Dist. 4, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/4/q/bon-sent-II-d4-a2-q2
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### QUESTION II. *Whether their damnation could have been revealed to the evil Angels.*

Secondly it is asked whether their own fall could have been revealed to the evil angels. And that [it could] not, it seems.

1. Every certain knowledge of future punishment and misery is penal; but if an Angel were to know with certainty that he would sin, since he would know by a certain judgment that sin is to be punished and that the sinner separated from God is wretched, he would have a certain foreknowledge of his own misery: therefore he would have punishment before fault. But this is against the order of divine justice: therefore, if God cannot act against the order of divine justice, God could not reveal [it].

2. Likewise, every certain foreknowledge of the loss of some good compels a man to despair of it; but God cannot compel any innocent [being] to despair, since he cannot compel to sin: therefore he could not reveal to the Angel his own fall.

3. Likewise, let the argument of Anselm in the book *On the Fall of the Devil* be made: «If the devil knew his own fall, either he willed [it] or not. If he willed [it]: then he had already fallen, therefore he did not foreknow that he would fall. If he foreknew [it] and did not will [it]; but the more he did not will [it], the more he grieved; and the more he did not will [it], the more just he was; and the more he grieved, the more wretched he was: therefore the more just, the more wretched. But this is altogether unfitting»: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, let the argument of the Master be made: «If they foreknew [it], then either they could and willed to avoid [it], and so they did not fall; or they willed to avoid [it] and could not, and so they were wretched; or they could avoid [it] and would not, and so they were foolish and malicious». If therefore any of these is impossible, it is impossible that they had foreknowledge of their own fall.

**But on the contrary:** 1. The Lord could foretell to Peter, without sin, his own fall, as is said in Matthew 26 and in the other Gospels: therefore by a like reasoning he could reveal [it] to lucifer.

2. Likewise, Bernard, *On the Degrees of Humility*, treating that word of Isaiah 14: *I will set my seat toward the north:* «I think that by the north the reprobate men were designated; by the seat, [his] power over them». And in what follows he says that «in God's foreknowledge he foresaw his own princedom», namely that he was to be set over the evil [ones]; and therefore he said: *I will set my seat.* Therefore the princedom followed the fall; and he could foresee the princedom: it seems similarly that he could foresee the fall.

3. Likewise, it seems that the reasons concerning *punishment* are not valid, for a twofold cause. For God can separate things that are naturally conjoined, as in fire heat from light, as Basil says: therefore much more strongly the aforesaid knowledge from punishment. *Moreover,* however much something be punitive, yet it does not punish unless the subject be punishable — whence if Peter's soul were in hell, it would not be punished — therefore, since the Angel in that state was innocent and in no way disposed to punishment, it is clear etc.

4. Likewise, it seems that the reason concerning *despair* is not valid, because just as the foreknowledge of damnation is an occasion of *despair,* so the foreknowledge of glory is an occasion of *presumption;* but *presumption* does not prevent God from being able to reveal future glorification: therefore by a like reasoning [neither does it prevent revealing] the fall. *If you say* that it is not similar, because on that side it is an *occasion,* [but] here a *necessity; on the contrary:* to despair is an act of the deliberative will and an act which is a sin; but nothing can compel the will to anything, most of all to sin: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, God's foreknowledge does not impose necessity, therefore neither [does] the devil's foreknowledge: therefore if he knew that it could be otherwise, then he could still hope: therefore he would not be compelled to despair.

> **Conclusion.** The evil Angel could not have a certain foreknowledge of his own fall.

**I respond:** It must be said that the angel could not have a certain foreknowledge of his own fall. — For since this was contingent, it could not be known with certainty except by him who knows all things with certainty, both the necessary and the contingent, because his knowledge does not depend on the thing; such is God alone. Therefore he could not foreknow [it] except by the Lord's revealing [it]. But God could not *reveal* [it] to him, because he ought not to *foretell* what he could [foretell] — as he *foretold* to Peter — which I do not call revealing; but to give a certain interior illumination for foreknowing one's own fall, this I call revelation. And this God could not give by his *ordained* power, because such foreknowledge necessarily has fault or misery annexed. For either it would *please* him that he should fall, and so he would be impious; or it would *displease* [him], and so he would be wretched and sorrowful. Either is impossible and disordered for God: namely, to inflict *punishment* on the innocent, or that the innocent, while he is innocent, should *have fault.* — And this the *first* reason proves, and the reason of Anselm and of the Master. But the other reason, concerning *despair,* proves that his damnation could not be revealed to the Angel, because it is impossible to hope with certainty of damnation. Whence that way is good and is to be conceded.

1. To that, then, which is objected first, that the Lord could reveal [it] to him, as also to Peter; it is resolved [thus]: because to Peter he did not reveal, but foretold; whence Peter did not understand [it] simply, but under a condition, or also did not advert well [to it] up to the fall; so I believe that he could foretell to the Angel. — Yet some say that it is not similar, because Peter's fall was reparable, not so the Angel's fall.

2. To that which is objected, that he foresaw his own dominion; why similarly not his own downfall? it must be said that Bernard himself wonders at this and resolves [it]: that it could be so, as in the case of Joseph, who saw his own princedom and did not foresee his own sale. But also the Lord could reveal to the devil [his] dominion and not [his] *downfall,* since that dominion does not necessarily have a downfall annexed; for someone good can have dominion over the evil. — Yet some wished to say that what is said *toward the north* is a word of the Prophet. For the devil wished to be set over [others] and to set his seat of dominion before the others; and the Prophet, foretelling what was to befall him, says *the north,* signifying by this the evil [ones].

3. To that which is objected against the reason concerning *punishment,* it must be said that to separate punishment or grief from this knowledge is to take away good will; because he who foresees that he will do evil and does not grieve, by this very [fact] is evil; and so this knowledge by a necessary disposition disposes the soul either to *punishment* or to *fault;* nor ought God to take away and separate *punishment,* so that from this *fault* should redound. And so that [objection] is clear.

4. To that which is objected concerning *despair,* I say that, supposing he were to foresee the fall and the impossibility of rising again, he would be compelled to despair, because this knowledge cannot stand with hope. Whence if someone does not believe [in] another life, he necessarily despairs of the future life, because this is necessarily required for hope; so he who is certain of damnation despairs of salvation. Whence it is not similar concerning the occasion of presumption and God's foreknowledge, because that [foreknowledge] does not take away what is necessary for humility and salvation; but this certain foreknowledge necessarily takes away the certainty toward the opposite, and so the certainty of hope.