Dist. 40, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/40/q/bon-sent-II-d40-a2-q1
----------------------------------------
### Article II. *On the goodness which works superadd to the goodness of the intention.*

Next there is inquiry, with respect to the second principal point, concerning the goodness which works superadd to the goodness of the intention. And concerning this three things are asked. First it is asked whether works add anything of goodness or of merit beyond a good intention by reason of the prerogative of dignity. Second it is asked whether they add by reason of quantity on the part of the gift. Third it is asked whether they add anything by reason of multiplicity.

### Question I. *Whether exterior works add anything beyond a good intention.*

As to the first, the procedure is thus, and it is asked whether exterior works add anything beyond a good intention by reason of their own excellence and dignity, as are privileged works. And that they do, it seems.

1. Upon that text to the Ephesians, in the first chapter: *What is the surpassing magnitude;* the Gloss: « A certain increment of glory the highest doctors will have, beyond what the others will have in common »; but this is only by reason of the doctrine which they communicate to others: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, in the Church the Martyrs are commonly solemnized more than the Confessors; but it is settled that the Church has shown honor to the Saints according to the requirement of their merits: therefore they are worthy of greater glory who endure death for Christ than those who only will to suffer.

3. Likewise, Christ merited for us something by His passion which He had not before merited for us, namely the opening of the gate and the diffusion of many graces: if therefore the charity of Christ was most eminent from the instant of His conception and was of greater efficacy with the passion than without it; it seems therefore that in any other case the excellence of the exterior work adds to the merit of the good will or intention.

4. Likewise, good added to good makes more good; but a privileged work is good: therefore, added to the intention, it makes it more good. But what adds to goodness adds to merit: therefore, etc.

5. Likewise, if privileged works added nothing beyond the goodness of the intention, then he who did them would labor in vain: if therefore it is impious to say that one who does excellent works labors in vain; it seems that an excellent work adds beyond the goodness of the intention.

**On the contrary:**
1. Concerning blessed Martin the Church sings: « O blessed soul, whom, even though the sword of the persecutor did not take away, yet the palm of martyrdom did not lose »: therefore it thus seems that blessed Martin had the palm of martyrdom through the goodness of his intention, just as if he had endured the bitterness of the passion; therefore it does not seem that an excellent work adds anything beyond the goodness of the intention.

2. Likewise, the one acting does not please by reason of the action, but rather the action pleases by reason of the one acting, however noble that action may be: therefore, however much God approves the one acting, so much does He approve the action: therefore it does not seem that a man is made worthy of greater reward before God on account of an excellent operation superadded to the goodness of the will.

3. Likewise, if someone were to undergo death for the world, he would rather earn disfavor before God than merit anything: therefore the undergoing of death for Christ, if it pleases God in any way, this is for no other reason than that it is ordered to Christ; but that ordering is by means of the intention: therefore the whole goodness of the operation, however excellent, takes its rise from the intention and pleases God on account of it. But where one thing is on account of another, in both there is only as much as in the one: therefore a perfect and good intention with the work pleases just as much as it pleases without the work.

4. Likewise, if any works contribute to merit, they are especially the works of humility and lowliness — for these works God especially commends — but privileged works are works of a certain excellence and dignity: therefore it seems that, least of all among all the kinds of works, do they add to the merit of a good intention.

5. Likewise, where the capacity is lacking, the will is reckoned for the deed, as was determined above; and this is for no other reason than that otherwise the will would not be full and perfect: if therefore the will by itself alone is reckoned for the work, it seems that in such a case a privileged work adds nothing beyond the goodness and merit of the intention.

### Conclusion

> A privileged exterior work, by reason of its dignity, adds something beyond the goodness of the intention, although it does not add in every mode of addition.

**I respond:** It must be said that a greater good can be so called in two ways: either intensively, namely because it pleases God more; or extensively, namely because it profits more persons. And according to this, in two ways it can be understood that a privileged work adds to the goodness of the intention: either as to the edification of one's neighbors, or as to God's approval. And in the first way the increase is considered as to example, in the second way as to merit.

If therefore we speak of the addition as to example; thus without doubt a privileged work adds to the goodness of the intention, because the goodness of the intention does not shine outwardly except through the showing forth of good works, and especially of privileged ones. — But if we speak in the second way, namely as to the addition which is considered as to merit; thus a distinction must be made, for it is one thing to speak of merit with respect to substantial reward, and with respect to accidental reward. With respect to accidental reward, a privileged work adds beyond a good intention and will, because accidental reward, which is the aureole, is not owed to the will in itself, but to the will in the work. But if we speak of merit with respect to substantial reward, it is still necessary to subdistinguish, for there is merit of congruity and there is merit of condignity. As to the merit of congruity, without doubt a privileged work adds beyond the goodness of the intention, for this reason, that the will in that work is prepared and disposed to the reception of greater grace, through which it is worthy of greater retribution. But if we speak of merit with respect to condignity; thus without doubt it does not add, for this reason, that the quantity of condign merit is weighed by the quantity of the root; and he who has a full will and cannot have the work pleases God just as much as he who has both the will and the work, as to the retribution of essential reward, if they are in equal charity. — And thus it is clear that a privileged work, by reason of its dignity, adds something beyond the goodness of the intention, although it does not add in every mode of addition. Therefore the reasons which are adduced for the first part are to be granted.

**To the objections:**
*To 1.* As to that which is objected concerning blessed Martin, that he did not lose the palm of martyrdom; it must be said that there the palm of martyrdom is not taken for the accidental reward, which is the aureole, but for the substantial reward, which is the golden crown (*aurea*). For each is a palm of martyrdom; but the one, namely the *aurea*, corresponds to the martyrdom because it is endured out of charity; the other, namely the *aureola*, corresponds to it because it is of a special privilege and prerogative.

*To 2.* As to that which is objected, that the action pleases by reason of the one acting; it must be said that it is true; yet, while the one acting uses well the gift through which he pleases God, by this very fact he disposes himself to something greater and is worthy of something of which he would not be worthy if he did not so use it well. And therefore it does not follow that, if the action pleases God by reason of the one acting, the one acting does not please more by reason of the action than without it; for nothing prevents, of two goods, of which one has its goodness from the other, that both should be worth more than either of them is worth by itself.

*To 3.* As to that which is objected, that to die for the world displeases God; it must be said that it is true; but yet from this it does not follow that the whole goodness of a privileged work comes from the intention, but that there cannot be a perfectly good work without intention. Nevertheless privileged works have a certain goodness of their own nature, which, joined with the goodness of the intention, confers a certain excellence on the one acting well which other kinds of works would not confer. And therefore that saying, by which it is said that where one thing is on account of another, in both there is only as much as in the one, has no place here. For this is understood when that on account of which the other participates in some property is the whole ground of that participation. But it is not so in the case at hand, as has been seen.

*To 4.* As to that which is objected, that privileged works are excellent works, and therefore ought to contribute less to merit; it must be said that an excellent work can be so called in two ways: either according to vain estimation, as when someone reckons it an excellence to avenge himself on his adversaries and to dominate others; or according to the dictate of truth; and thus to endure the most ignominious kind of death for Christ is a work of great excellence; and such a work of excellence is not set in opposition to a work of humility, but rather stands together with it and necessarily requires it as its companion; and since it has in itself difficulty and dignity, and charity going before and humility joined to it, it is no wonder if it disposes one to greater glory.

*To 5.* As to that which is objected, that the will is reckoned for the deed where the capacity is lacking; it must be said that this is true as to sufficiency for salvation and as to substantial reward, because no one loses the kingdom of heaven from this, that he does not do what he cannot do; but it is not true as to the excellence of the reward or as to accidental reward. And in this way it has been said before that a privileged work adds beyond the goodness of the intention.