Dist. 40, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/40/q/bon-sent-II-d40-a1-q1
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### Article I. *On the goodness which works receive from intention.*

Concerning the first there are three questions.

First, it is asked concerning the goodness of works with respect to quality, namely whether the quality of works generally corresponds to the quality of intention.

Second, it is asked with respect to quantity, namely whether a man does as much as he intends.

Third, it is asked with respect to necessity, namely whether a good intention without works suffices for salvation.

### Question I. *Whether the quality of works always corresponds to the quality of intention.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is asked whether the quality of works always corresponds to the quality of intention; and this is to ask whether every work that is done with a good intention is good. And that it is so, it seems:

1. *First*, by the authority of Ambrose, which the Master adduces in the text: « Your affection imposes a name on your work »: if therefore the denomination of the work is from its quality, and the intention or affection denominates the work; it seems also that it informs it with its own quality.

2. *Likewise*, a good tree, which operates insofar as it is good, always makes good fruit; but the will, which is the tree, when it operates with a good intention, operates insofar as it is good: therefore it seems that it makes a good work.

3. *Likewise*, an act is neither meritorious nor demeritorious except because it is voluntary; and the will is neither good nor evil except from intention, as was shown above: if therefore the goodness of the will makes goodness in the work, and the goodness of intention makes goodness in the will: therefore *from the first*, the quality of the work is caused by the quality of intention.

4. *Likewise*, the good is more powerful with respect to the good than the evil with respect to the evil; but however a work may be and however good it is, it can be depraved by an evil intention: therefore much more strongly, however a work may be and however evil it is, it can be rectified by a good intention. And the inference of this argument can be confirmed as it were *from the lesser* and *from the like* and *by consequence in itself*, « because if the opposite is the cause of the opposite, so too is the thing proposed of what is proposed ».

5. *Likewise*, suppose that someone does an evil work with a good end, such that the malice is in the work and the goodness in the intention; either the intention remains good while the work is evil; or the intention becomes evil from the evil work; or the intention makes the work good. If in the first way: then a man will at one and the same time merit and demerit, which is impossible. If in the second way; but on the contrary: the work is the effect of the intention; but the effect does not flow back into the cause, but rather the reverse: therefore the intention rather communicates its own property to the work than the work to the intention: therefore if the intention is good, the work which proceeds from it must be good.

6. *Likewise*, however much a work is in itself evil; if nevertheless it is done by one who operates wholly apart from intention, as by one who wholly lacks the use of reason, it is in no way culpable: therefore if the privation of intention can deprive a work, however much in itself evil, of malice, and make it not be evil with the malice of conduct; by parity of reasoning it seems that the rectification of intention can make a work, however much in itself evil, good and right.

**On the contrary:** 1. Hugh of Saint Victor: « Love transforms the lover into the beloved »; but this is not said in reverse: therefore whatever the intention may be, if the will wills evil, it must become evil: therefore it does not seem that the quality of the work corresponds to the quality of intention.

2. *Likewise*, the Philosopher says that « there are some things which, the moment they are named, are conjoined with evil », and the theologians say that such things are evil in themselves: if therefore in such acts malice inseparably adheres, it seems that acts of this kind cannot be made good by our intention.

3. *Likewise*, something is evil which is against God's commandment; but our intention cannot infringe the divine commandment: therefore it cannot make a man, by acting against God's commandment, not sin: therefore however good a thing he intends, if he acts against God's commandment, it will not be good but evil: therefore it is not generally true that the quality of the work is caused by the quality of intention.

4. *Likewise*, the absolute good presupposes the good from circumstance; for nothing is simply and absolutely good unless it is clothed with the due conditions and circumstances. But there are some works which always bespeak the lack of a due circumstance, such as killing the innocent, or knowingly speaking falsehood, and the like: therefore it seems that however much someone does such things with a good intention, they will not be simply good: therefore it does not seem that the quality of the work always corresponds to the quality of intention.

### Conclusio

> The quality of works always corresponds to the quality of intention, provided the good intention is taken not only with respect to the end intended itself, but also with respect to the good ordering of the means to the end; but the goodness of the thing intended alone does not suffice to render the work good, as malice renders it evil.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing, it must be noted that concerning this there was from of old a twofold opinion, as the Master explains in the text.

For some said that it is generally true that works are weighed as good or evil from intention. But others said that works are not generally weighed as good or evil, but only those which are indifferent as to whether they are done well or ill. But those works which are evil in themselves cannot be weighed from intention, because, with whatever intention they are done, they are always evil.

But each of these opinions speaks truly, if it is rightly understood. For the quality of intention can be taken in two ways, according as intention is twofold. For in one way intention bespeaks the will of the end; in another way it bespeaks not only the will of the end, but also the ordering of that which is toward the end to the end itself, which it desires. And according to this, intention can be called good or evil in two ways. — In one way an intention is called good, in which there is a perfect and good ordering of the work to the end intended; and on the contrary it is called evil, in which there is an indirect ordering. And in this way the goodness of intention regards not only the goodness of the end, but also the right ordering of that which is toward the end to the end itself. For these two are necessarily required for the eye to be simple, as Bernard says to Eugene, namely, that « truth be in the choice, and charity in the intention ». And this is to say that the eye of the mind is then simple, or the intention good, when it loves finally what is to be loved, and chooses what is to be chosen. And in this way the quality of the work always corresponds to the quality of intention and admits no instance against it; rather, if the eye is simple, the whole body is luminous; and if the eye is dark, this is the evil intention, and the work is judged evil.

In another way an intention is called good because that which it finally intends is good, and evil because that which it finally intends is evil. And in this way it is not generally true that the quality of the work is caused by the quality of intention; and this I say with respect to the quality which is goodness. For if someone lies, for instance to free an innocent man, or steals to feed the poor, he is not said to do well, as Augustine says, and also the Apostle: *Evil things are not to be done, that good things may come about.* — But with respect to the quality of malice, there is no instance against it; rather, the malice of the work necessarily corresponds to one intending evilly. For whatever the work may be, while a man does it with an evil intention, God, *who searches hearts*, reckons it evil. For since the intention of a good end is necessarily required for the goodness of the work, when that alone is wanting, the work is judged to be evil; yet not, when that alone is present, is it judged to be good, because more is required for building up than for tearing down.

From these things appears the response to the proposed question, and also to the objections for the most part. For the objections which prove that the truth of the work does not correspond to the goodness of intention speak of the goodness of intention insofar as it regards the end itself; and thus they conclude truly, because for the work to be good, it does not suffice that a man intend the good, but it is also required that he tend toward the good by the right way. — But the arguments to the contrary for the most part proceed by another way, namely insofar as intention is said to be good not only because the thing intended is good, but also because the ordering is good.

*To 1, 2, 3.* And thus is understood the authority of Ambrose, by which it is said: « Your affection imposes a name on your work », and the second and third reasons. For the will is not said to be good in itself, nor a good tree, from the goodness of intention, except insofar as the intention is said to be good, because in a good manner it tends toward a good end.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that an evil intention suffices to make a work evil; it must be said that it does not follow from this that likewise the intention of the good suffices for the good. « For it is easier to destroy than to build ». And because the good is attended to according to its constitution from the concurrence of many circumstances, while evil is attended to from any privation whatever; hence it is that « evil is in every way, and good in one way »; and therefore it does not follow that if the defect of some thing suffices to make evil, that the positing of it suffices to make good; for more is required for the good; nor is there place there *for the like* nor *for the lesser*. Again, since evil is the privation of good, in such cases the consequence does not hold *in itself*, but rather the consequence *from the contrary*.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that the intention ought rather to influence the work than the reverse; it must be said that the work does not make the intention evil by influencing anything, but rather by being deficient. For because the work is in itself disordered, and the intention cannot order it; hence it is that, while it applies itself to that work, it disorders itself.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that the privation of intention removes malice from the act; it must be said that it is not alike, in that the privation of intention is said to remove malice from the act not because it confers anything of intention upon the act itself, but rather because it draws that act outside the genus of conduct; because there is no moral work except what is done from intention. And therefore the manner of arguing is alike in this reason and in the preceding, in which it was argued from the comparison of evil to good. For it does not hold: it suffices to destroy: therefore it suffices to posit.