Dist. 38, Divisio Textus
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/38/q/bon-sent-II-d38-divisio
----------------------------------------
## COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXXVIII.
### *How through sin a depravation comes about in the will itself.*

*After the foregoing concerning the will and its end, etc.*

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above, the Master showed what evil or sin is in general; in this part he determines how sin is introduced through an act of the will. Now this part is divided into three parts. In the first of these the Master determines how sin has its origin from the will in general. In the second he descends to the special differences of sin, below in the forty-second distinction: *But when the evil will and the operation, etc.* In the third he inquires whence the power of sinning has its origin in the will itself, below in the forty-fourth distinction: *After the foregoing, something worthy of consideration arises, etc.*

The first part has two. In the first the Master inquires how the will itself comes to be depraved. In the second, how from the pravity of the will a depravation comes about in the exterior act, below in the fortieth distinction: *After these things, something must be added concerning acts.* The first part has two. In the first he determines how the will comes to be depraved. In the second he inquires why the will is depraved more than another power, below in the thirty-ninth distinction: *But here arises a question of considerable necessity.*

The first part, which contains the present distinction, has two parts. For since the depravation and the rectification of the will is regarded with respect to the end, and the will is to be compared to the end by the mediation of intention; therefore this part has two parts. In the first of these the Master determines concerning the rectification and depravation of the will on the side of the end. In the second he inquires into the difference between will and intention, at the place: *It is also wont to be asked what distinguishes will from intention.* The first part has four parts. For since obliquity comes to be known through rectitude — «for the straight is the judge of itself and of the oblique» — therefore in the first part the Master shows that the rectitude of the will comes on the side of the end. Secondly he determines what that end is, at the place: *He, therefore, who sets charity as his end.* In the third he determines concerning the unity of the end in respect of good wills, at the place: *But it is asked whether all good wills, etc.* In the fourth he raises a certain doubt and determines it, at the place: *Nevertheless, against this opinion, by which it has been said, etc.* The second part, in which he determines concerning the difference between will and intention, has two. In the first of these he seeks the difference according to reason, at the place: *It is also wont to be asked, etc.* Secondly the difference according to the thing, at the place: *But it is asked whether such an intention is a will.* — And according to this two things are determined in this part, namely concerning the comparison of the will to the end, and concerning the difference between intention and will.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding, then, of this part, a question arises here concerning two matters.

And first it is asked concerning the comparison of the will to its end.

Secondly it is asked concerning the difference of intention from will.

Concerning the first, four things are asked.

First it is asked whether the will is commendable by reason of its end.

Secondly it is asked what that end is.

Thirdly it is asked whether good wills have one end, or diverse ones.

Fourthly it is asked whether evil wills share in a common end, or set up for themselves ends differing from one another.

---