Dist. 38, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/38/q/bon-sent-II-d38-dubia
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked concerning what he says: *The will is known from its end, whether it be right or perverse.* Now the end of the will is beatitude. On the contrary: beatitude is a good unknown to us; whence this is that *which neither eye has seen nor ear heard* etc.: therefore, if through what is unknown we cannot know anything else, it seems that the will cannot be known, whether it be good or perverse, from that end. — Likewise, what is present to ourselves is more certain to us than what is absent; but our will is present to us, beatitude is absent: if therefore we do not know things present through things absent, but rather the converse; it seems that through beatitude there comes about no knowledge of goodness in the will.

*(Twofold knowledge of beatitude.)* **I respond:** It must be said that the knowledge of beatitude is twofold, namely in the universal and in the particular. The knowledge of beatitude in the universal is innate in all; but the knowledge in the particular, namely where beatitude is to be placed, is had by us through the habit of faith in some way, and in some way is awaited to be had through the deiformity of glory. For now we know as it were by speculation and from afar and half-fully; but then we shall know by experience perfectly. Although now we do not know perfectly, we nevertheless know with certitude, by the certitude of faith, that beatitude is a great and true good. Concerning our will, whether it be right or perverse, we know nothing except by conjecture; and therefore, just as a certain thing is a ground of coming into the knowledge of a doubtful thing, so the knowledge of beatitude brings one into the knowledge of the goodness of the will, when one sees his will tending toward beatitude.

As for what is objected, that beatitude is unknown to us; this is now clear. For it is true that it is not known to us by experience, yet it is known to us by faith.

To that which is objected, that the rightness of the will is present to us; it must be said that, as was shown in the first book, although charity and grace are present to us, they are nevertheless unknown to us, insofar as they are gratuitous, because no experience can be had of them. Hence, even though I am most certain of my affection, insofar as it is an affection, I am nevertheless very doubtful concerning my affection, whether it be ordered or gratuitous; and so I acquire for myself probability through certain signs.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning that word of the Apostle, which the Master sets down in the text: *The end of the precept is charity, from a pure heart and a good conscience and faith unfeigned.* Since precepts are more directly ordered to obeying than to loving, therefore he ought rather to have said: obedience is the end of the precept, than charity. — Likewise, since the end which we attain from the observance of the commandments is eternal life itself, it ought rather to be said: the end of the precept is eternal life than charity.

In connection with this it is asked concerning the number and difference of those conditions appended, namely concerning a pure

heart etc. For since charity is not of faith nor of conscience, but rather of affection, it does not seem rightly described by those conditions.

**I respond:** It must be said that, according to how the doctors expound it, the Apostle here defines charity. *(Exposition 1.)* But some so expound it that those determinations *from a pure heart* etc. are determinations on the part of the subject; and that what is called the end of the precept is the description itself, so that the sense is: charity proceeding from a pure heart etc. is the end of the precept. — *(Exposition 2, more probable.)* In another way it is expounded, so that this whole is the description of the end of the precept, from a pure heart etc. This manner of speaking seems more fitting. And according to this manner of speaking it must be noted that charity is here defined through its act. Now the act of charity, which is to love, has to be described in two ways: both by comparison to that from which it proceeds as from an efficient principle, and by comparison to that in which charity itself is terminated as in what brings rest; and therefore in that description of it its twofold comparison is touched upon, namely to the pure heart and to the precept itself. And because purity of heart, from which the act of love immediately proceeds, presupposes the confidence of faith and the certitude of hope as preambular dispositions; therefore, that the Apostle might manifest that the act of charity presupposes the acts of the other theological virtues as disposing toward it; hence it is that he says these three things: *from a pure heart*, in which he touches the sanctity of charity; *a good conscience*, in which he touches the confidence of hope; and *faith unfeigned*, in which he touches the constancy of faith. And in these two the Apostle most perfectly commends charity, in this, that he shows that in the act of charity consists the completion of every virtue and the end of every good operation, which is understood in the name of the precept. Hence the meaning of the aforesaid definition is this: charity is the end of the precept etc., that is, charity is that in which consists the fulfillment of every commandment and the perfection of all the virtues. And hence it is that Scripture so commends charity to us, and especially the Scripture of the New Testament, and the Apostle praises it most elegantly.

As for what is objected concerning obedience and eternal life, that they ought to be called the end of the precept; it must be said that obedience is ordered to the having of charity, and eternal life is nothing other than charity consummated.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that the end is *God the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and yet these three are not three ends.* On the contrary: the end is a thing to be enjoyed; but «these three are three things to be enjoyed», as Augustine says in the book *On Christian Doctrine*: therefore they are three ends. — Likewise, the intention of the end is directed by faith; but faith posits three articles in believing in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit: therefore by parity of reason the intention is directed toward Him, setting up for itself three ends.

*(Incidental question.)* It is asked therefore why there is not a diversity of ends, just as there is a plurality of articles.

**I respond:** It must be said that it belongs to reason to distinguish, and to the will to unite. Again, as Damascene says, «the persons are distinguished by reason and agree in reality and nature». According to this, then, it must be understood that those names which are common to reality and reason, those can be pluralized; but those which are *real*, cannot be pluralized. Therefore it can be said that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three things; yet it cannot be said that they are three goodnesses. — Again, because an article states what is in the mind *(To the incidental question.)* on the part of reason, whereas the end states what regards the will; therefore we can say several articles, yet we cannot say several ends. Although, however, there are several articles, there is nevertheless one truth in them, because, since complex truth, insofar as it posits something, is reduced to incomplex truth; and there is one incomplex truth in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, insofar as they are one entity and one truth: those three articles have to be founded upon one real truth.

To that, then, which is objected, that they are three things: it must be said that that argument is not valid: they are three things: therefore three ends; because it proceeds from a personal plurality to an essential plurality; and *thing* is taken differently when it is said: the end is a thing, and when it is said: they are three things.

To that which is objected, that faith distinguishes; it must be said that from this it does not follow that the intention distinguishes several ends, just as faith distinguishes several articles; for since the intention is consummated in charity, and it belongs to charity to unite, the intention has more the character of uniting than the character of distinguishing.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning the question last proposed in the text, which the Master does not determine in either direction, namely whether the will of the end and of that which is toward the end are two wills, or one. For that they are two seems to be the case from this, that one is of the created and the other of the uncreated, one temporal and the other of the eternal. But that it is one seems to be the case from this, that there one thing is for the sake of another; and where this is so, there only one thing is willed, as when I love sweet wine, I do not love two things, but one.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master here sets down two responses, yet does not reject either of them nor approve the one more than the other. — And the reason for this is that according to diverse considerations each says what is true, and both must be said. For one says that there are two wills; the other says that there is one will. *(A distinction to be noted.)* Now they said this looking to different things. For the will of the end can be in two ways: either as of an object, or as of an end in the character of an end. If it be the will of the end as of an object, then, since the object created is one thing and the uncreated another, the will by which I will the end is one, and that by which I will what is toward the end is another, just as the motion of affection by which I love God in Himself is one, and the motion by which I love a creature is another. But if it be the will of the end under the character of an end, namely insofar as something else has to be ordered to it, then by one will and one course I will both, although the will cannot at one and the same time be borne upon both, but successively; as is clear, when I love eating for the sake of health, because in the love of eating I include the love of health. — And according to these two ways there are two manners of speaking that are probable and true, if they be rightly understood.

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