Dist. 39, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/39/q/bon-sent-II-d39-a2-q3
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### Question III. *Whether synderesis can be depraved by sin.*

Third, an inquiry is made concerning synderesis with respect to its abuse. And the question is whether synderesis can be depraved by sin. And it seems that it can, thus.

1. The Gloss on the first chapter of Ezekiel: *The face of an eagle on the right side of those four*; there the Gloss, speaking of conscience and synderesis, says thus: «We often see this one cast down and lose its place, when certain men sin without shame, to whom it is deservedly said: *Thou hast had a harlot's forehead*»; if then a casting-down is only through fault, it is evident, etc.

2. Likewise, on that passage of Jeremiah, chapter two: *The children of Memphis*, etc.; the Gloss: «The malignant spirit reaches from the lower members up to the crown of the head, when the disease of diffidence corrupts the chaste loftiness of the mind»; but the chaste loftiness of the mind is synderesis itself: therefore it happens that it is corrupted through sin.

3. Likewise, this seems to be the case by *reason*. Punishment and fault must come to be about the same thing; but according to the act of synderesis, which is to murmur against sin, there comes to be a punishment of the soul: therefore according to that act there comes to be the perpetration of sin.

4. Likewise, synderesis follows upon conscience as its natural tribunal; but conscience can be right and erroneous: therefore it seems necessary that synderesis sometimes be moved rightly, sometimes be moved obliquely. If then the disorder found in the act of the motive power is a fault, it seems, etc.

5. Likewise, «opposites are by nature apt to come to be about the same thing»; but the gift of wisdom and the beatitude of *mourning* are about synderesis, since the gift of wisdom is about the highest part of the soul, and synderesis *asks for us with unutterable groanings*. If then a fault is opposed to the gift of wisdom and to the beatitude of *mourning*, it seems that the fault has its being about that power.

6. Likewise, synderesis is either about the *greatest* goods, or about *middle* goods, or about the *least* goods. If about the greatest: then it is grace, or virtue; both of which are false, since synderesis remains together with sin. If it is about *middle* goods; but these one can misuse: therefore one can misuse synderesis. But misuse is a fault: therefore about the act of synderesis there can be a fault. About the *least* goods there is no doubt that it is not, since the least goods are goods of the body.

**On the contrary:** 1. The Gloss on the first chapter of Ezekiel: «They properly assign synderesis to the eagle, as not mingling itself with the three, but correcting their errors». If then it does not mingle itself with the three, but rather corrects them; it seems that according to its act sin does not consist.

2. Likewise, Ambrose says, and the Master adduces in the text, on that passage to the Romans, chapter seven: *What I will not, that I do*; there he says that man always naturally wills the good: therefore since that will is nothing other than synderesis, synderesis always wills the good; and if it always wills the good: therefore it never sins.

3. Likewise, that power which according to its motion directly resists sin is not depraved by sin; but the act of synderesis always murmurs against fault, even in the worst sinners: therefore it seems that it cannot be depraved and disordered through fault.

4. Likewise, when the whole nature is corrupted through disease, there is no further possibility of health: therefore if the whole rectitude of the soul were taken away through fault, there would no longer be hope of returning to grace; but it is established that there is hope of returning, since no one is to be despaired of while he is on the way: therefore it seems that some rectitude remains. But the rectitude which is of the greatest adherence is the rectitude of the will by way of nature, and this is synderesis: therefore it does not seem that it can be depraved through fault.

### Conclusion

> Synderesis cannot be depraved in itself through sin, but only cast down as regards its dominion of ruling.

**I respond:** It must be said that, according to those who say that synderesis is nothing other than the superior portion of reason, there can be sin about its act. For they say that this superior portion of reason can be moved in two ways: either insofar as it is turned to God and is ruled and directed according to the eternal laws, and thus in it sin cannot be; or insofar as it is turned to the lower powers, and thus from them it takes occasion of deviating and can be depraved through sin. And they put forward the example of the sin of Arius, who erred concerning the Trinity and the Unity, and so according to the superior portion of reason or according to synderesis. And they say that this is what the aforesaid Gloss on the first chapter of Ezekiel means to say. For first it says that «it does not mingle itself with the others when they sin»; afterward it says that «it is cast down and loses its place»; and they say that both hold true according to the diverse comparisons of the superior portion or of synderesis itself.

— But since, as the Saints and the Glosses manifestly say, synderesis, as far as it is of itself, always has it to spur toward the good and to murmur against sin, so long as we are in the state of the wayfarer; therefore others said otherwise, namely that synderesis names the will itself, insofar as it has it to be moved naturally. And since sin cannot be about the act of the will, as it is nature or as it is moved naturally, but only as it is moved deliberatively; hence it is that synderesis cannot be depraved through sin. Yet because it has it to rule and direct the others, and can lose the dominion of ruling: hence it is that it happens that it is cast down through fault. For the presidency of dominion depends on two things, namely on the *rectitude of the one presiding*, and on the *compliance of the one serving*; and although synderesis, as far as it is of itself, is always right, yet because reason and will frequently oppose it — reason through the blinding of error, and will through the obstinacy of impiety — hence it is that synderesis is said to be *cast down*, in that its *effect* and *presidency* over the other deliberative powers is, on account of their resistance, repelled and made void. — And an example is put forward in a soldier, who, as far as he is of himself, always sits well upon his horse, yet when the horse falls is said to be cast down. So too it must be understood in the matter at hand.

Now this way of speaking is, as the more reasonable, upheld by the more numerous. And therefore the arguments which are brought in for this side must be conceded.

1. To that which is first objected concerning the Gloss, that we see synderesis cast down; the response is already evident. For it does not follow, if it is cast down, that on account of this it is depraved through sin, since its casting-down is regarded not only about its *own act*, but also about the *act of the other virtues*, over which synderesis itself ought to preside.

2. To that which is objected, that the disease of diffidence corrupts the loftiness of the mind, and that the soul is defiled up to the crown of the head; it must be said that the *crown* and *loftiness* of the mind is not there called synderesis, but the superior portion of reason.

The superior portion of reason, however, does not name the power of the soul itself insofar as it is moved *naturally*, but insofar as it is moved *deliberatively*. And in this way sin can consist about it, especially that which is regarded according to the act of reason which is on high, such as is the sin of infidelity and despair, and the other sins which are directly opposed to the theological virtues.

3. To that which is objected, that punishment and fault must come to be about the same thing; it must be said that this does not hold true, speaking *precisely*, in that for the sin of the will the whole body is to be punished. Yet it is true that, as the will is the principle of sinning, so also it is principally punished; whence also the *worm of conscience* is more afflictive of the will, as it is deliberative, than as it is a certain nature, on account of their mutual resistance. — But whether the will alone is the subject of punishment, or something else, this will be made manifest below in its proper place.

4. To that which is objected, that conscience, which is the tribunal preceding synderesis, is right and not right, therefore synderesis also; it must be said that it does not follow, in that conscience itself not only consists in the universal, but indeed also descends to the *particular*; it is not only moved by a simple motion, but indeed also by a collative one. Nor is it any wonder, since it consists in reason, of which reason it belongs to *discern* one thing from another and to *compare* one thing to another. And therefore, although conscience, as it stands in the *universal* and is moved by a *simple gaze*, is always right; yet as it descends to *particulars* and compares, it can become erroneous, on account of the fact that the act of deliberative reason mingles itself in.

And this is evident thus. For the *conscience* of the Jews, from the very first natural dictate, dictated that God is to be obeyed; and they afterward assume that God now commands circumcision and the distinction of foods; and from this their conscience is formed in particular, that they circumcise themselves and abstain from foods. But this error does not come from the first principle, which indeed was true, but comes from the assumption, which indeed was not of conscience, as it is a natural tribunal, but rather of erroneous reason, which indeed pertains to free choice. But synderesis, as far as it is of itself, is moved by a simple motion in murmuring against evil and instigating toward the good. Furthermore, it is moved against evil not this or that, but in the *universal*; or if synderesis is in some way inclined to detest this or that evil, this is not insofar as it is *this*, but insofar as it is *evil*; and hence it is that synderesis is not bent awry, as conscience errs.

Another reason too could be given, namely that synderesis names the natural power itself, as it is naturally enabled; whereas conscience names a habit not only natural, but also *acquired*; and because nature, as far as it is of itself, is always rightly moved, but what is *acquired* can have both the account of rectitude and that of obliquity: hence it is that, while synderesis always remains right, conscience can be both right and erroneous.

5. To that which is objected, that the gift of wisdom is about synderesis; it must be said that it is false; for all gifts and all virtues and beatitudes regard the will, insofar as it is *deliberative*. But that synderesis is said to *ask for us with unutterable groanings*, this is understood *causally*, since it instigates us to groaning over the evils in which we are immersed.

6. To that which is objected, that one can misuse middling goods; it must be said that this is true of those things which are moved at the beck of free choice, according to whose act *use* and *abuse* are properly regarded; but synderesis, since it is a natural power and is moved naturally, is not subject to the command of free choice: and therefore it does not follow that free choice can abuse it. Furthermore, granted that it could abuse it, still it does not follow that on account of this there would be sin in it; for although free choice abuses the eye, when it gazes in order to lust, yet sin is not said to be in the eye: for sin is not in that which one abuses, but rather in the one abusing.

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