Dist. 41, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/2/d/41/q/bon-sent-II-d41-a2-q3
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### Article II.
### Question III. *Whether, just as to sin, so also to be punished is proper to the will.*

Thirdly it is asked whether, just as to sin, so also to be punished is proper to the will. And it seems that it is:

1. Anselm, *On Original Sin*: « Someone perhaps wonders, he says, why for the fault of the will the members and the senses are punished; but it is not so; for nothing is punished except the will; for nothing is a punishment to anyone except what is against the will, and no thing feels punishment except one which has a will; but the members and the senses by themselves will nothing. Just as, therefore, the will operates through the members and the senses, so in them it is itself either tormented or delighted ». From this authority, which encloses within itself a reasoning, it is had that to be punished is proper to the will.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book of the *Six Questions*: « For the will itself is punished, whether by a punishment of the soul or of the body, so that what is delighted in sins may itself be chastised in punishments ».

3. Likewise, by reason: « Opposites are by nature produced about the same thing »; but the voluntary and the involuntary are opposites; but punishment is an involuntary affection, as Augustine says in the book *On Free Choice*: therefore, just as fault, which is a voluntary affection, regards the will as that from which it is; so it seems that punishment regards the will as that against which it is.

4. Likewise, fault is the merit of punishment; but merit with respect to reward has both the character of order and the character of disposition: if therefore the disposition and that toward which it disposes are in the same thing, and fault, as it is in the character of fault, rather regards the will: therefore punishment too.

**On the contrary:**
1. Four things, as Bede says, were inflicted on us for sin, namely « ignorance, malice, infirmity, concupiscence »; but what is inflicted for sin is a punishment: therefore ignorance is a punishment;

but it is established that ignorance does not regard the will, but the reason: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, there is a twofold punishment in the future, namely the punishment of loss and the punishment of sense; but the punishment of loss, which consists in the lack of the vision of God, not only regards the will, but rather much more regards the reason; and the punishment of sense, which consists in the burning of fire, much more regards the sensible part and the composite, than it regards the rational will, since to feel is a passion of the composite: therefore it seems that punishment more principally regards the other powers of the soul than the will.

3. Likewise, if punishment regards the will, this is either because it is according to the will, or because it is against the will. If because it is according to the will: then no one would be punished except one who willed it; which is plainly false. If because it is against the will: then since a just man voluntarily endures all punishments, and most of all Christ, no penal passion would belong to any just man, nor even to Christ, which is manifestly false.

4. Likewise, if punishment were to regard the will as its proper subject: then just as no one can sin except one who has the use of the will, so no one could be punished except one who had the use of the will; but this is plainly false — for little children are punished for the sins of their parents — and they also suffer many torments, not only in habit, but also in act — therefore etc.

### Conclusion.

> Punishment, as it is retribution, and also as it is a passion that wounds, afflicts, and displeases, directly regards the will itself; insofar only as it wounds and afflicts can it regard also the other powers.

**I respond:** It must be said that punishment by reason of punishment names two things, namely a harm to nature and an instrument of divine justice: the one as material, the other as formal. Hence punishment is both retribution and also a passion. When therefore punishment is compared to something, this can be either insofar as it is retribution, or insofar as it is a passion. — If insofar as it is retribution, then it is properly to be compared to the will itself. For God does not avenge himself upon the hand, or the foot, or any sensitive power, but upon the deliberative will, of which God takes vengeance not only by afflicting it in itself, but also by afflicting it in the other members of the body, in which it desired to be delighted.

But if punishment be compared to something insofar as it is a passion, then it must be said that, since not every passion is a punishment according to the complete character of punishment, but a passion that wounds, a passion that afflicts, a passion that displeases; so still punishment, according as it fully holds the character of punishment, namely the punishment which makes a man truly miserable, still regards the will by reason of what completes it. For no one is fully miserable, as Augustine says, from the fact that he merely suffers, but from the fact that he suffers and knows himself to suffer and does not will to suffer. — But according as the passion holds a half-full character of punishment, as it is called a passion that wounds or afflicts in that in which it is not by nature meant to be, so far as belongs to the first condition of nature; so it regards not only the will, but also all the powers of the soul and all the members of the body; yet it does not regard them apart from the will, because in nothing can there be punishment except in that in which there is a rational will. Hence the brutes, although they suffer, are nevertheless not punished.

Thus therefore it is clear that punishment, both insofar as it is retribution, and insofar as it is a passion fully holding the character of punishment, directly regards the will itself, so that it is proper to the will itself to be punished. Hence the arguments which show this are to be conceded. Insofar, however, as it is a passion that wounds or afflicts, it does regard the other powers and also the organs of the body. And according to this the response to the arguments which are brought for the opposite is clear.

1. 2. For to that which is objected concerning ignorance and concerning the punishment of loss and of sense, the response is clear. For although ignorance signifies a privation of some good which regards the cognitive power, and likewise the punishment of loss, and likewise the punishment of sense a privation of the delight and rest of the sensitive part; yet God orders all this toward avenging and taking vengeance upon the will. For it is the will that directly opposes divine justice, while it perpetrates injustice; and therefore the order of avenging divine justice directly regards the removal of that disorder. It also was the will alone that set itself up as its own principle and despised God by forsaking him, when it sinned; and therefore it ought through the multitude of punishments to be reduced into the servitude of God, so that, having dishonored God by despising him voluntarily, it may honor him involuntarily by suffering punishments.

3. 4. To that which is objected, that in just men and in Christ there was no involuntary punishment; it must be said that there punishment does not hold the character of retribution, except as related to the sinning will of Adam, with respect to which will every punishment is involuntary, because the sinning will seeks gratification, and in seeking gratification flees passion. — To that which is objected concerning the little child who suffers punishments; one can respond as to this.