Dist. 40, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/40/q/bon-sent-II-d40-a2-q2
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### Question II. *Whether good works add anything beyond intention as regards the quantity of what is given.*

Secondly it is asked whether good works add, beyond good intention, anything as regards the quantity of what is given. And that they do seems to be the case.

1. *Second to the Corinthians*, chapter nine: *He who sows sparingly shall also reap sparingly; and he who sows in blessings shall also reap of blessings.* If, therefore, that sowing of which the Apostle speaks lies in the giving of alms, it seems that the greatness of the gift contributes to the excellence of glory.

2. Likewise, *Tobit* four: *If thou have much, give abundantly:* if then this exhortation is not useless, it seems that the abundance of the gift contributes to the increase of merit.

3. Likewise, although God from equal goodness confers greater and lesser goods, nevertheless he to whom he has conferred greater things is bound to greater thanksgiving: therefore by parity of reasoning, if from equal charity a greater gift and a lesser gift be given, it is fitting that God render a greater recompense for the greater gift.

4. Likewise, if he who gives more does not merit more than he who gives less, then he who leaves all things for God and gives to the poor does not merit more than he who gives a single shilling: therefore all are fools who follow the divine counsel. But if it is impious to say that the divine counsel is undiscerning, it seems that the quantity of what is given contributes to the amplifying of merit.

**On the contrary:**
1. *Mark* twelve: *Amen I say to you, that this woman hath cast in more than all into the treasury;* he speaks of the widow: therefore if Christ valued more highly the gift of that widow, which was very small, as is intimated in the text, than the great gifts of others, it seems that God values works only according to the quantity of good intention, and in no way according to the quantity of the exterior offering.

2. Likewise, the Gloss upon that passage: « *God does not consider the substance of those who offer, but the conscience; nor does he weigh how much you offer, but out of how much* »: if therefore merits are worth only as much as God weighs them, it seems that the quantity of what is given does not increase the merit of good intention.

3. Likewise, upon that text of the *second to the Corinthians*, chapter eight: *And he that had much had nothing over;* there the Gloss: « *Where the will is equal, it shall have an equal reward* »: therefore whether one give much or little, provided it be from equal charity, it seems that they are recompensed equally.

4. Likewise, if the quantity of what is given adds anything, it either adds to merit in respect of the *substantial* reward, or in respect of the *accidental* reward. Not in respect of the *substantial* reward, because that regards the root of charity and the quantity of grace. Not in respect of the *accidental*, because the accidental reward is owed to excellent and privileged works; for no one merits the aureole from this, that he gives a great alms. It seems, therefore, that the quantity of what is given adds nothing whatever to the merit of good intention.

### Conclusion.

> The quantity of what is given in good works adds to the essential reward, yet not directly, but dispositively.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that there is a twofold way of speaking about the quantity of what is given: either by comparing the gift to *the gift alone*; or by comparing these *to one another* and to the means of the giver. — Speaking in the first way, a greater quantity of the gift adds something to the goodness of intention — not, I say, in respect of the *essential* reward directly, but because it in some way disposes a man *to advance in good* and *to withdraw from evil*. For he who gives a greater gift, that he may *make himself a friend of the mammon of iniquity*, more obliges the recipient to pray for him, and in a certain way, in obliging him, obliges God; and therefore he more *disposes himself to grace* than he who gives a lesser gift. Likewise he disposes himself more *to withdraw from evil*, because in this, that he makes a greater alms, he merits to be absolved from a greater punishment, according to what is said in *Luke* eleven: *Give alms, and all things are clean unto you;* and *Tobit* twelve: *Alms delivereth from death;* and therefore, *Daniel* four: *Redeem thou thy sins with alms.*

Likewise, if we compare the quantities of gifts in comparison to *the means of the givers*, a greater quantity does not add as regards the merit of the *substantial* reward directly, but in a certain way *dispositively*. For he who, his own resources being weighed, gives more than another, his resources being weighed, disposes himself more *to the gift of grace*, and also *withdraws more from sin*. And thus, speaking generally, the quantity of what is given, granted equality of good intention or will, as regards the *essential* reward does not add *directly and properly*, but in a certain way *dispositively*: either because, by disposing to charity, it disposes to greater glory, or because, by snatching from evil, it makes a man reach the crown more quickly.

And this indeed admits of no exception, when there is an excess of the quantity given both in comparison to *the gift* and in comparison *to the means of the giver*. But when on one side one gift *exceeds* another in itself, and conversely is exceeded by some other in comparison to the means of the giver — in which manner the Lord said that the widow had cast more into the treasury than all the rich, because she had put in *her whole living* — then they stand as exceeding and exceeded. For according to diverse conditions one gift advances more than the other. For a greater quantity of the gift is worth more for escaping punishment, because, as is said in the thirteenth chapter of *Proverbs*: *The ransom of a man's life are his own riches.* But a greater quantity of the gift according to *the means of the giver* is worth more for acquiring grace, inasmuch as such a one disposes himself more to the perfection of beatitude, namely of poverty. — The arguments are therefore to be granted which show that the quantity of what is given increases something for the merit of good intention, namely *dispositively*.

**To the arguments to the contrary:**
*To 1.* As to that which is first objected to the contrary, that that widow gave more — it can be said that there the Lord speaks of the quantity of the gift by comparison *to the means of the giver*, because she had given the whole, as is clear from the following text. Moreover, God, *who searcheth the hearts*, saw that that widow gave her offering from a better will; and therefore her gift was valued more by reason of her better will. But when we now ask whether the quantity of what is given adds anything to the goodness of intention, we ask this presupposing equality of good will; for otherwise there would be no question, since it is plain that the greatness of a good will with a small gift is worth more than the smallness of a good will with a great one.

*To 2.* As to that which is objected from the Gloss, that God does not consider how much, but out of how much — it must be said that this is true principally, namely as regards the recompense of the *substantial* reward; yet the Gloss does not deny that the quantity of what is given in some way disposes by *congruity* to greater glory, or to glory more quickly obtained.

*To 3, 4.* As to that which is objected from the other Gloss, that an equal will has an equal reward — the response is already clear. For no greater recompense is made while the will remains in its equality, but because the quantity of what is given disposes one to have a better and purer will; hence it is that it in some way contributes to the increase of glory. — And by this is clear the response to that which was asked last, namely that it in some way contributes to the *substantial* reward, though not principally and of itself, but by the mediation of grace and charity, to which it disposes. Nevertheless that which it objects concerning the *accidental* reward does not compel, inasmuch as accidental merit is not only the aureole, but also joy concerning some created good, whether it be of some prerogative and excellence or not. And this will be better made manifest in the following problem.

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