Dist. 40, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/40/q/bon-sent-II-d40-a2-q3
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### Article II.
### Question III. *Whether the goodness of works adds to the merit of a good intention by reason of number.*

Thirdly it is asked whether the goodness of works adds to the merit of a good intention by reason of number; and the question is whether a good work, added to a work, renders the one acting worthy of a greater essential reward. And it seems that it does not:

1. *First*, by that text of Zechariah, chapter four: *He will make grace equal to grace*: therefore where there is equality of grace, there will be equality of glory: therefore if two persons, out of equal grace, act unequally, they will nonetheless be made equal in the reward of glory.

2. Likewise, on that text of Judges, chapter two: *Who lived a long time after him*; the Gloss: « It belongs to God alone to know, among the elders, which of them sent forth a greater light after himself, whether Paul, or Peter, or Bartholomew »; but it is certain that Paul *labored more than all*, as he says in the first to the Corinthians, chapter fifteen: therefore the greatness of the reward is not weighed according to the multitude of works.

3. Likewise, Augustine: « Not the multitude of works, not the length of time, increases merit, but charity alone and a better will »; but nothing can be said more expressly than this.

4. Likewise, as much as a man loves God, so much is he loved by God; and as much as he is loved by God, so much is he rewarded by God: therefore if there is equality in love, there is equality in reward. But many are equal in love who nonetheless are not equal in work: therefore it seems that the multitude of works does not contribute to the increase of the reward of substantial merit.

**On the contrary:**
1. To the Romans, chapter four: *To him*, he says, *who works, the wage is not reckoned according to grace, but according to merit*; the Gloss: « The wage will not be given according to the grace of faith alone, but according to the merit of one's working »: therefore it seems that by more works one merits to have a greater wage.

2. Likewise, on that text to the Galatians, chapter six: *But doing good, let us not fail*; the Gloss: « As much as we shall have sown in works, so much shall we reap in fruits »: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, by one good work a man merits eternal life: therefore if another following work is as good as the prior one, he will merit just as much as by the first; therefore either he merits *that same thing*, or something *superadded to it*. If something *superadded to it*; I have my point, that the multitude of works avails for the increase of merit. If *nothing*; then it seems that he works in vain: therefore he is foolish who, having done one good thing, does another in addition. But if it is impious to say this, it remains etc.

4. Likewise, sin is not more efficacious for meriting punishment than a good work is for meriting glory; but a following sin, added to a preceding one, if it is equal to it, merits twice as great a punishment: therefore a good work, added to a preceding one, merits twice as great a glory.

5. Likewise, whoever serves a man, the longer he serves him, the greater the wage he obtains: if therefore God in rewarding is both more just and more generous than a man is; it seems that the more anyone serves him in more things and the more works he does for Christ, the greater the reward he receives from him.

6. Likewise, he who multiplies good works *sows in good ground*: therefore it is necessary that he receive some fruit of reward from it, either therefore a substantial reward, or an accidental one, or of the aurea, or of the aureole. But not of the aureole, since that is owed to excellent works: therefore he will receive a greater substantial reward, that is, of the aurea.

The question, therefore, is how much multiplied good works avail and what fruit they bring.

### Conclusion.

> The multiplication of good works does not avail for progress in merit with respect to the essential reward except by disposing and conserving, but it can avail in three ways for progress in the accidental reward.

**I respond:** For an understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that to progress in merit, or toward merit, can be in two ways according to the twofold difference of reward. For one reward is substantial, which indeed consists in the vision and enjoyment of God; and it is called the substantial reward because the foundation and substance of our whole beatitude is God, and once he is perfectly possessed, our beatitude is perfect. The other is the accidental reward, which indeed consists in the joy that is had from a created good, or from liberation from some evil. — Taking merit, therefore, with respect to the substantial reward, it can be said that something avails for the progress of merit in three ways: either because through it a man merits a greater glory, and in this way a greater charity or a better will contributes to the progress of merit; or because it *disposes toward meriting* a greater glory, and such are works of perfection, which are said to contribute to the progress of merit; or because it *conserves* that by which a man merits glory, and thus all good works are profitable toward merit, because in them charity is exercised and conserved and rooted, so that a man may finally persevere in it. And this is no small thing, because, whatever a man may do, he is not saved unless he finally perseveres. And thus it is clear that the multiplication of works in a certain way avails for progress in merit with respect to the substantial reward; and this I say by disposing and conserving, but not by meriting a greater glory by condign merit. — Likewise, for progress toward a greater accidental reward something can avail in three ways: either by reason of the attainment of the aureole, and thus works of special excellence contribute to the progress of the merit of the good will; or by reason of the attainment of some internal delight, and thus all works that are done from grace in a certain way avail for the progress of the accidental reward, because, according as a man does more good works, accordingly will he rejoice over more things in his conscience; or by reason of the diminution of punishment, and thus difficult and penal works contribute to the progress of merit and add to the merit of the good will, because a man merits the remission of some punishment by the will together with the work, which he does not merit by the will alone.

This distinction, moreover, avails not only for settling what has been said, but also for the two preceding questions. For it is generally true that the worthiness of works and the quantity of what is given and the number of works contribute to the progress of merit with respect to the accidental reward, though in different ways. It is also generally true that all these works do not contribute to the progress of merit with respect to the substantial reward, except only by disposing and conserving. — Hence those arguments which show that the wage of the substantial reward is not multiplied according to the multiplication of works are to be conceded; for they conclude truly.

**To the arguments for the negative side:**

1. To that which is first objected on the contrary, that to the one who works the wage is reckoned according to merit; it must be said that that text, according as the Gloss expounds it, does not mean that the quantity of the wage corresponds to the work principally; but it means this, that where there is opportunity for working, the grace of faith does not suffice without good working; but where opportunity or capacity is lacking, grace alone suffices; hence the sense is: *to him who works*, that is, to him who has time for working.

2. To that which is objected from the Gloss, that as much as we shall have sown in works, so much shall we reap in fruits; it must be said that by the name of fruits is there understood the joy that one will have from good workings; not the substantial reward, which consists in God. But if it be understood of the latter, namely the substantial reward, then *as much* and *how much* do not signify commensuration, nor do they signify a disposition of necessity, but of congruity.

3. To that which is objected, that by a following work a man merits just as much as by the first; it must be said that this is true; but he does not merit something else, but that very same thing which he had merited before, speaking with respect to the essential reward. And it does not

follow that he labors in vain; because, although the first work was meritorious of eternal life, nonetheless he did not merit efficaciously except by persevering charity; and charity cannot live in a man without going forth into good acts, when he can and ought. Therefore the following work is not done in vain, because, although it does not add to the excellence of the *reward*, it nonetheless adds to the efficacy of the *merit*; it also disposes none the less toward progress and contributes to the increase of merit with respect to the accidental reward, as was shown before.

4. To that which is objected, that sin added to sin doubles the merit and the punishment, therefore also good added to good; it must be said that it is not the same, because of this, that, since we do evil, we are evil, but not, since we do good, are we good; rather, on the contrary, the goodness of works has its origin from the goodness of the one acting. And hence it is that for different sins a man merits different punishments, although for different good works a man merits one glory, because the *ground of meriting* and of being accepted in many good things is one; but the *ground* of displeasing and of demeriting is diverse in many sins.

5. To that which is objected, that with a man a person merits a greater reward from more works; it must be said that it is not the same, because a man does not reckon a work worthy of recompense on account of the goodness of the one *acting*, but rather the one acting on account of the goodness of the *work*. For a man needs another's service; but God, who *does not need our goods*, accepts and rewards not the *one acting* on account of the works, but the *works* on account of the one acting; and therefore it is not the same on this side and on that.

6. To that which is objected last, that multiplied works do not avail for the accidental reward, because they do not attain the aureole; it must be said that the accidental reward is more than the aureole. For by the name of aureole we do not understand any accidental reward whatever, but that which has a certain prerogative and dignity, just as also the work to which it corresponds. Nevertheless the joy over the multiplication of good works does pertain to the accidental reward, since without it eternal life can be had; and to this indeed multiplied good works do contribute; they contribute also to the essential reward in some way, as was shown before. — From these things the response is clear to that which was last asked.

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