Dist. 41, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/41/q/bon-sent-II-d41-a1-q3
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### Article I. *On the division of deliberative action into good, evil, and indifferent.*
### Question III. *Whether the division of action into good and evil is by immediate differences, or whether a third difference is to be posited, namely an indifferent action.*

Third, it is asked whether the division of action into good and evil is by immediate differences, or whether one is to posit a third difference, namely an indifferent action. And that it is by immediate differences, it seems.

1. First to the Corinthians, chapter ten: *Do all things for the glory of God*; and to the Colossians, chapter three: *Whatsoever you do, in word or in work, do all in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ*. Either, therefore, our action is for the glory of God, or it is not. If so, it is good; if not: then what the Apostle commands is omitted. But to omit doing what is commanded is always a sin: therefore every action is either meritorious or with sin: therefore none is indifferent. If you say that it is a counsel; this does not seem so, because a counsel is neither given to all nor absolutely, but under a condition, nor does anyone sin by being unwilling to do a counsel. The three opposites of these are found in the matter at hand: therefore it does not hold the character of a counsel.

2. Likewise, Matthew, chapter twelve: *For every idle word that men shall speak, they shall render an account in the day of judgment*; but « an idle word, as Gregory says, is one that lacks the reason of just necessity and the intention of pious utility »; but every word either has just necessity and pious utility, or lacks it: therefore every word is either good or idle; and by the same reasoning every deed too. But of everything idle we shall render an account; and we shall render an account only of evil things: therefore our every word or deed is either good or evil.

3. Likewise, Bernard: « To stand still in the way of God is to go backward »; but he who does a non-meritorious action does not advance in the way of God in that action: therefore by that action he goes backward. And he does not go backward except by an evil one: therefore every action is either good or evil, and none indifferent.

4. Likewise, wills attain to recompenses through actions; but there is no mean, but that every will is either good or evil; there is no mean among recompenses, but that all are either saved or damned: therefore it seems that there is no mean between goodness and malice concerning our actions.

5. Likewise, God is *alpha and omega, the beginning and the end*; but what is not from God as from a principle is deprived of the character of good: therefore likewise, what is not toward God as toward an end is deprived of the character of good. But the privation of good is nothing other than malice: therefore what is not toward God as toward an end is evil, and what is toward God as toward an end is good; this is established. But our every action either is toward God as toward an end, or is not toward God: therefore our every action is either good or evil.

6. Likewise, when our will, from deliberation, does something, either it rests in a creature, or it refers it to the Creator. If it refers it to the Creator, it does well; if it rests in a creature, it acts badly and is disordered, because it enjoys that which is to be used: therefore it seems that the will in its every action either merits or demerits.

**On the contrary:** 1. To the Romans, chapter seven: *To will is present with me* etc.; the Gloss: « There is a willing of grace, a willing of vice, and a willing of nature »; but action corresponds to will: therefore between meritorious and vicious action there falls some intermediate action: therefore not every action of our will is evil or good, but a certain one is indifferent.

2. Likewise, to lift a straw from the ground is neither good in genus nor evil, nor even good from

circumstance nor evil, and likewise, so far as concerns itself, it is neither meritorious nor demeritorious: if, then, the good of morals is sufficiently divided by these three divisions, and there is nothing in genus that is not in species; it seems that such an action is neither good nor evil, but indifferent.

3. Likewise, someone eats to satisfy a natural appetite; such an action is not good with the goodness of merit, this is established, because it is not done for the sake of God nor referred to him; nor is it evil with the malice of fault, because sin does not accord with nature, but is discordant; but such an action is consonant with nature: therefore it seems that some action of ours holds a mean between goodness and malice.

4. Likewise, if our every action were meritorious or demeritorious, since in him who lacks charity none is meritorious, his every action would be evil: therefore he would sin in this, that he goes to church: therefore also in this, that he does all other works: therefore he would never dispose himself toward grace, but rather by disposing himself would distance himself the more.

5. Likewise, no action is good and meritorious except one that is done with a good intention and through it is referred to the due end: therefore if our every action were good or evil, meritorious or demeritorious, in every action and thought of ours which we do not refer to God, we would sin: therefore there would scarcely be anyone who would not sin a thousand times in a day, since we have innumerable thoughts and affections in which we think nothing of God; I speak especially of those who attend more to action than to contemplation.

6. Likewise, just as charity is the principle of all goods, so lust and concupiscence is the principle and cause of all evils; but men do many actions the whole day long which they do neither from lust nor from charity, but rather either from natural love, or from social [love], or from a certain civil courtesy and custom of acting: therefore it does not seem that every voluntary action is immediately good or evil.

### Conclusion.

> The division of action into good and evil is not by immediate differences, since a third genus of work is found, which is neither good nor evil, both with respect to its own genus and with respect to the agent.

**I respond:** It must be said that when it is asked whether action is divided into good and evil as by immediate differences, the question is about the action of the deliberative will, insofar as it is deliberative; for it is this which is divided into good and evil. And since the action of the deliberative will can be spoken of in two ways, namely as to the genus of the action, and in comparison to the agent, these differences can be compared to the action in two ways: either according to the genus of the work, or with respect to the agent. — If in the first way, then it is plain that the division is not by immediate [differences], but rather between a good action and an evil action it is possible to find an intermediate, indifferent one. And this is manifest, because, since there is a threefold difference of the good of morals — for there is a good in itself or principal, and a good from circumstance, and a good in genus — and on the contrary, since there is a threefold evil, namely evil in genus, evil from circumstance, and evil in itself; among all these it is possible to find a mean. For between good and evil in itself there are, as it were, means those which are neither good in themselves nor evil in themselves, such as things good or evil in genus or from circumstance. — Between good from circumstance and evil from circumstance the means are both indifferent things and things good and evil in genus; for all those can indifferently be made good or evil from circumstance. — But between good in genus and evil in genus there falls a mean simply indifferent, such as to will to eat or to will to lift a straw from the ground, which do not denote the goodness of morals, or malice. — And so it is plain that the division of action into good and evil as to the genus of the work is not by immediate differences, but rather it is possible to find a third difference; and in this all commonly agree.

But if we speak of the goodness and malice of action in comparison to the agent, then there are diverse opinions. — For some say that it is an immediate division; for a man does nothing from deliberation which God does not reckon to him for reward, or does not impute to him for some demerit. Hence in the day of judgment, as they say, we shall render an account of every deliberative act. And to this position the words of the Saints seem consonant, who say that just as a hair of the head shall not perish, neither shall a moment of time, of which we shall not render an account, as Bernard says. And Anselm seems to say the same, that all time spent will be required of us, how it was spent. And Truth itself seems to be

consonant with this, when it says that we shall render an account of every idle word. — But this manner of speaking either much widens the way of salvation, or much narrows it. For in order that a work be meritorious, they will say either that an actual relation of that work to God, and in particular, is required, or they will say that a relation in habit and in general suffices. If they say that a relation in particular is required, the way of salvation is too narrow, because then in every work which a man does not actually refer to God, he demerits and sins; which is very harsh to say. If a habitual and general intention sufficed, then, when someone had proposed in his heart to serve God at the beginning of the year or month or week or day, all the works which he afterward did, even thinking nothing of God, would be meritorious to him. But if this be said, the way of salvation is much widened and enlarged; and in this it goes against the authorities of the Saints, who say that it is very narrow.

And therefore there is another manner of speaking, somewhat more tempered than that one, namely that some are actions of the deliberative will which regard it directly; while others are those which regard it insofar as it governs the natural powers. The first operation is speech, which indeed is rational insofar as it uses reason; the second is eating or walking and the like. They say, therefore, that concerning those operations which regard the rational will, insofar as it is rational, it is not possible to find a mean between goodness and malice; but concerning the others it is. Hence they rightly concede that not every deliberative action is either good or evil. But every speech is either good or evil; for it is either useful or idle; and if idle, then it is evil; if useful, then it is good. And therefore the Lord said that we render an account of every word, not of every deed. And blessed James in his Canonical [Epistle] says that he who offends not in word, the same is a perfect man. And therefore a certain one says that « a word ought to come to the file before it comes to the tongue ». — But still this manner of speaking does not seem fully to satisfy. For to will to think about truth is an act of the will, insofar as it is moved rationally; and yet frequently a man thinks about truth

in such a way that he does not refer it to God; and yet it is harsh to say that he sins. Further, someone can speak to another out of natural kindness or out of civil courtesy, as when he greets a man on the road; and then it is very harsh to say that he sins; nor can it be said that every such speech is meritorious. Likewise, if to do is more than to say, we shall rather render an account of an idle deed than of a word. Hence the Saints conclude this from the lesser, from the word of the Gospel.

And therefore there is a third manner of speaking, that in the works of the deliberative will a mean is to be posited between malice and goodness. For a certain action proceeding from the deliberative will is ordered to the due end, namely to God; and this indeed is good, and if it be from charity, it is meritorious of eternal life by the merit of condignity; but if it be done outside charity, it is meritorious by the merit of congruity. But a certain action proceeding from the deliberative will is not ordered; and this is a division by immediate [differences]. But not every action not ordered to God as to an end is evil, because some is not ordered on account of a disordered turning toward a creature, some is not ordered on account of the agent's negligence, and some is not ordered on account of the agent's infirmity and misery. The first difference of unordered action is evil with the malice of commission; the second is evil with the malice of omission; the third is in neither way evil, but is indifferent. But such is an action when someone does some operation in such a way that he is not disordinately affected toward a creature; nor yet does he compare that operation to God, but does it for some end which regards the need of nature, as when someone walks in order to be refreshed, or eats in order to be restored. Such an action is judged indifferent, because God neither rewards it nor imputes it as fault; and this because in such an action there is no malice of commission, since there is no disordered delight; nor of omission either, for a man does not always omit when he does not refer his actions to God. For it is granted to frail and infirm nature that it can do many such things; nor does God require of a man in such a state of distraction and misery that he refer all things to himself while he does them; yet he does require it sometimes, when there is place and time; and then if

the man does not refer, by omitting he sins. — It must therefore be conceded, as the reasons show, that the division of action into good and evil is not by immediate differences, for the reason that between these differences it is possible to find a mean, whether the action be considered according to the genus of the work or with respect to the agent.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1.* To that, then, which is objected first about that word of the Apostle: *Do all things for the glory of God*; some respond that it is a counsel, some that it is a precept, some that it is the end of a precept, like that: *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God* etc. Now in all the aforesaid ways the aforesaid saying can be understood. — For it can be taken affirmatively or negatively; and affirmatively in two ways, because this sign *all* can there be taken collectively or distributively.

If it be taken negatively, then it is a precept, and then the sense is: do your works in such a way that you do nothing against the glory of God. — But if it be understood affirmatively, and this sign *all* be taken distributively and severally; then it is a counsel and an admonition. For the Apostle admonishes, according to this sense, that we should refer each of our works to God; and of each severally we are able to do so, and it is useful and expedient for us if we do. For there is no deliberative work done by us which we cannot do for the sake of God; and if we did this, we would do better than when we do not refer it. — But if the aforesaid saying be taken affirmatively, and this sign *all* be taken collectively; then it is neither a precept nor a counsel, but the end of a precept and counsel. For to this we ought to tend and this to desire, that we may come to such a state that we refer all our thoughts and affections to God; but this we shall then obtain, when we love God with our whole heart.

And so it is plain that from that authority it is not concluded that anyone sins when he does not actually refer his work to God. Nor does that hold which is objected, that it cannot be a counsel; for here we do not take « counsel » properly, as it is proposed to perfect men, but we here call « counsel » any general admonition which clears the way to attaining salvation, such as are the admonitions of Solomon in the book of Proverbs and similar exhortations to good.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that we shall render an account of an idle word; it must be said that a word is not called idle because it is not ordered to an end alone, but because it lacks all utility, while yet it ought to have some; and between such an idle thing and a meritorious or good one there falls a mean, when someone does something which is not deprived of every utility, yet is not ordered to God as to the ultimate end; whence a man is not said to be always idle when he is not laboring, but he is then said to be idle when he is not laboring and ought to labor. Yet frequently those words which seem to be useless become useful, when they are ordered to some recreation of the spirit and to the exclusion of sloth; according to what is reported that blessed Bernard said, when he made someone stumble: *It was an idle deed*, he said, *but not idly done*; for he had done this to gladden the one whom he had seen sad.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that to stand still in the way of God is to go backward; it must be said that it is true when a man stands still when he ought to walk; and as to that time Bernard says that a moment of time shall not perish; and Anselm, that an account will be required of us, how time was spent. — But if it be asked, when; this is difficult, indeed impossible to determine, because to diverse persons the opportunity of going forth into good operations and into good affections and intentions presents itself in diverse ways; and therefore the Saints, in order to make us solicitous, alarm us, and the Lord himself, when he says: *What I say to one I say to all: Watch*.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that there is no mean between wills and recompenses; it must be said that it is not alike, for the reason that every man who is born is born with sin, from which he is not freed except through grace, and that grace is lost through fault. Hence it is necessary that the will be either acceptable or hateful. And because recompenses correspond to persons, hence it is that all who are not saved are damned, so that there is no mean. But it is not so concerning action, because from a will in which there is lust some action can proceed even apart from the lust of morals. Hence just as this argument is not valid: the will cannot be without lust or grace, therefore it cannot move without lust or grace; so neither [is valid] the argument stated before.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that everything which is not from God is deprived of good, therefore likewise everything which is not toward God; it must be said that it is not alike, because the ordering of action toward God as toward an efficient cause, or toward a principle, is attended to not only as to the being of morals, but also as to the being of nature, and thus regards being; but the ordering as to the end regards well-being. Although, however, there is no mean between being and non-being, there is nevertheless a mean between the well-being and the ill-being of morals, for the reason that moral goodness does not extend to all actions, as natural goodness does.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that if the will does something, either it rests in a creature, or it refers it to God; it must be said that to rest in something happens in two ways: either because it halts there as in the ultimate end; and then it is an action evil with the malice of mortal sin, namely when the will sets a creature before itself as its ultimate and principal end: or because it so halts there, not because it sets there its ultimate end, but because it does not tend further. And this can be in three ways, as was said above: either from some disordered affection by which it is bound to that thing; or from negligence and torpor, by which it neglects to refer, when it could and ought; or because it is weighed down by a certain weakness and infirmity, so that it is difficult for it to turn all its actions to God. And in the first two ways there is sin, but in the third not.

It must be noted, however, that in order for some action to be meritorious, it is not required that one always actually refer it to God, but a habitual relation suffices. Now I call it a habitual relation, not because it has the charity by which it is apt for referring, but because in the beginning of that operation or of another to which it consequently relates, it has a direct intention toward God. Hence if someone intends to give a hundred marks for the sake of God and begins to give and thinks of God at the first mark, and in the others does not think [of him]: nonetheless all those givings are meritorious and fruitful to him. But if he should begin a work of another genus, it would be necessary that the intention be renewed in order that this work be meritorious.