is clear that intention can be an *act*, can also be a *habit* and a *power*; and just as it does not name one simple act, but several, so it does not name a single habit nor one power only. Nor does that reasoning avail: there is one intention: therefore one power, or one habit; because this is one name imposed on many, as was said above concerning freedom of choice; and so there is in this name *concord and consent*.

3. To that which is asked, in which it is principally; it must be said that according to diverse [respects] it is both principally in the cognitive and principally in the motive power. For as regards *direction* it principally belongs to the side of the cognitive power, but as regards *tending* it principally belongs to the side of the affective power; and this is not unfitting.

4. To that which is objected, that intention is inferior to intelligence; it must be said that Damascene speaks of intention according to another acceptation, namely according as it signifies the *turning* of the intellective power itself to some *determinate object*, in which mode he is said to intend toward another who looks upon or considers him; and such a mode of taking is frequently had in Scripture. Whence in *Acts* the third it is said that the lame man, who stood at the gate of the temple, *intended upon them*, that is, upon Peter and John; and in the Psalm: *O God, attend (intende) unto my help*.

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