Dist. 39, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/39/q/bon-sent-II-d39-a1-q3
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### Article I. *On conscience.*
### Question III. *Whether we are bound to everything that conscience dictates to be necessary for salvation.*

Thirdly there is inquiry concerning conscience as to the effect of binding. And the question is whether we are bound to everything that conscience dictates to be necessary for salvation. And that we are, it seems.

**Arguments for the affirmative side.**
1. To the Romans, chapter fourteen: *Everything that is not of faith is sin*; the Gloss: "What is not of faith, that is, against conscience, so that we believe it to be evil, is sin"; but this would not be so, unless conscience bound to everything that it itself dictates: therefore we are bound to do everything that is of conscience's dictate.

2. Likewise, law obliges to doing that which it itself dictates — for law (*lex*) is so called from binding (*a ligando*) — but "conscience is the law of our intellect": therefore we are bound to everything that conscience dictates to be necessary for salvation.

3. Likewise, we are bound to doing that which the judge commands; but conscience is our judge, according to what is said in Ecclesiastes, chapter seven, in the Gloss: therefore we are bound to everything that conscience dictates.

4. Likewise, it is a rule that whenever anyone does something, believing it to be mortal, he sins mortally, on the ground that he despises God: therefore if we cannot but believe the things that conscience dictates, it seems that, whatever that thing be, if we act against it, we sin mortally: it seems therefore that we are bound to do everything that conscience dictates to be necessary for salvation.

**On the contrary:**
**For the negative side.**
1. If we are obliged to everything that conscience dictates; but conscience sometimes dictates doing something against God: therefore we are bound to act against God. But no one sins by doing that to which he is bound: therefore by acting against God we do not sin.

2. Likewise, certain things are so evil in themselves that God cannot do them, nor command them, things that can be done with no good end; but conscience can oblige to nothing to which God cannot oblige, since conscience is below God: therefore if conscience should dictate such things, it seems that it cannot oblige to such things: therefore we are not obliged to do them.

3. Likewise, it seems that it can bind to nothing of itself: because "all sin is something said, or done, or desired against the law of God," as Augustine says: therefore if conscience dictates something that is not of the command of the divine law, to act against it is not sin, since it is not to act against the law of God: therefore one is not bound to do it: therefore conscience binds to nothing, as far as concerns its own power.

4. Likewise, no one can be absolved from any bond through the dictate of conscience, therefore neither through that dictate can one incur any bond: therefore it seems that conscience of itself and through itself can bind to nothing.

**Connected questions.**
There is therefore the question, to what conscience binds: whether it binds to everything that it dictates; and whether every conscience binds; and whether a man is perplexed when conscience dictates one thing, and the divine law dictates the contrary; and which is rather to be obeyed, whether the dictate of conscience, or the precept of the prelate, when they conflict with one another.

> **Conclusion.** Every conscience either binds to doing what it dictates, or binds to laying itself aside, if it is erroneous.

**I respond:** It must be said that conscience sometimes dictates something that is according to the law of God, sometimes something that is beside the law of God, sometimes something that is against the law of God; and we are speaking here of a dictate by way of precept or prohibition, not by way of counsel or persuasion. — In the first kind, indeed, conscience binds simply and universally, on the ground that man is bound to those things by the divine law, and conscience, which agrees with it, shows him to be bound. In the second kind, however, conscience binds as long as it remains; whence either man is bound to lay aside conscience, or he is bound to fulfill that which conscience dictates, as for instance if it dictates that it is necessary for salvation to lift a straw from the ground. In the third kind, however, conscience does not bind to doing or not doing, but binds to laying itself aside, on the ground that, since such a conscience is erroneous with an error repugnant to the divine law, it necessarily, as long as it remains, places man outside the state of salvation; and therefore it is necessary to lay it aside, because, whether a man does what it says, or its opposite, he sins mortally. — For if he does what conscience dictates, and that is against the law of God, and to act against the law of God is mortal sin; without doubt he sins mortally. But if he does the opposite of what conscience dictates, while it remains, he still sins mortally, not by reason of the work that he does, but because he does it in a bad manner. For he acts in contempt of God, while he believes, conscience dictating to him, that this displeases God, although it pleases God. And this is what the Gloss says upon that text to the Romans, chapter fourteen: *Everything that is not of faith is sin*; there the Gloss: "Everything that pertains to conscience, if it be done otherwise, the Apostle says to be sin. For although even what is good be done, if it be believed not to be done, it is sin." And the reason of this is that God attends not only to what a man does, but with what mind he does it; and that man

who does what God commands, believing himself to act against the will of God himself, does not act with a good mind, but with a bad one; and therefore he sins mortally. — Thus therefore it is plain that every conscience either binds to doing what it dictates, or binds to laying itself aside. Yet not every conscience binds to doing what it dictates; such as that one which dictates that what is not to be done is that to which a man is otherwise bound; but such a conscience is called erroneous. — These things seen, the response to the proposed question is plain, and also to the objections for the side.

**To the arguments for the affirmative side:**
1. To that which is first objected, that *everything which is not of faith*, that is, against conscience; the response is now plain. For I say that to act against conscience is always sin, because it is always in contempt of God; yet to act according to conscience is not always good, as for instance when conscience dictates something that is against God. Whence this has two grounds of truth: to act against conscience is sin, either because conscience binds to doing it, or because it cannot be well done, while such a conscience remains; and therefore there is in it a sophism according to the consequent, because it proceeds from several grounds of truth to one in that argument.

2. 3. To that which is objected, that conscience is the law of our intellect; it must be said that it is true that it is a law, but it is not the supreme law; for above it is another law, namely the divine law. But when it is said that law binds to doing everything that it dictates; it must be said that this is true, when the lower law does not dictate the contrary to the higher law; but this conscience often does. — And similarly the response is to be made to what follows, which objects concerning the judge.

4. To that which is last objected, that whoever believes himself to sin mortally, sins mortally; it must be said that this is true. For that is generally true which is said: "He who acts against conscience builds toward gehenna." But nevertheless from this it does not follow that we are bound to do everything that conscience dictates to be done, because, as has been said, that has two grounds of truth.

**To the arguments for the negative side:**
1. 2. To those first arguments, which are adduced to the contrary, it is not fitting to reply, on the ground that they conclude truly; for they show that conscience does not bind in all things.

3. To that which is objected, that it binds to nothing of itself, because that is not called sin which is done against conscience, but against the law of God; it must be said that to act against the law of God can be twofold: either truly, or interpretively, that is, either according to truth, or according to estimation; and in either way it is mortal sin; for in either way God is despised. And although one acting against conscience does not always act against the law of God according to truth, he yet acts either according to truth, or according to estimation; because conscience is like the herald of God and his messenger, and what it says, it does not command of itself, but commands as if from God, like a herald, when he proclaims the edict of the king. And hence it is that conscience has the power of binding in those things that can in some way be well done.

4. To that which is objected, that it cannot absolve from anything; it must be said that it is not alike, because conscience cannot infringe another law; whence neither can it absolve from the precept of God nor from the precept of a prelate, to whom a man has obliged himself by the law of a vow. From this, however, it does not follow that it cannot bind finally; rather it is an argument from the lesser by destroying. Whence just as that argument is worth nothing: conscience cannot reach above a superior: therefore it cannot reach an inferior; so that one is not valid: conscience cannot absolve a man from the command of a superior: therefore it cannot oblige him. Yet it does well follow that it cannot oblige against the command of a superior. To something, however, it can oblige us, on the ground that in a certain way it is above us and a mean between us and God, just as a herald is a mean between the king and the people.

From these things are plain those things which were last inquired, namely when conscience binds, and when it does not bind. — It is plain also that no one is perplexed from conscience except for a time, namely as long as conscience remains; yet he is not perplexed simply, on the ground that he ought to lay aside that conscience; and if he does not know how to judge of it by himself, on the ground that he does not know the law of God, he ought to consult the wiser, or through prayer to turn himself to God, if human counsel is lacking. Otherwise, if he is negligent, that which the Apostle says is verified in him: *He who is ignorant shall be held ignorant*. — It is plain also that the precept of the prelate is rather to be stood by than conscience, especially when the prelate commands what he can and ought to command.