Dist. 39, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/39/q/bon-sent-II-d39-a2-q1
----------------------------------------
### Article II. *On synderesis.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the second principal matter, namely concerning synderesis, which is the spark of conscience. And concerning this three things are asked.

First, there is inquiry concerning synderesis itself as to its essence, namely whether it belongs to the genus of the cognitive or of the affective.

Second, there is inquiry concerning it as to its use, namely whether it can be extinguished through sin.

Third, there is inquiry concerning it as to its abuse, namely whether it can be depraved through sin.

### Question I. *Whether synderesis belongs to the genus of cognition or of affection.*

Concerning the first the procedure is thus, and it is asked whether synderesis belongs to the genus of cognition or of affection.

And that it belongs to the genus of affection seems [to be the case]:

1. From that which is said in the Gloss on the first chapter of Ezekiel, in which, after many words, it is said concerning synderesis: "This is the spirit which intercedes for us with unutterable groanings"; but to groan is an act of affection: if therefore synderesis is to groan, synderesis pertains to the affective power.

2. Likewise, Ambrose says, and it is found in the text [of the Master], that "a man subject to sin naturally wills the good"; but that which naturally inclines us to the good is either synderesis or conscience; therefore that will inclining us to the good is either synderesis or conscience; but it is not conscience: therefore it is synderesis.

3. Likewise, opposed to evil is the good opposite to it; but we have in the sensitive motive part something impelling toward evil: therefore also in the rational motive part there ought to be in us something instigating toward good; but this is nothing other than synderesis: therefore synderesis is in the affective part.

4. Likewise, just as the intellect needs light in order to judge, so the affection needs a certain warmth and spiritual weight in order to love rightly: therefore just as in the cognitive part of the soul there is a certain natural faculty of judgment, which indeed is conscience, so in the affective part of the soul there will be a weight directing and inclining toward the good; but this is nothing other than synderesis: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. On that text of Malachi, chapter two: *Keep your spirit, and despise not the wife of your youth;* the Gloss of Jerome: "By the wife of your youth understand the natural law written in the heart; but the spirit is called not the animal part, which does not perceive the things that are of God, but the rational part"; and this he calls synderesis: therefore it seems that synderesis is held on the side of reason, that is, of the cognitive. If you should say that "spirit" is taken there commonly for intellect and affection; the objection is made through this, that in the same Gloss it is added: "This is the spirit which intercedes for us with unutterable groanings"; but to intercede is an act of reason: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, on that text of Luke, chapter ten: *They departed, leaving him half-dead;* the Gloss: "They could strip away immortality,

but they could not abolish the sense of reason, so that man might not be able to be wise and to know God." If therefore the sense of reason is held on the side of reason, and a sense of this kind, which remains in us, is nothing other than synderesis; it seems etc.

3. Likewise, the spark of conscience and conscience are in the same part; but conscience, as was proved above, pertains to the cognitive, and synderesis is the spark of conscience, according to what is said on the first chapter of Ezekiel: therefore it seems that synderesis is held on the side of the cognitive.

4. Likewise, if synderesis is held on the side of the motive [part], then it is either a power, or a passion, or a habit? It is not a passion; this is evident. It is not a habit, as it seems, because it would be either good or bad. It is not good, because if good, it would be a virtue; if bad, it would be a vice; neither of these is conceded of synderesis. It is not a power, as it seems, because the power of the will is indifferently disposed toward any appetible object whatsoever; but synderesis is not spoken of with respect to food and drink and appetible objects of this kind. Therefore it does not seem that it is held in any way on the side of the affective.

It is therefore a question what synderesis itself is, and concerning its comparison to the natural law and to conscience, how they are related, whether they are the same or diverse.

Likewise, how it is related to the three powers of the soul, namely the concupiscible, the irascible, and the rational. For it seems that it is something beyond these three, according to what is found in the Gloss on the first chapter of Ezekiel: *The face of a man* etc; the Gloss: "Most, following Plato, refer the rationability of the soul and irascibility and concupiscence to the man and the lion and the calf, but they place a fourth above these and outside these, which the Greeks call synderesis, which spark of conscience is not extinguished even in Cain, by which, overcome by pleasures or by fury, and ourselves sometimes deceived by a likeness of reason, we perceive that we sin; which they properly assign to the eagle, as not mingling itself with the three, but correcting those that go astray." From this Gloss it seems that it differs from those three. — But against this is the fact that in the book *On the Spirit and the Soul* it is said that the powers of the soul are sufficiently divided by these three, namely by the concupiscible, the irascible, and the rational. Therefore if synderesis is something of the soul, it seems that it is necessarily held alongside some one of these three powers, or alongside all of them.

### Conclusion

> Synderesis, since it goads toward the good, is held on the side of affection.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning the distinction of synderesis from the other powers there is a manifold opinion, just as also concerning the distinctions of the other powers of the soul.

For some wished to say, and to gather from the preceding Gloss, set down earlier on the first chapter of Ezekiel, that synderesis is called the supreme [part] of the soul itself. But the supreme [part] of the soul itself is the superior portion of reason, by which the soul is turned to God; and that superior portion governs the inferior portion of reason, and the irascible, and the concupiscible. But this superior portion, insofar as it is turned to God, is always right; it is bent, however, insofar as it descends to these lower things. And these men said that between synderesis and conscience and the natural law there is this difference, namely that synderesis names the power itself, namely the superior portion; but conscience names its habit, according to which it governs the inferior portion; and the natural law names that to which conscience directs. — But this manner of speaking seems probable enough, were it not repugnant to that Gloss had earlier, which says that synderesis does not mingle itself with the others when they sin. For since mortal sin cannot exist without an act of the superior portion, because in the eating of the man consists the consummation of sin; if synderesis were the superior portion of reason, it would assuredly mingle itself with the others when they sin. Furthermore, the superior portion of reason bespeaks an ordering to God; but the act of synderesis regards not only God, but also the neighbor, according as the natural law regards both.

And therefore there is another manner of speaking, that since the rational powers can be moved in two ways, namely intellect and affection, both by way of nature and by way of deliberation; just as freedom of choice consists

in reason and will, according as it is moved deliberatively; so conscience and synderesis regard reason and will, insofar as they are moved by way of nature — both synderesis, and conscience, and also the law of nature always incline toward the good; but free choice [inclines] sometimes to good, sometimes to evil — and therefore just as free choice embraces at once reason and will, so synderesis embraces at once reason and will, and the law of nature likewise, and conscience likewise, and they can be taken for the same thing.

By appropriation, however, synderesis bespeaks the power, and conscience the habit, and the natural law the object. Or in another way of appropriating, so that synderesis bespeaks the habit with respect to good or evil in universal; conscience the habit with respect to good or evil in particular; the natural law is indifferently disposed toward both. — But because, as was held earlier, conscience bespeaks a habit held on the side of the intellect; either it will be necessary, besides conscience and synderesis, to posit in us some directive [principle], or it is necessary to posit that synderesis is held on the side of affection.

And therefore there is a third manner of speaking, that just as from the very creation of the soul the intellect has a light, which is to it a natural faculty of judgment, directing the intellect itself in things to be known; so the affection has a certain natural weight, directing it in things to be desired. But things to be desired are of two kinds: for some are in the genus of the honorable [honestum], some in the genus of the advantageous [commodum]; just as also knowable things are of two kinds: some in the genus of the speculable, and some on the side of moral things. And just as conscience does not name that faculty of judgment except insofar as it directs toward moral works; so synderesis does not name that weight of the will, or the will with that weight, except insofar as it has [the office] to incline it to the honorable good. And just as the name of conscience can be taken for the power with such a habit, or for the habit of such a power; so also synderesis. By the more usual manner of speaking, however, synderesis rather names the habitual power than it names the habit, as is clear in the authorities which were adduced above. And because that power is never separated from that habit, hence it is that habit and power are comprehended under one name, and that power, as thus enabled, takes the name of its habit.

**Reply to the arguments:** And from this is clear the response to the question first proposed, by which it was asked whether synderesis bespeaks something affective or cognitive. For I say that synderesis bespeaks that which goads toward the good; and therefore it is held on the side of affection, as the reasons adduced for the first part show.

*To 1.* But to that which is first objected on the contrary, that synderesis is the rational spirit which intercedes and pleads; it must be said that, as Gregory says on the first [book] on Job, we speak to God not only by thoughts and by exterior words, but also by affections and desires; and therefore, while synderesis by continually goading makes us desire the good, it is said to intercede with God with unutterable groanings.

*To 2.* To that which is objected concerning the sense of reason, it must be said that by "rational sense" is rather understood there the natural faculty of judgment than synderesis is understood. But if anyone should contend that by that sense synderesis is taken; it must be distinguished that "reason" is sometimes taken properly for the cognitive part, sometimes taken commonly, insofar as it comprehends the whole rational spirit; and so the sense of reason is taken not only on the side of the cognitive, but also on the side of the affective; as is clear concerning spiritual taste and touch; and therefore from this it does not follow that synderesis is held on the side of cognition.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that synderesis is the spark of conscience; it must be said that it is called a spark for this reason, that conscience, as far as it is of itself, cannot move nor prick nor goad except by means of synderesis, which is as it were its goad and little fire. Hence just as reason cannot move except by means of the will, so neither can conscience except by means of synderesis; and therefore from this it does not follow that it is on the side of the cognitive, but rather that it is on the side of the affective.

*To 4.* To that which is asked, whether it is a power, or a passion, or a habit; it must be said that it is properly a power, yet it does not name the power of the will generally, but only the will insofar as it is moved naturally; nor even universally, but only with respect to the honorable good, or its opposite. Nonetheless it can also bespeak a habit; but that [habit] ought to be called neither a virtue nor a vice, for this reason, that virtue and vice properly regard free choice and the will insofar as it is deliberative, not insofar as it is natural.

From the foregoing is clear the response to those questions which were last asked. — For to that which is asked, how synderesis is related to conscience and the natural law; it must be said that synderesis is related to conscience as charity is related to faith, or as the habit of the affection itself to the habit of the practical intellect, according as it is a habit. But the natural law is related commonly to both, namely to synderesis and to conscience. For the natural law can be taken in two ways: in one way, insofar as it bespeaks a habit in the soul; and so, because by the natural law we are instructed and by the natural law we are rightly ordered, it bespeaks a habit which comprehends intellect and affection, and thus comprehends synderesis and conscience. In another way the natural law is called the collection of the precepts of natural right; and so it names the object of synderesis and of conscience, of the one as dictating, and of the other as inclining. For conscience dictates, and synderesis desires or shuns. And in both of these ways the natural law is found in diverse places; this last way, however, is taken more properly. And so, that we may speak properly, synderesis bespeaks the affective power, insofar as it is naturally apt for the good and tends toward the good; but conscience bespeaks the habit of the practical intellect; the natural law bespeaks the object of both.

And by this is clear the response to the last question, how synderesis is related to the concupiscible, the rational, and the irascible. For those three powers indifferently name powers of the soul, whether according as they are moved naturally, or according as they are moved deliberatively. But synderesis names the affective power, according as it is moved naturally and rightly; and therefore it is not distinguished from those powers according to the essence of the power, but according to the mode of moving; and because according to that mode of moving it always moves rightly: hence it is that it is said to fly above the others and not to mingle itself with the others when they err, but to correct them.