Dist. 39, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/39/q/bon-sent-II-d39-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether conscience is an innate or an acquired habit.*

Secondly it is asked whether conscience is an innate or an acquired habit. And that it is an innate habit appears as follows.

1. To the Romans, chapter two: *When the gentiles, who do not have the law, naturally do the things that are of the law, they are a law unto themselves, since they show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness to them.* And the Gloss on the same place: «Although the gentiles do not have a written law, they nonetheless have a natural law, by which they are conscious to themselves»: therefore from the text and the Gloss it is clear that conscience denotes a habit naturally inscribed upon the human heart.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the third book *On Free Choice*: «Before any merit of a good work it is no small thing to have received a natural faculty of judgment, by which one prefers wisdom to error, and rest to difficulty». If therefore conscience is a faculty of judgment of this kind, it is then a habit innate to man.

3. Likewise, Isidore: «Natural right is that which nature has taught the animals»: therefore if nature taught the animals that which belongs to natural right, much more did it teach man, who surpasses all the animals; but the knowledge of natural right is nothing other than conscience: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, we have a natural instinct to desire happiness and to honor our parents; but this cannot be without some prior knowledge: therefore it appears that for doing things of this kind we have some knowledge naturally impressed upon us. But the knowledge inclining to this is conscience: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, natural law is known by man in some way, therefore either by acquisition or by nature. If by acquisition: then it ought not to be called natural, but acquired, just as neither are the political virtues. But if by nature; and the knowledge of natural law is nothing other than conscience: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, natural right naturally binds the will; but the binding of the will necessarily precedes the act of knowledge — for the intellect precedes the affection — therefore if the will is naturally bound to that right, it appears that that right is naturally known by the soul. If therefore the knowledge of that right is conscience, it is clear etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. The Philosopher in the third book *On the Soul* says that «the soul is created like a blank tablet, on which nothing is depicted»: therefore it appears that the soul, from its first condition, has no innate knowledge. If then the habit of conscience denotes some knowledge, it appears that it is not innate but acquired.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the first book of the *Retractations* retracts what he had said, that «the soul is created knowing, but, oppressed by the mass of the body, forgets the things it knew»; but he would not retract it unless he held it for false: therefore it is false according to Augustine that the soul has naturally a knowledge of things to be done. If then conscience is a cognitive habit of this kind, it appears that it is not innate but acquired.

3. Likewise, knowledge of the complex is not had unless knowledge of the incomplex is had — whence he who does not know the terms does not know the principle, on account of which the Philosopher says that «we know principles insofar as [we know] the terms» — but we do not have knowledge of incomplex things except by means of the senses; for no one knows color except through sight, and therefore «those who lose one sense necessarily lose one science». If therefore all science of incomplex things is by means of sense, it is necessary that all knowledge of complex things be acquired and received from sense; but conscience denotes knowledge of the complex, namely of some rule of natural right: therefore it appears that conscience does not denote an innate habit but an acquired one.

4. Likewise, it is of equal or greater difficulty to know the things that pertain to morals as those that pertain to mere speculation; but science, which is the cognitive habit of speculative matters, is not innate to us but acquired: therefore by parity of reasoning conscience also, which is a habit directing in matters to be done, is not innate but acquired.

5. Likewise, every natural habit is always right; but conscience is sometimes right, sometimes erroneous: therefore conscience is not a natural habit but an acquired one.

6. Likewise, natural habits are present in *all* and *always*, because natural things are those that are the same among all, and natural things accompany nature inseparably; but consciences are not the same among all, indeed they are frequently contrary; conscience also is not *always* present, since frequently a man begins to have a conscience which he did not have before, as a religious, from the time he enters religion, has a conscience that it is not lawful for him to act against the counsels, and this he did not have before: therefore etc.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusion.** Conscience denotes an innate habit by reason both of the light implanted in the soul and of the first moral principles, but it denotes an acquired habit both by reason of the species of the very thing knowable and in respect of particular operations.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that, besides that Platonic position which held that all habits of things to be known are simply innate to the soul, but are given over to oblivion for a time on account of the mass of the body — which both the Philosopher and Augustine disapprove and reject — there have been three opinions of the doctors concerning the origin of cognitive habits. And all three of those positions agree in this, that just as habitual virtues are neither wholly from nature nor wholly from acquisition, but are in a certain way innate, in a certain way acquired: so also cognitive habits are neither wholly innate nor wholly acquired, but in a certain way innate and in a certain way acquired. But in assigning the manner according to which these habits are innate, and according to which they are acquired, the various [doctors] differ.

For some wished to say that they are innate as regards the agent intellect, but acquired as regards the possible intellect; and it is with regard to this latter intellect that the Philosopher says that the soul is created like a bare tablet, and this is the intellect which has to be perfected by means of the sensitive powers. — But this does not seem to be consonant either with the words of the Philosopher or with the truth. For if the agent intellect had the habits of things to be known, why could it not communicate them to the possible [intellect] without the aid of the lower senses? Again, if the agent intellect had the habits of things to be known, then the soul from its condition would not be ignorant, but rather would be knowing. It is also difficult at the same time to understand how species are said to be in the agent intellect, since the possible is called «that by which it is to become all things», and the agent «that by which it is to make all things».

And therefore there is a second way of speaking, that cognitive habits are in a certain way innate, in a certain way acquired. For they are innate as regards knowledge
in the universal, acquired as regards knowledge in the particular; or innate as regards the knowledge of principles, acquired as regards the knowledge of conclusions; whence a self-evident proposition [dignitas] is that which everyone approves once it is heard. — But neither does this way of speaking accord with the words of the Philosopher and Augustine. For the Philosopher in the book of the *Posterior [Analytics]* proves that the knowledge of principles is not innate to us, leading [the opposite view] into many incongruities; and in the same place he shows that «the knowledge of principles is acquired by way of sense, memory, and experience». Augustine too, in the twelfth book *On the Trinity*, speaking of the little boy who answered concerning all the principles of geometry, says there that this was not because the soul of that little boy had previously known them, but rather «he saw these things in a certain incorporeal light of its own kind; just as the eye of the flesh sees the things that lie before it in this corporeal light, of which light it is capable and to which it is suited, being created [so]».

And for this reason there is a third way of speaking, that cognitive habits are in a certain way innate to us and in a certain way acquired, not only speaking of knowledge in the particular and of the knowledge of conclusions, but also of the knowledge of principles. For since two things necessarily concur for knowledge, namely the presence of the knowable and the light by means of which we judge of it, as we see in vision, and as Augustine intimates in the preceding authority; cognitive habits are in a certain way innate to us by reason of the light implanted in the soul, they are also in a certain way acquired by reason of the species; and this indeed accords with the words of the Philosopher and Augustine. For all agree in this, that there is a light implanted in the cognitive power, which is called the natural faculty of judgment; but the species and likenesses of things are acquired in us by means of sense, as the Philosopher expressly says in many places; and this experience too teaches. For no one would ever know *a whole*, or *a part*, or *a father*, or *a mother*, unless by some exterior sense he received the species of it; and hence it is that «those who lose one sense necessarily lose one science». But that light or natural faculty of judgment directs the soul itself in judging both of things knowable and of things to be done.

But this must be especially attended to; for, just as among knowable things some are very evident, such as self-evident propositions and first principles; some are less evident, such as particular conclusions; so also among things to be done some are most evident, such as this: «what you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another», and that God is to be obeyed, and the like. As therefore the knowledge of first principles is said to be innate to us by reason of that light, because that light suffices for knowing them, after the reception of the species, without any superadded persuasion, on account of their evidence: so also the knowledge of the first moral principles is innate to us, for the reason that that faculty of judgment suffices for knowing them. Again, as the knowledge of the particular conclusions of the sciences is acquired, for the reason that the light innate to us does not fully suffice for knowing them, but needs some new persuasion and habituation: so also it must be understood on the side of things to be done, that certain things are to be done, to which we are bound, which we do not know except by superadded instruction. — Since therefore conscience names a habit directive of our judgment in respect of things to be done, hence it is that in a certain way it names an innate habit, and in a certain way names an acquired one. An innate habit, I say, it names in respect of those things that are of the first dictate of nature; but an acquired habit in respect of those things that are of superadded institution. It also calls it an innate habit in respect of the directive light; nonetheless an acquired habit in respect of the species of the very thing knowable. For I have a natural light which suffices for knowing that parents are to be honored, and that neighbors are not to be harmed; yet I do not have naturally impressed upon me the species of a father, or the species of a neighbor.

These things seen, the response to the question proposed and also to the objections is plain. For I grant that conscience denotes a habit in a certain way innate, namely by reason of that light signed upon us, which indeed shows us good things, and which is the seedbed of the other habits to be acquired; and thus run the reasons adduced for the first part.
I grant nonetheless that conscience denotes in a certain way an acquired habit, namely by reason of the species of the things themselves knowable, as the first three reasons adduced for the second part show. I grant also that it denotes a habit in a certain way acquired in respect of particular operables, as the three other reasons show. — But if there are any knowable things which are known through their essence, not through a species, in respect of such conscience could be called a simply innate habit, as in respect of this which is to love God and to fear God. For God is not known through a likeness received from sense, indeed «the knowledge of God is naturally implanted in us», as Augustine says. But what love and fear are, man does not know through a likeness received from without, but through their essence; for affections of this kind are essentially in the soul.

From these things is plain the response to that question by which it is asked whether all knowledge is from sense. It must be said that it is not. For it must necessarily be posited that the soul knows God and itself and the things that are in itself, without the support of the *exterior senses*. Hence if the Philosopher sometimes says that «there is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in sense» and that «all knowledge takes its origin from sense»; it must be understood of those things which have *being* in the soul through an *abstracted likeness*; and these are said to be in the soul after the manner of writing. And therefore the Philosopher very notably says that in the soul nothing is written, not because there is no knowledge in it, but because there is in it no picture or *abstracted likeness*. And this is what Augustine says in the book *On the City of God*: «God has implanted in us a natural faculty of judgment, where what is of light, what of darkness, is known in the book of light, which is truth, because truth is naturally impressed in the heart of man».