Dist. 41, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/41/q/bon-sent-II-d41-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the comparison of the evil action to the will.*

Next there is inquiry concerning the second principal point, namely concerning the comparison of the evil action to the will. And concerning this three things are asked. First it is asked whether every actual sin, both mortal and venial, is voluntary. Second it is asked whether every mortal sin is in the will as in a subject. Third it is asked whether to be punished, just as also to sin, is proper to the will itself.

### Question I. *Whether every actual sin is voluntary.*

As to the first, the procedure is thus, and it is asked whether every actual sin is voluntary; and since it is certain concerning mortal sin that it is, the inquiry concerns venial sin. And that every venial sin is voluntary, it seems.

1. As Augustine says, and as is had in the text (*littera*): « So far is sin voluntary that in no way is it sin unless it is voluntary »: therefore if venial sin is a sin, then it is necessary that it be voluntary. If you should say that every sin is voluntary, either by one's own will or by the will of Adam, and a venial sin is a sin because it is voluntary by the will of Adam: against this it is objected: because, if it suffices for the character of venial sin that it be voluntary by the will of Adam; since that sin which Adam transmitted into us is original sin, a venial sin would be original sin. But if this is false, it remains that the first too is false.

2. Likewise, the inordinate movements toward illicit things, which are said to be sins in us, are sins neither in little children nor in the insane; but this is only because they are not moved by the use of reason and will: therefore it seems that sins of this kind are in us voluntary by our own will.

3. Likewise, when the emptied stomach before the hour of eating craves to eat, there is no fault there, although that appetite is immoderate and toward that which is not licit at such a time; but this is only because that movement is present of necessity: therefore it seems that, for some movement toward the illicit to be a venial sin, it is necessary that it be voluntary.

4. Likewise, everything that one does, one does either naturally, or voluntarily, or by violence: if therefore we commit venial sins, then we do so either through violence, or through nature, or through the will. If through violence: then there is no fault there. If through nature: likewise, because in those things which are done naturally there is no fault: therefore if a venial sin is a fault, it is necessary that it be from the will.

5. Likewise, given some venial sin, either one can avoid this sin, or one cannot. If one cannot, and « no one sins in that which he cannot avoid »: then in committing this sin, he does not sin. If he can avoid it; and what we commit, being able to avoid it, we commit voluntarily: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. Proverbs, chapter twenty-four: *Seven times in a day* etc.: the Gloss: « Each day, through necessity or the frailty of the flesh, whether willing or unwilling, we sin ». If therefore we sin venially, whether we will or not; it seems that not every venial sin is voluntary.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book of *Retractations*: « There are, he says, certain things done of necessity which are to be disapproved, as when one wishes to do rightly and cannot. Whence is that saying of the Apostle: Not what I will, this good I do, but what I hate, the evil »; but such are venial sins: therefore some venial sins are of necessity, and so not from the will.

3. Likewise, Augustine in the nineteenth book of *On the City of God*: « It is no small vice, when the flesh lusts against the spirit »; but the flesh lusts against the spirit frequently, the man himself being unwilling, as is had in the text: therefore, willing or not, a man sins venially: therefore not every venial sin is voluntary. The minor is proved in the text: « He who, when the flesh lusts against the spirit, does not do the things which he wills, indeed lusts unwillingly, and does in this what he does not will ».

4. Likewise, venial sins are in us from the resistance of sensuality to reason, and also from sudden onset (*surreptio*), as are the first movements; but, willing or not, there is in us the resistance of sensuality, and many inordinate movements also arise from sudden onset. If therefore the will cannot subdue sensuality, and what is from sudden onset forestalls the will; it seems that venial sins, which are first movements, are not voluntary.

5. Likewise, either some venial sin is involuntary, or not. If so, I have my point; if not, then every venial sin is voluntary. But everything voluntary can be avoided through the will: therefore through the will one can avoid every venial sin: therefore one can take care never to sin venially. If therefore this is impossible, that anyone should live long in this flesh without committing some venial sin; it seems that it is necessary to hold that some venial sin is not voluntary.

### Conclusion

> Every actual sin is voluntary either simply, or in a certain respect, as are some venial sins.

**I respond:** It must be said that something can be called voluntary in three ways: either by another's will, or by one's own will, or partly by another's will and partly by one's own will. And according to this threefold mode of speaking of the voluntary, there is a threefold distinction of sin.

For original sin is voluntary, but not by the will of him in whom it is, namely the will of Adam from whom it is, but by the will of him, namely of Adam, who in the transgression corrupted himself and all his posterity. — But voluntary by one's own will is actual mortal sin; in this kind of sin no one sins except by consenting. — But voluntary in the middle way, namely partly by one's own will and partly by another's will, is venial sin, especially that which arises from the resistance of the flesh to the spirit, or from the corruption of the powers of the soul. This sin, I say, because it is partly from another's will and partly from one's own will, therefore in a certain way, according to Augustine, holds the character of a penalty, and in a certain  way the character of a fault. Therefore Augustine says: « Because man did not will to avoid sin while he was able, it has been inflicted that he cannot, when he wills ». Voluntary, I say, it is called by comparison to the will of Adam, because Adam willed deliberately; whence also corruption followed, from which arise in us inordinate movements, which are said to be venial sins. But voluntary by one's own will or by the will of the one sinning, not every venial sin is voluntary simply, but in a certain respect. For that is voluntary simply which is from a will going before and moving. But that which arises from a will accompanying and not prohibiting or forestalling, while it could prohibit or forestall, is called voluntary in a certain way or interpretatively, for this reason, that such disorder is imputed to the will. And in this way at least every venial sin is called voluntary, because no one sins venially except when he has the use of the will; nor does anyone sin venially in that which he can in no way prohibit, nor was even able to forestall. For although all venial sins cannot be forestalled nor prohibited, yet there is no single sin which cannot be prohibited, or which at least could not have been forestalled. For although there may be a state in which it is necessary that someone fall into some determinate sin, yet one could have forestalled that state; and therefore, if he did not forestall it, it is imputed to his will, although then he cannot prohibit it. — Therefore the reasons showing that every actual sin is voluntary are to be granted. For mortal sin is voluntary simply, while venial sin is either voluntary simply, like that which comes about from deliberation, as a jesting lie; or in a certain respect or in a certain way, like that which comes about from sudden onset, as are the first movements.

**To the objections:**
*To 1.* As to that which is first objected to the contrary, that each day we sin unwillingly; it must be said that in that Gloss someone is said to sin unwillingly not through a complete privation of will, but through the privation of full will or of complacency. And this indeed is true, that we frequently sin unwillingly, and it displeases us that we are thus moved inordinately; yet if we had taken good care beforehand, we would not have fallen into this act or that, although we cannot so take care that we do not fall into some; just as the example is given of the sailor, who can take care and watch lest water enter through some determinate opening; yet he cannot bring it about that it has entry through none.

*To 2.* As to that which is objected, that certain things done of necessity are to be disapproved; it must be said that Augustine speaks of the necessity of venial sins, not as to this venial sin or that determinately, but generally as to venial sins, or even as to some kind of venial sin; just as we see in a young and strong man, that he can never altogether avoid the movements of the flesh, although he can avoid this hour or that, or this movement or that. And because nothing prevents there being a certain necessity in the universal, and the will being in a certain way in the particular; therefore that authority does not stand against the things which have been said.

*To 3.* As to that which is objected, that it is no small vice when the flesh lusts against the spirit; it must be said that it is true. — But as to what is subjoined, that it is necessary to lust: it must be said that it is true of concupiscence, speaking generally; but of the concupiscence of this thing or that, at this time or that, it is not true. And as to what Augustine says, that one lusts unwillingly; and the Apostle: The evil that I will not, this I do; it does not deprive the will in every way, but it deprives it of this, that the will is not there the principal mover.

*To 4.* As to that which is objected, that the first movements are from sudden onset and from rebellion; the response is already clear from the things which have been said. For it is true that they cannot be prohibited or forestalled generally, so that none should arise; yet each one taken by itself can be forestalled. Whence also a sign of this is that we do not hold there to be sin concerning the first movements of the nutritive power, as of the generative; for the act of the nutritive power is necessary for the health of the one nourished, but not the act of the generative; although another reason too can be assigned: because the nutritive power is only corrupted, while the generative is corrupted and infected. Yet the first reason holds better. For, as Augustine holds in the first book of *On the City of God*, if some woman is violated by force, if she altogether resists, she is without any fault; and yet  she is not altogether immune from delight. For he says thus: « If that concupiscential disobedience, which still dwells in the members, is moved beyond the law of the will as if by its own law, it is also without fault in the body of one not consenting ». From this it is clear that, if venial sins have the character of fault, this is because they can be avoided and forestalled by the will in particular and divisively (*divisim*).

*To 5.* As to that which is objected, that if this and that can be avoided, and so of the individual ones, then all; it must be said that this is twofold: "this man can avoid every venial sin," like this: "this man can conquer every man": either because the power of avoiding or of conquering is compared to its object conjointly, or divisively. If divisively; thus this is true; this man can avoid or forestall every venial sin, because there is none to be given which could not be avoided. But if conjointly; then it is false; for the sense is that he could bring it about that he be altogether without venial sin; and in this sense it is said that we cannot avoid all venial sins. — Nor is that reasoning valid: "I can avoid this and that and that, therefore all together"; rather there is there a figure of speech (*figura dictionis*), either from the diverse supposition of this term which I call "venial," or rather because the argument proceeds from several determinate suppositions of this verb "can" to one; just as if it were argued: "this man can carry this stone and that and that, and so on up to ten stones: therefore he can carry these ten stones"; and just as if it were said: "man is Socrates, man is Plato: therefore man is Socrates and Plato." The premises are true, and the conclusion false, and the argument proceeds from several determinate suppositions to one. But supposition is called determinate when the term is not confused, but ought to render the statement true for one, as it is when it is said: "man runs." So too in the present case it must be understood, because this verb "can," insofar as it is taken with respect to every venial sin conjointly, regards every venial sin as one object, and asserts one perfect power exceeding and conquering every impulse toward venial sin; just as if it were said: "this man can conquer ten men, or carry ten stones." — And thus it is clear that that process does not hold, because the law of right inference is not preserved in it.