Dist. 4, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/4/q/bon-sent-II-d4-a1-q2
----------------------------------------
### QUESTION II. *Whether the Angels were created in grace.*

Supposing that the Angels were not created in glory, it is asked whether they were created in grace. And it seems [that they were]:

1. Through Augustine, *On the City of God*, book 12: «God created the Angels, founding nature in them and bestowing grace at the same time».

2. Likewise, on that [text of] Hosea 3: «They loved the grape-skins of clusters», the Gloss of Jerome: «By *grape-skins* are understood the demons, who were created in the great richness of the Holy Spirit, but, dried up through pride, fell from heaven»; it is established that the richness of the Holy Spirit is the grace of the Holy Spirit.

3. Likewise, Damascene more expressly: «Through the Word of God all the Angels were created, and perfected by the Holy Spirit through sanctification»: if therefore perfect sanctification is only through sanctifying grace, and he speaks of all [the Angels]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, it seems by *reason,* because God, since he is most liberal, is prompt to give grace to all who are ready to receive [it]. Whence also Anselm: «Man does not have grace, not because God does not give [it], but because he himself does not receive [it]»; but there is no better preparation for grace than pure innocence and a right will: therefore if these were in the Angels from their origin and creation, consequently grace [was] also.

5. Likewise, God made the rational creature for dwelling in it, and this because God himself wills to dwell in it; whence Proverbs 8: *My delights [are] to be with the sons of men;* therefore that he does not dwell [in it] comes from some depraved disposition on the part of the mind: since therefore in the Angels there was no depraved disposition on the part of the mind, but rather every fitness for grace, it seems etc.

6. Likewise, God is more inclined to have mercy than to condemn; but he made the Angels in a state in which they could at once demerit: therefore in a state in which they could merit. But it does not happen [that one] merits without sanctifying grace: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine, *On the Literal Meaning of Genesis*: «By *heaven* is understood the unformed angelic nature»; but it was not unformed through a lack of natural form: therefore it was unformed through a lack of a form superadded to nature. But this is grace: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Gregory, *Morals* book 32, treating that word of Ezekiel 28: *Gold [was] the work of your beauty, and your perforations were prepared in the day in which you were created:* «The perforations of this stone were prepared in the day of its creation, [the stone] which, namely, was created capable of charity, with which, had it willed to be filled, it could, while the Angels stood, have adhered [to God] like stones set in a king's ornament. This stone therefore had *perforations,* but through the vice of pride they were not filled with the gold of charity». Behold, expressly, that it did not have charity.

3. Likewise, it seems by *reason,* because grace in an Angel has nothing retardant: therefore if it had grace uniting [it] to God, the Angel would be borne wholly into God: therefore it would never have sinned. But it did sin: therefore it never had charity or grace.

4. Likewise, just as fault stands to eternal damnation, so grace [stands] to glory; but as soon as they had fault, they were damned eternally and obstinate: therefore as soon as they had grace, they were confirmed: therefore they would never have fallen, if they had had grace.

> **Conclusion.** It seems more probable that the Angels did not have sanctifying grace from the first instant of their creation.

**I respond:** It must be said that this question is one *of fact;* and since we find no other reason than [that] of fittingness, we can probably hold either [view], as others before us [did].

For there were some saying that all the Angels were created in the gratuitous [gifts] that make [one] pleasing [to God]. — And the reason that moved them was this: namely, on God's part, perfect *liberality,* and on the part of the created [beings], *fitness.* For since from the instant of creation they were clean vessels and receptacles, and God is prompt to impart his grace unless he have an obstacle on the part of the recipient; God did not leave them empty for a moment, but as soon as he created [them], he made [them] resplendent with grace. And such receptacles had to come forth from God's hand, so as to be at once ready for good use. Whence, just as some probably conjecture that God made trees full of fruits and other things in the noblest and most perfect state; so also he adorned the Angel's nature with grace from its very condition, [a grace] which in the first good use or victory was to be perpetuated, and in the first disordering perpetually lost. — This is one position, and it seems sufficiently consonant with the authorities of the Saints, as is evident to one who inspects [them].

There were also others, who said that the Angels did not have sanctifying grace from the instant of creation, but afterward. — And the reason that moved them is the disposition of the angelic nature, which is borne toward what it seeks without retardation. Whence, just as from the conversion to evil they were so deeply turned that they could not return, so, indeed much more, from the conversion to good, or from [their] aptitude, they would have adhered wholly to the good, if they had had grace, so that they would never have fallen. Whence it does not seem in any way probable that lucifer had grace; and if he did not have [it], since among the rest he was lofty, it is argued *from the greater* [case] that the others too did not have [it] from their origin. This position the Master seems to accept, this position the doctors commonly hold; and so one must concur with this as the more probable and more common.

1. 2. 3. To the authorities adduced to the contrary, the answer must be given by a distinction of grace. For in *one* way *grace* is said commonly, insofar as it comprehends whatever is superadded to the *natural [endowments]* — the natural [endowments], I say, that are of the general constitution of the thing; as one is said by a *grace* to have a good native talent, to read well, to sing well, and the like. In *another* way it is said [of] what is superadded to *free choice,* making and disposing [it] toward rectitude, as we call [them] natural virtues, such as innocence, mildness, piety. In a *third* way, [of] what is superadded as *rectifying* and *completing* and *elevating,* and this is called *sanctifying grace,* because it makes man acceptable to God, and acceptable for this [reason], because conformed. — When therefore it is said that gratuitous [gifts] were given to the Angels, either it is not understood of gratuitous [gifts] said in the third way, but in the first or second, since they had many gratuitous gifts; or, if it is understood of gratuitous [gifts] properly so called, it is not understood from the instant of creation; but just as the sin of the devil is understood to have been from the beginning, since at once after the beginning and after the first deliberative motion he fell, so it must be understood of the grace of the Angels. Or if it is understood of gratuitous [gifts] properly so called and from the instant of creation, this is not understood *formally* or essentially, but *dispositively;* whence someone is said to be created in something, because in proximate disposition to it. And so by this threefold way one can briefly respond to the authorities adduced and to many others that could be adduced.

4. 5. To the reasons drawn from God's liberality, it must be said that liberality is [exercised] with the order of wisdom and justice preserved. For although from the instant of the creation of any man he could beatify him, yet he delays for a long time; similarly, although he could give grace to any little child without baptism, as with baptism, yet he does not give [it]. And the reason of this is that *glory* is a praiseworthy good; therefore he does not give [it] except through praiseworthy merit; and therefore it is fitting that it be given when some merit of congruity precedes. Similarly, when he confers *grace,* if he confers [it] on an adult, since grace makes the one having [it] worthy of glory, he does not confer [it] except at a motion of free choice, if [the adult] has the use [of it]; but if he does not have [it], at a motion of another's faith, or at the merit of Christ; therefore according to the order of wisdom he ought not to give [it] at once, but to await a motion of free choice, which he did; whence to those turned to him he gave grace without delay. — The answer, then, is evident to that which is objected concerning liberality and aptitude, because he requires not only cleanness as a disposition, but a motion of free choice in an adult; but for a little child another's merit can avail, as also [another's] demerit.

6. To that which is objected lastly concerning the state, that he was in evil; it must be said that it is false. For although he could not merit from those [things] which he had received, nevertheless, since the Lord was as prompt to give as he himself [was] to receive, he had no obstacle in meriting, just as [none] in demeriting. And this is evident: for just as it was easy for the devil to turn away, so [it was] easy for the good Angels to turn [to God]; and just as the aversion was demeritorious, so the conversion became meritorious, grace being at once applied. Whence, just as someone is said indirectly to have something which he at once has, while he needs and asks [for it], although he does not have [it] in his own possession; so also the Angels could indirectly be said to have had grace. But if they had had a greater facility toward evil or [a greater] inclination, and the divine help in the [needed] opportunity were lacking, [the objection] would rightly object.