Dist. 39, Divisio Textus
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/39/q/bon-sent-II-d39-divisio
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## COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXXIX.

*Why the will is more depraved in its act than any other power.*

*But here arises a question sufficiently necessary, etc.*

### DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above, the Master showed whence the will has it to be set right and to be depraved. In this part he inquires why the will is more depraved in its act than any other power. Now this part is divided into two parts: in the first of which he inquires about the cause of the depravation of the deliberative will; but in the second he inquires about the rectitude of the human will, insofar as it is moved after the manner of nature, there: *Furthermore, it is wont to be asked how it is to be understood*, etc.

The first part is divided into two parts, in the first of which he raises the question and determines it; but in the second he raises objections against the aforesaid solution, for the fuller explanation of the truth, there: *But still it is asked, why a natural [appetite] of this kind*, etc.

Likewise the second principal part is divided into two parts; in the first of which he raises a doubt and objects; in the second part he resolves it according to the opinions of various [authorities], there: *A profound question is proposed*, etc. — And so the Master principally determines two things in this part: namely, in what way the will can be depraved, since it is a natural power of the soul, and how a human being naturally wills and desires the good, namely by reason of a natural faculty of judgment, which indeed is conscience, which always dictates the good, and by reason of the spark of reason or conscience, which indeed is synderesis, which always inclines toward the good and kicks back against evil.

### TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

Therefore, for the understanding of this part, a question arises here concerning two things.

And first it is asked about conscience itself, which is a certain directive rule of the will.

Secondly it is asked about synderesis, which is called the spark of conscience itself.

Concerning the first, three things are asked.

First it is asked about conscience itself in comparison to its subject, namely whether it is on the side of the cognitive [power], or on the side of the affective.

Secondly it is asked in comparison to its origin, namely whether it is from nature, or from acquisition.

Thirdly it is asked in comparison to its effect, namely whether every conscience has [the power] to oblige.

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