Dist. 41, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/41/q/bon-sent-II-d41-a2-q2
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### Question II. *Whether every sin is about the will as about its proper subject.*

Secondly it is asked whether every sin is about the will as about its proper subject. And that it is so seems to be the case:

1. *First*, through Anselm in the book *On Original Sin*: « Nowhere save in the will is there sin ».

2. Likewise, this same thing is proved by such a reasoning. « The members and the works, and whatever we are, God has subjected to the will; whatever therefore they do, the whole is to be imputed to the will »: if therefore the fault is in that to which it is imputed; and every fault is imputed to the will: therefore every fault is in the will as in its proper subject.

3. Likewise, fault is in that power alone in which justice is born to be, « because opposites are born to come to be about the same thing »; but justice is in the will as in its subject, because, as Anselm says, « justice is nothing other than rectitude of the will »: therefore in the same power, namely in the will, is fault as in its proper subject.

4. Likewise, fault is in that power alone which cannot be coerced; for no one sins except in that from which he is able freely to abstain; but it is the power of the will alone that cannot be coerced: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, fault is in that power alone which is sometimes called good, sometimes evil; but we are not said to have an evil understanding or memory, but only an evil will: if therefore an accident denominates its subject and fault denominates the will alone, then fault is in the will alone as in its proper subject.

6. Likewise, fault is in that power alone as in its proper subject, to whose act it is compared as to its proximate and immediate cause; but no power of the soul is the proximate and immediate cause of fault except the rational power alone; for « to remember evil or to understand evil is not a fault, but to will evil is a fault »: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. Never is there mortal sin except through consent; but consent belongs not only to the will, but also to reason: if therefore fault is about that power by whose act it is perpetrated, then it is not only about the will, but also about reason.

2. Likewise, one sins not only by affection, but one sins also by forgetfulness, as is said in *Deuteronomy* six: *Take heed, lest thou forget the Lord thy God,* and frequently in Scripture the Lord reproves those who have forgotten him: therefore if forgetfulness is in the memory, it seems that sin is not only in the will, but also in the memory.

3. Likewise, one sins not only by delight, but also by thought, according to what man confesses daily; but thought belongs to the intellect, not to the affect: therefore sin has its being not only in the affect, but also in the intellect.

4. Likewise, one sins not only by deliberation, but also by suggestion, according to what Gregory holds; but suggestion is in the sensitive part: therefore sin is not only in the rational part, but also in the sensitive part.

5. Likewise, sin is a deformity, formally speaking; but it is established that by every sin the image is deformed — for any sin whatever, so far as is of itself, expels grace, which is reformative of the image — therefore if the image regards not only the will, but also the other powers; it seems that sin has its being not only in the will, but also in the other powers.

6. Likewise, no one loves except what he judges to be lovable, therefore before disordered love there precedes a disordered judgment. If therefore the first disordered judgment could not be a punishment, because punishment does not precede fault; it is necessary that it was a fault: therefore sin is prior in reason than in the will: rather, therefore, it seems that the subject of sin ought to be assigned to reason than to the will.

### Conclusion.

> Sin, as it holds the character of fault, regards the will as its subject; but as it holds the character of vice, speaking causally, it is in the will alone, as principle and first subject; speaking materially, it is also in the acts of the other powers.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that sin from its very nature says two things. For it says a disorder or privation of order about the act of some power; it says nonetheless that disorder as worthy of blame and punishment. And as to the first, sin holds the character of a vice in some way corrupting; as to the second, it holds the character of fault and demerit. When therefore we compare sin to its proper subject, either we speak of it insofar as it is fault, or we speak of it insofar as it is vice.

If we speak of it insofar as it is fault and demerit, thus it properly and precisely regards free choice. For since to free choice is committed the governance of the whole man, if any disorder arise in the kingdom of the whole soul, it is imputed to free choice itself. Hence if all the members through which it was consummated, and all the powers in which any disorder has been done, were drawn into the cause, all would complain of free choice, to which they are subject, and the Lord would impute the whole to it, whatever of evil was done in them. Hence if free choice be taken away, there will now in no way be sin. And because the freedom of choice principally resides in the will, as was shown in what precedes; hence it is that fault under the character of fault is said to be in the will as in its proper subject.

But if we speak of fault insofar as it is vice, thus it still happens in two ways. Since sin is called a vice insofar as it disorders some act of some power, according as that disorder can be compared in two ways; so also sin, as it is vice. Now that disorder is compared to the act of some power as to the material *about which*, and as to the causal *from which*. — If therefore we speak of that disorder materially, thus I say that it consists not only about the act of the will, but also about the acts of the other powers of the soul. For the acts both of memory and of understanding and of the other powers of the soul, which are subject to the will, are liable to be disordered through diverse sins. — But if we speak of that disorder causally, thus all such disorder is from the will.

But if the reason for this be asked, it must be said that the reason for this is threefold: first, because in the will consists the lordship of governance; second, because in it is found the principle of rectitude; third, because to it pertains the completion of governance. — For in it consists the lordship of governance, inasmuch as it commands the other powers and is commanded by none. — In it also is observed the principle of rectitude; for love is the principle of rectitude and of obliquity, as Augustine shows; whence good love is the foundation of the city of God, and evil love the foundation of the city of the devil. And the reason of this is that love is the root of all the affections and of so great an adherence that it transforms the lover into the beloved. — In it also consists the completion of rectitude and of governance, since its object is the good; « now the good and the end are the same ». And because in direction to the end consists the completion of goodness, but in obliquity consists the loss of goodness; hence it is that from the will itself arises all sin. And therefore Augustine, in the book *On the Two Souls*, defining sin, says that « sin is the will to attain or to retain what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain »; now by this that he says: *the will to attain* etc., he describes sin insofar as it is vice and disorder, which takes its origin from the will. But by this that he says: *from which one is free to abstain,* he marks out sin insofar as it holds the character of fault; for no one is faulted in that which he cannot avoid, as he himself says in the same place.

Thus therefore it is clear that sin, insofar as it holds the character of fault, regards the will as subject; insofar also as it holds the character of vice, it regards the will as principle and as first subject, although it in some way regards the acts of the other powers. — Whence the reasons which are brought forward for the first part are to be granted.

**To the solution of the opposing arguments:**
*To 1.* As to that, then, which is first objected, that we do not sin except by consenting; it must be said that although consent regards at once reason and the will, nevertheless it more principally and more completely regards the will, because in it it is consummated. For however much reason may deliberate, unless the will prefer the one alternative, it never chooses nor consents; and whatever there is there of fault and of injustice, this is by reason of the will joined to it.

*To 2, 3, 4.* To the three following, which it adds, that one sins by forgetfulness, by thought, and by suggestion; the response is clear from what has been said; for such things are not sins, except inasmuch as they are voluntary. Hence never does fault consist about the act of memory nor even about the act of understanding, unless the will mingle itself with them either antecedently, or concomitantly, or consequently. Likewise neither is suggestion, if it is wholly from without, a fault, but that which is from within, which is in a certain way voluntary, whether because it took its origin from the will of Adam, or because it is not guarded against by the will of the one sinning.

*To 5.* As to that which is objected, that sin deforms the whole image; it must be said that although the whole image is deformed and vitiated, nevertheless that deformation alone which is in the will is the one which is the ground of inculpating; and therefore it does not follow that fault regards the other powers of the soul under the character of fault, although about their acts there consists a vicious corruption.

*To 6.* As to that which is objected, that every evil will is preceded by an evil judgment; it must be said that this is true as regards the act of the will, which indeed is full consent; but that judgment never, in a rational creature, according as it was instituted, would an erroneous judgment intervene, unless the will mingled itself with that judgment; for never would Adam have presumed, or judged of himself presumptuously, unless by the love of his will he had clung too much to himself. Hence love marvelously perverts judgment. Although therefore the first Angel or Adam, when he sinned, presumed before he loved; nevertheless the perversity of that presumption took its origin from the will, and the crime of ambition was consummated in the will: and thus sin regards the will principally, both because in it it is first begun, and because in it it is consummated. Therefore it is rightly called the first subject of sin, because it is both first in origin and first also in completion or consummation.

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