Dist. 40, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/40/q/bon-sent-II-d40-dubia
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this section there are questions concerning the text, and first it is asked concerning what Ambrose says, that *your disposition imposes a name on your work*. Therefore if someone commits adultery, intending to commit simple fornication, it seems that that sin ought to be called fornication, not adultery. — Likewise, from the same disposition someone can be moved to *believe* in God and to *love* him: therefore if a work takes its name from the disposition, it seems that *to believe* and *to love* are a work of the same species and of the same virtue, and ought to be named by the same name.

**I respond:** It must be said that something happens to be named in two ways, namely in a *general* and in a *special* manner. *General* names in matters of conduct are good and evil. But *special* names are the names of special differences, such as of special virtues and vices. When, therefore, it is said that the disposition imposes a name on the work, this is understood of the general name; but he raises his objection concerning the special name.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *Justice deservedly punishes him who says that he has taken away superfluous goods from a rich man in order to provide for a poor man*. For it seems that justice punishes such a man unjustly. For to have superfluous goods is a vice: therefore to cut off superfluous goods belongs to virtue. Similarly, to give to a poor man wherewith he may be nourished is a matter of virtue: if, therefore, it is unjust that anyone be punished for a work of virtue, the justice that punishes such a man acts unjustly. — Likewise, the same God who commanded the children of Israel to steal the vessels of the Egyptians, Exodus chapter twelve; the same commanded that alms be given to the poor; but those who stole the vessels, wishing to fulfill the divine command, did not sin: therefore by parity of reasoning he who steals in order to give to a poor man does not sin by stealing. — Likewise, in every sin there is a disordered turning toward a changeable good; but this man who steals in order to give to a poor man loves nothing in a disordered way nor loves anything out of cupidity: therefore it seems that he does not sin in any way.

**I respond:** It must be said that such a man without doubt sins, because he acts against the divine command; he also acts against his neighbor, because « he handles his property against his will »; and therefore he is justly punished not only by God, but also by his neighbor. — But to that which is objected, that he acts justly in cutting off superfluous goods, it must be said that it belongs to each one to cut off his own superfluous goods; but to cut off another's superfluous goods does not belong to him, when he is set over that man neither as lord nor as judge; and therefore when he cuts off another's superfluous goods, he usurps what is not his own; and on account of this he is punished for injustice.

To that which is objected concerning the children of Israel, it must be said that it is not similar, because the Lord dispensed with them when he commanded them to steal; nay, what is more, he transferred the goods of others into their ownership; and this he could rightly do, because he himself is the Lord of all. But this command of the Lord, by which the Lord commanded that alms be given, does not extend to the goods of others, but to one's own; whence it in no way conflicts with the command by which it is enjoined not to steal; nay, it presupposes it, and accords with it, according to what is said in Proverbs chapter three: *Honor the Lord with thy substance*.

To that which is objected, that he loves nothing in a disordered way, it must be said that the disorder of love can be in two ways: either because a thing is loved which ought not to be, or because a thing is loved more than it ought to be. And when someone does the contrary of what God commands, whether he is moved by great affection or by little, he sins; and his affection is disordered, not from the greatness of love, but from contempt of the divine prohibition.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *the Jews, in crucifying Christ, thought that they were rendering service to God*. For this seems to be false, because, as is said in Wisdom chapter two, out of malice and envy they condemned Christ to a most shameful death; and in Matthew chapter twenty-seven it is said: *For he knew that they had delivered him up out of envy*: if therefore they knew that they were doing evil, they did not think that they were rendering service to God.

**I respond:** It must be said that this is not said with respect to all the Jews, but with respect to the simple, who were deceived by their elders. For the greater Jews, such as the chief priests and the scribes, were moved by envy and malice, because they well recognized his holiness and innocence, although his divinity lay hidden from them; but the simple and the common people were moved by ignorance. For hearing from their elders that he had blasphemed, they thought that by killing Christ they were slaying a blasphemer, and thus rendering service to God. Yet this ignorance does not excuse, for the reason that the works which Christ did were able to give knowledge of his holiness not only to the great, but also to the lowly.

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