Dist. 40, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/40/q/bon-sent-II-d40-a1-q2
----------------------------------------
### Question II. *Whether one does as much as one intends.*

Secondly it is asked whether one does as much as one intends, so that just as a work receives in some way its quality from the intention, so too it might receive its quantity. And that it is so seems to be the case.

1. Upon that text of Matthew, chapter twelve: *A good man out of a good treasure* etc.; the Gloss: «As much good as you intend, that much you do».

2. Likewise, this seems so by reason. Every agent acting through intention sets before itself an end, to which it measures its work: therefore if every moral work proceeds from the agent through intention, the measurement of every moral work is regarded in its comparison to the end. But comparison to the end is intention: therefore the quantity of every moral work is regarded according to the intention.

3. Likewise, the merit of an exterior work is regarded according to the quantity of charity, and the magnitude of an exterior sin is regarded according to the magnitude of concupiscence. If therefore charity, as Bernard says, regards the intention, and likewise concupiscence, which means a coming-to-rest in a created good; therefore it seems that the quantity of every moral work is measured according to the intention.

4. Likewise, if some work is of the nature of its kind a venial sin, nonetheless the one who does it sins mortally, if he intends to sin mortally; but this would not be, unless the work received its quantity in the genus of morals from the intention: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. If «one does as much as one intends»: therefore if Linus or some other minor saint were to intend to merit the glory of Peter, he would merit the glory of Peter, and if he intended more, he would merit more: therefore to one having less charity a greater reward would be rendered, which is plainly false.

2. Likewise, if «one does as much as one intends»: therefore if someone committing adultery intends to sin venially, he sins venially: if therefore this is plainly false, it is manifest that the quantity of the work is not caused by the quantity of the intention.

3. Likewise, the more humble someone is, the less good he believes himself to do; but intention follows belief, since «faith directs the intention»: therefore the more humble one is, the less good he intends to do. If therefore the goodness of a work were measured according to the quantity of the intention, it seems that the more humble someone were, the less good his work would be; but this is plainly false: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, a simple man, when he does a small sin, believes it to be a most grave sin; another, impious and wicked, when he does the greatest sin, believes himself to sin very little: if therefore a work is measured according to the intention, it seems that the wicked and malicious man would sin less in an enormous kind of sin than a simple man in a kind of sin however slight. If therefore this is plainly false, then so too is that from which it follows, namely that the quantity of the work corresponds to the quantity of the intention.

### Conclusion

> **Conclusion.** The quantity of goodness and malice in the work corresponds to the quantity of goodness and malice in the intention, but in good works only then, if the quantity of the intention is regarded with respect to the act of intending.

**I respond:** It must be said that, just as in the preceding problem a twofold quality of intention is distinguished, so too here it must be understood that the quantity of the intention can be understood in two ways, namely either by reason of the act of intending, or by reason of the thing intended itself. And according to this, that locution is distinguished in two ways: «as much as you intend, that much you do», because *that-much* and *as-much* can be nouns, or adverbs. If *that-much* and *as-much* are adverbs, then they signify the quantity of the act of intending; and then the locution is true generally, whether with respect to good works or with respect to evil ones; because as much as the act of intending is intense in goodness and in malice, that much the exterior operation is good or evil. For all merit and demerit is reduced to the act of the will, although exterior circumstances in some way contribute to a greater depravation of the will. — But if *that-much* and *as-much* are nouns, then they signify the quantity on the part of the thing intended; and thus that statement is not generally true, because the exterior work done is not always commensurate with that which the intention intends. For frequently a man intends to do a great good, and does a small one, because he has little charity. It has nonetheless in some way truth in evils, namely by way of intending, though not by way of lessening, and insofar as *that-much* and *as-much* signify a certain comparison of proportionality, not a commensuration of equality. Hence whoever intends to sin much, sins much, whatever work he may do; but not so one who intends to sin little — he does not sin little, especially if he does a work which has much of deformity.

From these things the response to the question proposed is clear. For I concede that the quantity of goodness and

malice in the work corresponds to the quantity of goodness and malice in the intention, according as the quantity of the intention is regarded as to the act of intending, as the reasons adduced for the first part show. I concede also nonetheless that the quantity of the work does not always correspond to the quantity of the intention, according as the quantity of the intention is regarded on the part of the thing intended, as the reasons show which are adduced for the second part.

**To the arguments:**
*To 3, 4.* To the other two reasons, however, which are adduced last, it can be replied that they are not compelling, for the reason that it is not the same thing to say of someone that he believes himself to do a great or a small good or evil, and what he intends. For estimation is one thing, intention another; and although the work follows the estimation, it does not however follow the intention. Moreover, those two reasons, like the others, proceed from the quantity of the intention on the part of the thing intended. For although a humble man intends to do little, nonetheless his intention is of great goodness, since he is moved to do it out of great virtue. Likewise, when a wicked man intends to do a modest evil, yet, because he does it out of great concupiscence, his intention is much, that is, very depraved, since he clings too much to a created good; and therefore it does not follow that the one who is more malicious sins less.

---