Dist. 40
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/40/q/bon-sent-II-d40-littera
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### DISTINCTION XL.

### Sole Chapter. *Whether all acts ought to be weighed from their end, so that from affection or end all are good, or evil.*

After these things, it seems that, concerning acts, it must be added whether they too, like the will, ought to be weighed as good, or evil, from their end. For although, according to some, all are good insofar as they are, nevertheless not all are to be called good absolutely, nor are all rewardable, but some are called simply evil, just as others are good. For simply and truly good are those acts which have a good cause and intention, that is, which accompany a good will and tend toward a good end. But the evil

ought simply to be called those which have a perverse cause and intention. Hence Ambrose says: «Your affection imposes a name upon your work». And Augustine on the thirty-first Psalm: «Let no one reckon his good works before faith. For they seem to me to be like great strength and a most swift running off the road; because where there was no faith, there was no good work. For intention makes a work good, and faith directs the intention. Attend not greatly to what a man does, but to what, when he does it, he aims at — toward what end he directs the sinews of his best governance». — By these testimonies it seems to be implied that works are good, or evil, from affection and end. With these agrees what the Truth says in the Gospel: *A good tree cannot bring forth bad fruits, nor a bad tree bring forth good fruits.* By the name of tree is understood not the nature of the human mind, but the will, which, if it be evil, does not good but evil works; but if it be good, does good, not evil works.

But it is asked whether all the works of man are good, or evil, from *affection* and *end*. — To some it seems to be so, who say that all acts are indifferent, so that they are neither good nor evil *of themselves*, but every act is good from a good intention and evil from an *evil* one. According to whom any act can be good, if it be carried out with a good intention. — But to others it seems that certain acts are *of themselves* evil, so that they cannot be anything but sins, even if they have a good *cause*; and certain ones *of themselves* good, so that, even if they have an evil *cause*, they nevertheless do not cease to be good. Which they confirm by the testimony of Augustine, who says that a good thing is sometimes not done well: «For what one does unwillingly or by necessity he does not do well», because he does not do it with a good intention, as Augustine says on John. «Servile fear, he says, is not in charity, in which, although one believe God, nevertheless [he believes] not *unto God*; even if a good thing be done, nevertheless it is not done well». «For no one does well unwillingly, even though what he does is good». — Behold, you have it, that someone does not do well that which is good; he does therefore what is good with an intention that is not good. Therefore those men assert that certain works are such that they are good in such a way that they cannot be evil, in whatever manner they be done; just as, conversely, certain ones are evil in such a way that they cannot be good, from whatever cause they be done; but that other works are good, or evil, from their *end* or from their *cause*; and to these they refer the testimonies of the Saints, by which they say the judgment of works is weighed either by affection or by intention: these men set forth a threefold difference of acts.

But Augustine teaches most evidently in the book against Lying that all acts are to be judged good, or evil, according to *intention* and *cause*, except certain ones which are so evil that they can never be good, even if they seem to have a good *cause*. «It matters very much, he says, from what cause, with what end, with what intention a thing be done. But those which are agreed to be *sins* are by no means to be done under the pretext of any good cause, with any as-it-were good end, with any seemingly good intention. For those works of men, if they have had good causes, or evil ones, are now good, now evil, *which are not in themselves sins*, just as to provide sustenance to the poor is good, if it be done for the cause of mercy with right faith; and conjugal intercourse, when it is done for the cause of begetting, if it be done with that faith, that those to be regenerated may be begotten. These again are evil, if they have evil causes, as if a poor man be fed for the cause of vainglory, or for the cause of lasciviousness one lies with one's wife, or children are begotten not that they may be nourished for God, but for the devil. But when the works themselves are *sins*, such as thefts, fornications, blasphemies, who would say that they are to be done from good causes, or that they are not sins, or — what is more absurd — that they are just sins? Who would say: let us steal from the rich, that we may have what to give to the poor, or let us bring forth false testimonies, not that the innocent may thereby be harmed, but rather be saved? For here there are two goods: that the needy be fed, and that the innocent be not punished. Or who would say that adultery is to be committed, that through her with whom it is done a man may be freed from death? Why do we not also suppress true wills and substitute false ones, lest those who do nothing good should have inheritances, but rather those who help the needy? Why should not those evils be done for the sake of these goods, if for the sake of these goods those are not even evil?» «Why should not a good man seize riches from the unclean harlots who enrich fornicators, that he may bestow them on the needy, since no evil would be evil, if it were done for a good end»? «Who would say this, but one who endeavors to subvert human affairs and morals and laws? For what crime would not be said to be able to be done rightly — not only with impunity, but even gloriously, so that in it punishment is not feared, but even reward is hoped for — if once we have conceded that in evil acts it is not what is done, but why it is done, that must be inquired, so that whatever things are done for good causes should not themselves be judged evil? But justice deservedly punishes the man who says that he took away superfluities from the rich, that he might furnish them to the poor; and the forger, who corrupts another's will, that he might be heir who would make large almsgivings, not he who would make none; and the man who shows that he committed adultery, that through her with whom he committed it he might free a man from death». — But «someone will say: therefore any thief is to be equated with the thief who steals from a will of mercy. Who would say this? But of these two, no one is good for the reason that one is worse. For worse is he who steals from covetousness than he who steals from compassion. But if all theft is a sin, one must abstain from all theft. For who would say that one must sin, even though one sin be graver, another lighter? But now we are inquiring which act is a sin, or not; not, which is graver, or lighter». — At-

tend, reader, with the whole consideration of your mind to the words set forth, which have no useless exercise; and you will distinguish which act is a sin, namely that which has an evil cause; and not only that one, because there are some acts which, even if they have a good cause, are nevertheless sins, as was set down above. — From which it seems to follow that the will or action is not always judged evil from its end, as in those which are sins in themselves. For those, when one has done them for some good cause, seem to have a good end; nor is the will evil from its end, nor does the action become evil from the will, but from the *action* the will becomes depraved. Among these some place the act of the Jews, who in crucifying Christ thought *that they were rendering service to God*; because they say that these set for themselves a good end, namely the service of God, and yet they assert that their will and action were perverse. — But concerning *good things* no exception is made in the foregoing words of Augustine, but that every good will is good from its end, and from end and will every good action is good. But not every *evil* will is evil from its end, nor is every *evil action* evil from end and will; and every one which has an evil cause is evil, but not every one which has a good cause is good. And therefore, when it is said that the name is imposed on the work from affection, in *good* works this rule is generally true, but in *evil* ones those are excepted which are evil in themselves. — All the works of man, therefore, are judged good, or evil, according to intention and cause, excepting those which are evil in themselves, that is, which cannot be done without transgression.

Yet certain ones contend that these never have a good cause. For he who steals what is another's, that he may distribute to the poor, does not, as they say, steal for a good end. For it is not good to give to the poor what belongs to another. For he who offers to God a sacrifice from plunder, as the authority says, does the same as if he were to immolate a son in the sight of his father, or were to offer to God the sacrifice of a dog. For the oblation of the impious is abominable to God. So too they say that to free a man from death through adultery is evil. For although it be good to free a man from death, nevertheless to free him thus they assert to be evil. And therefore they say that Augustine in the foregoing tempered his speech and spoke cautiously, where he says: Those which are agreed to be sins are to be done with no as-it-were good end, with no seemingly good intention. For he did not say simply with a good end and a good intention, but added, *as-it-were* and *seemingly*; because such things are not done with a good end and a good intention, but with an *intention* which seems good, and with an end which is thought good, but is not. Nor did Augustine therefore except these, as they say, in such a way that they do not have evil causes, but because they have causes which *seem* good, yet are evil.

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